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THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY IN HENRI BERGSON* S PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The problem of this dissertation is to discover (l)
whether "identity" has a meaning in Henri Bergson's pniloso-
phy; (2) whetner, i f it has a meaning, the meaning reiers to
logical subsistents or to existents or to botb; and (3) if
there is place for identity in Bergson- s philosophy, in what
the identity consists.
The order in which we enumerate the three aspects of the
problem is indifferent. The whole problem of the possible
place of identity in Bergson’s tnought must be neld in mind
throughout each part of our inquiry.
B. THREE KINDS OF IDENTITY
Following Eisler,-*- let us distinguish three kinds of
identity
:
1. WPB, II, s_. v. " Identi tat . " See Baldwin, DPP, I, £>. v.
"Identity" - "apprehensive and individual," "apprehensive and
material," "in metaphysics," "logical," and II, s.. v. "Person-
al Identity"; Franck, DSP, s_. v. "Identite." Symbols in foot-
notes are explained in the Bibliography, infra
, 217.
..
Identit&t (identitas, tauto t*]<>) : Bieselbig-
keit, Einerleihei t . I. ist 1. phdnomenologisch
und logisch: Einheit der Bedeutung, des Gedach-
ten, "Gemeiriten" gegenllber der Mannigialtigkei
t
der Benk- und Vor stellungsakte
,
die sich auf
denselben (realen Oder idealen) Gegenstand be-
ziehen; 2. psychologisch : das sich Gleich-Blei-
ben des Bewusstseins als einhei tliches Ganzes
in seiner Stetigkeit; auf Grundlage der Erinner-
ung ergibt sich ein I . s-Bewusstsein ; 3. real:
das sich selbst Gleichbleiben eines Binges Oder
Wesens im Wechsel seiner Zust&nde und im Ver-
laufe seiner Entwicklung Identisch ist, was sich
in keiner Hinsicht von einem andern unterschei-
det, Oder wenigstens nicht in einer "relevanten"
Hinsicht. Absolute I. hat nur das Gedachte als
solches (der Begr ifi sgehalt ) und das Eormale,
Gesetzliche des reinen ( " transzendentalen" ) Be-
wusstseins (bzw. die reine "Ichheit", das lo-
gische Subjektj. Zwei Bingen kflnnen einander
mehr Oder weniger gleich sein, aber nie in eines
zusaminenfallen
,
daher nicht (absolut, eigent-
lich) identisch (d. h.
,
"dieselben Binge")
sein, auch wenn sie identische Wesensmerkmale
aufweisen. Identische Begriffe sind Begriffe
von gleichen Inhalt und Umfang (abc*abc;
Logical identity is identity of concepts. With the con-
cept Socrates introduced logical identity into philosophical
thought. The concept is "a general meaning or idea,"
2
in dis-
tinction from a perception, which "is the result of the mind’s
direct mode of apprehending real things as distinct individu-
als. Hence a percept always refers to ’this' or ’that,* some
distinct individual thing having its own place in space or in
time."*5 A concept "does not refer directly to some one object
of sense. It is not an individual embodiment of a particular
thing, but is a thought-construction, carrying with it the
2. Creighton, IL, 55.
3. Creighton, IL, 54-55.
_•
,
’
-
•
: i
'
.
- ' .
,
'
-
-
• -
i 1 - .
: ..
_•
. .
...
-
• - i - • - •
_
.. .
.
... . . . .
• j
-
.
; j j J . . ,
.
-
• • • •
;
• -
L ...
— y. - > - «
,
•
.
'
: ....
.
. .
.
- •
-
-
.
... ..
'
.
- . - .0 -
' 3 - - J
.
. .
... - . . J .
- J:. K ... 3 V-. J *' -
_ .
_
f '.£ w - 0 1 . . e-Jil :: •
.
-
idea of a general nature or meaning that may apply to a number
of individuals
.
Bowne distinguishes between a color sensation and a sensa-
tion of color.
5
"The former is the color impression as occur-
ring; the latter is the color impression as the bearer of an
abiding and recognizable meaning. The former is a flowing af-
lection of the sensioility; the latter is a timeless idea of
the intellect." 5 The concept is "the bearer of an abiding and
recognizable meaning"; it is "a timeless iaea of the intel-
lect."
To question whether identity of concepts is possible is to
question v/hether the word "chair" or the word "walk" or the
word "red" or the word "ahoy" or the word "invisibility" or the
word "admiration" or the word "ratiocination" means the same
thing to a mind on Jkonday that it meant on Sunday, trie same
thing in December that it meant in hay; the same thing in old
age that it meant in youth. The question asks even more than
that. It asks v/hether, if the meaning of the word is different
at one time or another, the difference is recognized as change
in the meaning of tne word or change in the psychological his-
tory of the questioner. ihe concept "atomicity" may seem to be
affected by time if the questioner has spent the time studying
chemistry. But he himself recognizes that the change has been
in his own mental development. He would not say that the
4. Creighton, IL, 55.
5. Bowne, 'lTK, 39-40.
6. Bowne, TTK, 40.
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4meaning of "atomicity" nas cnanged or that the meaning of the
concept with which he started has cnanged, but that he has
adopted a new concept of atomicity. Tne universal character of
the concept is in just this its independence of the particular
mind, and herein also lies its uniqueness as a logical unit in
distinction from a mere element in a psychological process.
To answer that a concept can "bear an abiding and recog-
nizable meaning," that it is a "timeless idea of the intellect, 1
that is, an idea unaffected by time, even though we may change
our names for the changeless ideas, is to affirm identity of
concepts
.
The last sentence of Eisler's paragraph applies, it would
seem, to logical identity.
Psychological identity is identity of consciousness. It
is experienced self-identity. If I recognize that I am the
same I that I was in the past, I proclaim my psychological
identity. Eisler bases psychological identity on Erinnerung.
Philosophers in whose thought purpose plays a large part, such
as Royce, Hocking, and Brightman, add purpose as a necessary
adjunct to the experience of self-identity. Projection of the
momentary self into both the past and future, they say, is the
basis of the sense of selfhood, that is, of psychological
identity .
^
This psychological identity must be consistent with a de-
7. See, e. g. , Brightman, IP, 192, and Stern’s definition
quoted in Knudson, PP, 27.
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velopment or change in the Ich which Eisler's definition of
psychological identity only implies in Erinnerun^ . St. Paul
could recognize his psychological identity with the Saul of
Tarsus who consented to tne stoning of Stephen, yet as the am-
oassador of Christ he was not at all the Jewish zealot wno per-
secuted the followers of Jesus. That is, psycnological iden-
tity is consistent with ethical change.
Here we touch on one of the serious practical problems in
life. Should M. Madeleine be arrested and punished for Jean
Valjean’s escape from the galleys? If so, are the arrest and
punishment justified on grounds of the identity of Monsieur le
Maire and Jean Valjean? Monseigneur the bishop has entered the
picture. The mayor of Montreuil is another man from the galley
slave. Or, is Javert right in thinking him tne same man? We
may say that we are faced with still another identity - legal
identity. What is self-identity in the eyes of the law? The
only answer would seem to be that the mind which remembers _I
did the deed asserts its sell -identity , or that the presentation
to the court of the body which served as an instrument of the
deed proves the legal identity of the man present and the of-
fender. 9 But it is hard to lay hands on the identity even of
the animal organism which is the body, considering the chemical
and electrical changes it is undergoing from moment to moment.
When Harry K. Thaw's lawyer introduced for the first time
8. This is all aside from the question as to what consti-
tutes the justification or purpose of punishment at all.
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the plea of temporary insanity, he was dealing with the prob-
lem of psychological identity in its ethical and legal forms.
And in this phase the problem of identity is a comusing but
momentous one in our present social life. It involves the
whole question of moral and social responsibility.
A further difficulty in defining or recognizing psycho-
logical identity arises from tne warring impulses witnin any
single human person. The word "person" connotes in itself
identity to some thinkers. Others disagree on the definition
oi the term and aoandon its use on the ground of its vagueness.
The person is tne natural datum of psychology for Stern, who
founded differential psychology or the psychology of individual
differences and after twenty years developed that psychology
into one frankly named Personalistic Psychology. Person in
this psychology is psycno-biological
.
9 In sell -psychology
,
self or psychological identity is identity of personality, and
identity of personality is based on the time-transcending prin-
ciple of consciousness. In general the stress in the self-
psychology of Miss Calkins, Professor Hocking, Professor Bright--
I
man, and others is less on the biological and more on the con-
scious than in the personalistic psychology of Stern. McDou-
gall*s definition is adjustive: personality is one's way of
adapting oneself to life. 'The adapting is more biological than
social.
9. See further Knudson, PP, 25-30.
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The difficulty lies in the definition of the term "per-
son." 10 The word has had a varied history. 11 As early as
Cicero there were two divergent interpretations of the word.
It was either the part played (an assumed outer appearance, a
meaning carried on now by Jung), or it was the player himself
(the meaning coming down from Boethius 1 definition of person as
an individual substance of a rational nature, through the
rationalist psychologists, and on to contemporary per sonalists
,
with consciousness substituted for substance). This disserta-
tion is written from tne standpoint of acceptance of such a
personalistic position as is typified by the section on the self
in Brightman's Introduction to Philosophy , 1^ out it must be re-
membered that the view neld here of the self and of personality
is not universally accepted by psychologists and philosophers.
TITitnin a consciousness there are warring impulses, and it
is possible to ask whetner the uncertainty attending the con-
flict and tne cnanges in the conflict permit one to speak of a
psycnological identity in terms of personality. Extreme con-
I
’
ilicts lead us into tne field of abnormal psycnology, and here
10. The material in this and the preceding paragraph is for
the most part a very mucn condensed form of a lecture by G. W.
Allport in a class in Psycnology of Personality in Harvard Sum-
mer Scnool, 1933. See also Knudson, PP, 80 -q 3; Brigntman, IP,
139-201; and the paper by Eari marlatt, entitled ~Jhat Is a Per -
son" published by the Boston University Scnool of Keligious Edu-
l cation in 1925.
11. One tneory is tnat the word comes from persona
,
meaning
a mask. Another theory is tnat tne word is from per sonar
e
,
to
sound through, because a reed was used in the actor’s mask for
enlarging his voice. Both theories link the word with the
stage
.
12 Brightman, IP, 189-201.
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are found the final complexities in the problem of psychologi-
cal identity. In a so-called "dual personality" are there two
self-identities? If we go so far as to recognize two psycho-
logical identities allied with one physiological organism,
what is to determine the fine line between the two and then
between either of the two and a third or a fourth? Once begin
recognizing a dual personality and one has set up a precedent
for divisions for which each judge must be his own authority. 13
The principal question which arises in connection with
real or metaphysical identity, is whether such identity re-
quires or permits changeless being. The urge toward metaphysi-
cal identity is in a sense the urge toward the synthesis of
logical identity and psychological identity. lie want to feel
that there is something in the universe as timelessly permanent
as the concept and as truly real to us as our own vivid con-
sciousness. Thought vacillates between regarding tne concept
or logical unit as ultimate reality and regarding change as
-
typified by the stream of consciousness as the only real. One
/
of Emile Meyerson s main theses is that the postulate of iden-
tity in time is a characteristic of the psychological structure
of the human being, "an integral part of our reason. 1 ' 14
with the concept we rest secure, but find ourselves out of
13. The substance of tnis paragraph was brought to my at-
tention by Professor Prancis L. Strickland of Boston University
School of Theology.
14. keyerson, Ik, 95. In commenting on the "psychological
ract" of which E. DuBois-xteymond speaks in connection with a
discussion of atomic theories, Meyerson says, "The explanatory
force of the theories resides essentially in the application of
the postulate of identity in time',' (Ik, 94).
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9touch with the moving vital universe; with the flow of con-
sciousness we move with a sense oi reality, but lear we have
nothing permanent to grasp or think about. The soul substance
of scholasticism, transcendent in respect to consciousness,
satisfies our longing for permanence but does not fully satisfy
our longing to keep the permanence witnin our real experience.
Rejecting soul substance, we are in danger of losing the per-
/
sistence of the individual consciousness.
If we reject all theories of static substance, we are con-
fronted with the question as to whether what we mean by meta-
*
physical or real identity can be expressed or experienced as
logical identity or as psychological identity.
As Eisler points out, absolute Identitat , whicn one sup-
poses is the final real Identit&t , cannot be affirmed of two
separate things or beings. Absolute Identit&t can be affirmed
only of a concept, or of a thing or being in the sense that ex-
pression is given to the "so-ness" of the fact that there is
real or metaphysical identity in the universe (if such, indeed,
there be )
.
C. THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION MARKED OUT
Keeping Eisler's three types of identity in mind, we shall
in a first chapter trace briefly the history of the problem of
identity and show in connection with the survey the outstanding
i
difierences between the views of the traditional Aristotelians
and the non-Aristotelians who nave been opposing the tradition-
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alists in recent years. In the following chapter we shall at-
tempt to relate the problem of identity to Bergson's total
thought: first, in relation to his motivating interests;
second, in relation to some of tne key words of his philosophy
and their definitions; third, in relation to his views about
attention and intention. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters
will treat respectively the problem of identity of concepts,
the problem of identity of objects in nature, and the problem
of identity of conscious beings. A final chapter relates the
different types of identity as they appear in Bergson's system
of thought.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHl
A. GitEEK PHILOSOPHY BEFORE ARISTOTLE
The problem of identity Began in Greek thought as the
problem of substance. It is the union of the problem of sub-
1 The Ionians stance and the problem of change
which issues in the problem of identity. Both Thales and
Anaximander had assumed that the power to change its form was
in the substance which remained identical with itseli . When
Anaximenes chose for his primal substance a substance charac-
terized by a property (condensation and rarefaction) which can
be pointed to as the reason why instances or changing api^ear-
ances of the original ever occur, he almost stated the necessity
of accounting for change as well as for permanence, and so al-
most stated the problem of identity.
The thougiit of the Ionians, insofar as it touched the prob-
lem of identity at all, touched it almost solely in its aspect
as the problem of the identity of objects in nature. The human
soul itself was an object in nature. In their theory there can
be no permanent identity of an individual object or being.
Permanence belongs only to the primal mass.
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7/hen the problem of cnange was recognized as the comple-
ment of the problem of substance,
1
the major problem became the
2 Heraclitus and the problem 01 the One and the
JiCl68.tics
a The Issue between Many, of Being ana Becom-
the Two Systems
ing, of nest and Motion.
Two schools of thought arose. One was based on the tnesis that
reality is being whicn is one and indivisible, uncnanging and
unchangeable, ana never in motion, and that change botn as mo-
tion a.nd as becoming is illusion. The other was oased on tne
o
thesis that reality is being wnich is one and divisible, con-
tinuously changing, always by necessity in motion.
Both schools were rationalistic. Parmenides and Heraclitus
alike and equally distrusted sense-percep tion , and tried to cor-
rect it through reason. But they interpreted the data oi sense-
!
perception differently, and they interpreted the conclusions of
rational thought differently.
The issue is not the reality of tne one versus the reality
of the many, the reality of reason versus tne reality of sense-
perception; the issue is static being versus active being, un-
changeable one versus ever cnanging one. And here is the prob-
lem of identity. Is identity reconcilable with multiplicity and
1. See Aristotle, jketa
. , A, iii, 984a, 17-23.
2. Philo, in giving his views ^on the identity of opposites,
Cased on Gen . xv . 10
,
wr i tes : . . . . t' v yap To if ap-d oi y Tu>y tya-yrcwy
T n ' / \ > / >/£,>// '/c/ , fp. , >OU J/xyflLyToj y]/u)pc^(V TO- IV&yTta-- o( u Too T LTTLV^ o (tacriy EAA-yytf
Toy julL'J&v Koh cuOiU/Uoy jra-^o &oroi$ //’pcc J<\ei Toy lip<j)a\a-^oy j-yr a^oToO
TTpoT j -ri era. pc £ v o V <fti\ otro f>La.j (ZOXtly U)( if tu^Ccrpt Ka.oy*j\ (^hilo,
7TE.PI Too T\Z OTTIU GEIUhl Em N KAHPdNoMoE l(A I 7TEP I THE^TA \ 2lA
AM I ENANTIA t~om HZ.
,
xliii).
.
,
-V
-if )0-w >... - xO . -
.
.
.
... ,
-
j- “ J ' ^ : ‘" J ;J '* ° D* 1 ^
-
-
.
variety? Is identity in and through difference possible? The
Eleatics said, No. Heraclitus said, Yes . The identity in
question was as yet only physical identity. Logical identity
got its start in the Eleatic dialectic invented in the interest
of physical identity.
Heraclitus believed that sense-perception reports at any
one moment apparently stable, separate objects. And sense-
perception is a matter ol the moment. It is only by reasoning
that we connect the oak tree witn the acorn. Sense-perception
gives an apparently stable, apparently separate object - an
acorn. Sense-perception gives an apparently stable, apparently
separate object - an oak tree. The acorn appears permanent.
We place it on a shelf and for a long time it seems to be the
same acorn. The oak appears permanent. Year after year we
play and work and rest under "the same" oak tree. Hut these
sense-i orms
,
these appearances of permanence, says Heraclitus,
are illusion. Turn to reason, the only true teacher, and
learn tne hidden truth that there is notning permanent in the
world around us except tne law governing change.
Parmenides believed that sense-perception reveals to us a
world of plurality and change, an illusion of things which be-
come and pass away. Plant the acorn and it seems to change
into an oak tree. We seem to see an oak tree sprout, and grow.
.Ve seem to see it put forth green leaves. We seem to see green
leaves change to red and brown and fall and decay. The oak
seems to decay finally, or it seems to be destroyed when we
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chop down the tree and burn its parts on oar hearth. Jut tnese
appearances of cnange
,
says Parmenides, are illusion. Turn to
reason, the only true teacher, and learn tne hidden truth that
nothing changes in t^e world around us.
External motion is an illusion ior botn men. It is an il-
lusion for Heraclitus because his reason declares it impossible
for there to be an object to move. for Parmenides reason de-
clares the motion to be impossible and the object also, since
being v/ould have to move in order to become differentiated into
•z
objects.
Heraclitus said that the great error resulting from trust
in sense-perception is belief in immobility. Parmenides said
that the great error resulting from trust in sense-perception
is belief in motion, change, or oecoming.
In more modern terms, we might say that for both Heracli-
tus and Parmenides sense-perception reports a diversity which
is illusion. But the illusion which strikes Heraclitus partic-
ularly is the diversity among individuals (discrete existences,
a spatial fact), and the illusion which strikes Parmenides is
the diversity within individuals (becoming, a temporal fact).
The diversity within individuals Heraclitus declares to be
real. The illusion of the senses is that they do not reveal
clearly enough this temporal diversity, which is reality itself.
3. At this period, of course, change was a new problem. In-
ternal motion as change oi structure had not been distinguished
from external motion as change of position.
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b Heraclitus
(l) The Central Point of
his System
For Heraclitus the real is an unperceived unity endowed
with an unperceived principle of change. For tne Sleatics the
real is an unperceived unity and - no more. Parmenides re-
jected the world 01 sense in favox of an abstract, Dut not
clearly non-material changeless being. Heraclitus rejected
the world of sense in favor of a continuously cnanging pnysical,
principle, governed by a rational necessity. The issue, tnen,
is unity which changes versus unity which does not change.
Heraclitus was the first to recognize "the transitoriness
of the individual and tne permanence of the law whicn governs
individual changes."'*
He was the first man
to see that the One and the llany could be reconciled, as Plato
pointed out. After mentioning the pluralism of some thinkers
(evidently Pherecydes ana the early Ionians) and the extreme
> / i 1 \ '
monism of the £\ta.ru<oV i&yo^
,
Plato wrote, hxfej (Heraclitus
' \
/
and his disciples) fc £ l Kl\cll nrL( (Empedocles and his
disciples) u6-ji^oy Mov^cu L vo-rj cav ofi (fu/A-Uht-tiSiV
TdTOV O'J'C/dcl l(cii Ujj 7 o 0 ]/ 7To\\cl TL Kch £y € <T ~j~i y
)
t
' V , / / p.k Ha. l <ruy 1/ 1 tcll?
The identity at issue between Heraclitus and the Sleatics,
as has been pointed out, 6 is purely physical, not logical.
Logic did not
yet exist. The
(2) The Identity in Difference
Physical, not Logical
Turner
,
HP. 57.
5. Plato, Sophist, 242 DE.
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logical principle of identity had not yet been formulated.
Heraclitus' identity in difference was simply the identity of
the primary substance in all its multiple and varied manifesta-
tions. A number of passages from Aristotle show that Heracli-
tus did not leave the physical realm with his principle of iden
tuy .
7
The eternal common ground in the system of Heraclitus is
not water, a.irnpo)'
,
or air, but strife. This common ground is
(3) o } ojoj typified by lire, and scholars are
pretty generally agreed tnat Heraclitus meant physical fire. d
But he did not mean mere physical lire. He meant fire endowed
r
\
'
’ \
'
with a rational principle of necessity - o hojoj . o is
the law governing the continuous change. o Aoyoj is tne only
thing that persists or remains the same. It is the reason in
things. "Whether he conceived it as conscious intelligence,"
says Thilly, 9 "we cannot say with absolute certainty, but it is
fair to presume that he did."
By the ancients it Co '\ofo^ of Heraclitus]
was understood to mean reason - cosmic reason -
universally diffused, present both in nature and
in man, not of course one incorporeal entity,
7. See Aristotle, Meta
. ,
A, iii, 983b, 7-12; 984a, 6-9; iv,
985a, 11-14.
In Meta.,p
,
iii, 1005b, 22-26, it is clear that Aris-
totle aid not understand Heraclitus to be speaking of identity
and contradiction in a logical sense, even though in the light
of Aristotle's own logic tne earlier philosopher might be so un-
derstood to speak. Cf. Meta
. ,
K, v, 1062a, 32-36.
8. Burnet objects to referring to Heraclitus' principle as
a.n Absolute with Lassalle because Heraclitus meant real physical
fire ^ Burnet
,
EGP
,
169).
9. Thilly
,
HP, 25.
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but identical / with the, everliving, ever thinking
i ipe - TTUp jpov i/A.oy - which constitutes
the changeless because ever-changing reality of
things; and this Kot.v'oj \ojo$ or universal rea-
son was held to be synonymous with God. In other
words, if the ancients are to be trusted, the
HeraClitean concept of Logos does not really dif-
fer from the Stoic, except that on its material
side, Logos is in Heraclitus fire, whereas, ac-
cording to the strictest Stoic definition, it is
aether. The ancient interpretation has been fol-
lowed by many exponents ol Heracli teanism in
modern times, such as Bernays, Patin, Teichmtiller
,
and, with certain reservations, Zeller; but others
have taken a different view. Thus, for example,
Heinze denies that the attribute oi intelligence
or thought belongs to the Heracli tean Logos; it
is merely what he calls 'objective reason,’ or
law, the universal reason manifested in the devel-
opment of the world, a principle destitute of any-
thing analogous to consciousness or personality:
and Professor Burnet goes so lar as to maintain,
ii I understand him rightly, tnat the Logos -doc-
trine is entirely Stoic, tne word Logos, in tne
relevant passages of neraclitus, meaning only
'argument" or "discourse." 10
It is difficult, tnerefore, to decide tne exact nature of
the Logos. Whatever it is, it bears in itself the only ground
for identity in the system of Heraclitus, reading "identity"
for "unity and permanence" in tne following quotation, we see
the difficulty of defining identity in Heracli tean thought.
Can the lact 01 law furnish all the unity and
permanence that we require? Will not the con-
ception of law, in connection with the material
world, only raise new questions? What ijs a law,
over and above the multitude of particular facts
and changes, each distinct and unrelated? If it
is only an ideal fact in our minds, it h,~s no re-
lation to the material world without; and if it is
a material fact, does it not furnish simply another
element to be brought into unity, and not a unify-
ing bond at all?11
10. Adam, VP, 77-78.
11. Rogers, SHP, 21.
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It is p.erfecily clear that there is one great identity-
according to the Eleatics. Everything is everything else,
c The Eleatics and this in a sense different
from the pantheism or absolutism of Heraclitus. In the opin-
ion of Heraclitus the cnanging sense-forms are manifestations
of fire. In the opinion of the Eleatics sense-forms are not
manifestations of any primal being; they are illusions. Keal-
ity is undifferentiated sameness. Change is inconceivable and
therefore untrue. What is contrary to thought cannot be real.
(And thought was not for many centuries to come to be defined
as creative activity .
)
Heraclitus took a step toward answering how tne universal
fire changes into other forms: the change is brought about by
a principle of change with which the fire is endowed. But the
Eleatics asked not only How? but Why? Why asks for what we
now call logical sequence. The Eleatics could find no answer
to the Why
,
and so they denied the fact. They were so sure
that reality is a matter for reason that they contended that
when the why of a fact cannot oe given, there is no lact.
But the Eleatics, of course, admitted that the senses do
reveal a world of plurality and diversity and motion and
change. lhey do not even explain how we can perceive such a
world, which has no place in reality, let alone explaining why
we perceive it. It v;as lor this reason that Plato and Aris-
totle called the Eleatics "the interrupters of the course of
the world" ( ot ToU o\ou a triuiTca) and the "unnatural scien-
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tists" {Jijucri Koi In their eagerness oo deny tne being of
not-oeing tne Eleatics almost succeeded in denying the being
of being.
So tne one great identity of the Eleatics is just the
xemaining-tue-same-ness of the real world. \7e seem to have
less meaning for identity here than we had with tne lonians
or witn Heraclitus. But in tne bare identity of being
taught oy the Eleatics (being still naving a physical, not a
logical connotation, let it oe remembered) plus the dialec-
tic method developed by Zeno in deiense of the bare identity,
there is the germ of the identity ot concepts, for there is
thought about something that cannot be seen or touched and
that can yet remain the same.
Heraclitus said, There is no changeless being; perma-
nence is an illusion; reality is ceaseless change. The only
3 The Mediating Schools of exception to uni-
Thought
a Their Relation to the versal change is
Thought of Heraclitus and
the Eleatics the permanence of
the law according to which change takes place. This law or
Logos, is a sort of rational necessity. It is in no sense a
substance. The Eleatics said, There is no change in the un-
derlying unity; there is no real change; change is illusion;
change is inconceivable; reality is one solid, eternally un-
derived, unchangeable being; the world of sense is illusion;
12. Plato, Theaetetus
.
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being and thought are one; what is contrary to thought cannot
be real. The mediators between these two positions said,
There are discrete elements or particles, eacn as permanent
as Eleatic being but each able to change its position or its
relation to the others; reason can interpret perceived diver-
sities in terms of conceived identities.
/ ^ / c c ' ‘ ' •> V
The TitTcra-pa. TcuV T\CDiju>y u^/^ara
f
o/ntfai fl-fycu of Empedo-
/ / .
cles and the crm^^afcL or XpijAara. of Anaxagoras (called since
b The "Elements” Plato’s time elements ( cttoi -
^Ua.)) each had its own quality. An identity of an element
has meaning, hut the numberless or aUa-L/iif cl , "un-
cuttaoles," " indivisioles , " of Leucippus and Democritus were
all alike in quality, wnicn is the same as having no quality.
They were conceived to be unlimited, 13 and to differ in shape,
order, and position, 14 and in magnitude15 and weight. 10 Iden-
tity of quality, or persistence of quality, is impossiole in
the atomistic system. There is permanence only of quantity.
One feels somewhat cheated when presented with the assurance
that a given quantity of indistinguishableness remains perma-
nent or maintains its identity.
The Eous of Anaxagoras was too vaguely lormulated and too
slightly connected with the total system of Anaxagoras ' though
13. Aristotle, Phys .
,
III, 4, 203a.
14. Aristotle, meta.
,
A, iv, 965b, 15; cf. De Gen. et Cor.
I, 8, 325b, 17-18.
15. Aristotle, Phys
. ,
III, 4, 203b.
16. Aristotle, De Gen, et Cor
. ,
I, 8, 326a, 9-10.
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c The Nous of Anaxagoras to permit one to state:
whether Nous preserves self-identity or not. Plato and Aris-
totle both complained of Anaxagoras' unclear statements about
Nous and its function. 17 But however unclear Anaxagoras may
have been in nis notion of the function of Nous, ne was the
first man definitely to distinguish mind f± om objects in na-
#
ture. (The Logos of Heraclitus, whatever its nature otnerwise
may have been, was in some way identified with a physical prin-
ciple.) ihis separation of mind from the physical universe
introduced the possibility of teleology into metaphysical
speculations (as is shown in the Phaedo 97-99 and in Aristotle'
Metaphysics, A, iii, 984b-985a, and A, vii, 98ba-988b. ) ; that
is, opened the way to the problem 01 mechanism versus purpose,
or explanation of the whole in terms of the parts versus ex-
planation of the parts in terms of the whole, and so prepared
for the questions: Gan any part have an identity apart from its
relation to the whole? Can identity inhere in purely physical
objects, or does the identity of a physical object consist only
in the meaning conferred on it by mind?
The Pythagoreans, not so easy to name or date as the
others, rejected the concept of any substantial nature of
4 The Pythagoreans things. The ultimate ground
of all appearance, they said, is nothing substantial; it is re-
17. Plato, Phaedo. 97B-^8C (cf., however, Phaedrus
, 270A)
:
Aristotle, Meta., A, ni, 984o, 15-19; A, iv, 985a, lc-22.
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lation, harmony, order, expressed by numbers. 18 The relation
of things to numbers in the Pythagorean system is not clear,
lJ
so the only definite identity is the permanent meaning of a
number or ratio.
Not until Socrates do we reach the identity of the con-
cept, the unit of abstract thinking, tnough tnere is a faint
5 Socrates and Plato foreshadowing of the
a The Socratic Concept
concept in the number
of the Py tnagoreans
,
the being of the Eleatics, and the atom
of Democritus.
The conflict between Heraclitus and tne Eleatics gave
rise to the problem of knowledge. The first answer to the
problem was given by the Sophists, and their answer tnrew the
proolem of identity overboard. If notning maintains a perma-
nent meaning, it is foolish to mention identity.
With Socrates came a change in direction of the proolern of
knowledge. It is to Socrates that we owe the concept. And
from his day till the days of evolutionary pnilosopnies the
problem of identity is most closely affiliated to tne concept.
Logical identity becomes the model or ideal for all identity.
During this period all discussions of identity are in terms of
conceptual logic, or formal logic, as opposed to tne develop-
mental logic of Hegel and its successors - experimental logic
and other systems of abstract reasoning in non-static terms.
18. See Aristotle, beta., A. viii, 989-990.
19. See Erdmann, HP~ T7 31.
20. Aristotle, Meta
. ,
M, iv, 1078b, 27-30; cf. 1078b, 17-19.
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The concepts of Socrates were ethical notions. 21 And as
ethical notions they were primarily epistemological units.
b Plato Plato is commonly said to nave univer-
salized and hypos tatized the concepts of Socrates (though Bur-
net has written, "nealism is prior to conceptualism, and I
doubt very much whether any one ever ' hypos tatised con-
cepts.’" 22 ). At any rate, Plato did extend the Socratic ethi*>
cal concept to the concept applicable to any sort of being,
and he did transform the epistemological unit into a metaphysi-*
cal notion.
Starting (1) from the Socratic concept as a possibility
of a kind of identity made necessary by Heraclitus 1 shewing
that sensible objects are in flux23 and made plausible perhaps
by the Pythagorean universal in the field of mathematics, and
(2) from the Pythagorean txieory of the Limited and Unlimited,
Plato solved the problem of Being and Becoming, of Identity and
Change, by the theory of Ideas. The idea, in Plato *s early
thought, is the only true reality. Ideas are changeless Being
(Identity), of which changing appearances (Becoming) partake,
or in which they participate, or of which they are copies. 24
Only objects of thought can be said to be; objects of sense are
only becoming . Objects of thought bear the self-identity of
Eleatic being; objects of sense are in the Beiaclitean flux.
2iT Aristotle
,
Meta
. , M, iv, 1078b, 17-19.
22. Burnet, GP, 317.
23. Aristotle, Meta
. ,
M, iv, 1078b, 12-18.
24. Plato, Phaear us
, 249-250, for example.
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Plato had had Heraclitean training ana he was influenced
oy that training to view all sensioie tnings as ceaseless
cnange. Then he listened to Socrates and was influenced to ac-
cept the validity oi tne concept ana the Socratic definition,
it was clear tnat tne Socratic definition could not apply to
the Heraclitean tnings in flux. Plato adopted tne Pytnagorean
number as Limit and called it Form. rne Form was limit in
terms of Socratic definition or concept; tne tnings in flux
were distinct from the Forms but they were copies of tne Forms
or participated in the Forms. Here arose tne difficulty of
explaining the connection between the particular and the gen -
eral
,
or between the moving events of experience and the defini
cions of abstract thought. The difficulty in linking tne uni-
versals of thought with the particulars of experience arose for
Plato as for his predecessors (notaoly for Anaximander, one
.aleatics, and tne Atomists). Plato himself became conscious of
the difficulty of accounting lor tne link oe tween the physical
object or the biological organism ana tne Idea or Form.^S
There is the difficulty of aetermining wnetner tnere is any
such thing as identity outside the abiding meanings embodied
in tne Ideas. Identity is itself a concept. If the Idea of
neauty and the Idea of u-oodness are transcendent in relation
to the beautiful thing ana the good soul, and if the notion
25. Parmenides ; Philebus , 14C-18E; 25C-27D. See also
Burnet, GP, 256-257.
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of Identity is another Idea, separate and distinguishable from
the Ideas of Beauty and Gooaness ana from the beautiful thing
and the good soul, it is difiicult to see how identity can be
affirmed ol' the oeautiful object or of the good soul.
In his later tnought^ 6 Plato includes with the Limit and
the Unlimited of the Pythagoreans, the Mixture .
^
An opening
is made for an identity of beings which nave become v/hat tney
are. In the Phaedrus
,
245C-246A, Plato introduces the idea of
the active nature of the soul, which suggests identity in
psychological change. And when in t^e Laws he sets forth his
dogma of the soul he allows for a sort of identity in tne
changes of soul which arise from tne soul itself.
^
B. ARISTOTLE
Aristotle built the Platonic concept (tne Socratic ethi-
cal norm and epistemological unit universalized) into syllo-
1 Logical Identity gisms and so became the
a lhe Basic Principle
of Aristotelian Logic founaer of formal logic.
This logic rests on tne principle oi iaentity. It is a logic
of classes. To classify is to recognize and group distin-
guishable entities whicn preserve identity in time. The prin-
ciple of contradiction and the principle 01 tne excluaded mid-
dle rest on the principle of persistent and separable iden-
26. See Timaeus
,
35 AB; cf. Sophist
,
244-245.
27. See Burnet, UP, 331-332.
28. Lav/s
,
966 BE. His second dogma, carried to its com-
pletion, introduces the theory of teleology, significant lor
the problem of identity (Laws, 966 E - 967 E)
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tities. A must be distinguishable as A and must be unalterably
A if it is eternally true that A is not B and is nothing inter*
pQ
mediate between A and B, is noi part A and part B.
The universal is the unit in Aristotelian logic. Now,
whereas Plato had derived the individual from the universal,
b The Status of the Universal Aristotle de-
rived the universal from the individual. The universal, Aris-
totle taught, is not apart from individual things. And yet
the universal as such exists not in tne individual tning but
in the mind alone. 30
It was chieily in regard to the doctrine of tne transcen-
dence oi tne Forms in relation to the things that Aristotle
2 Metaphysical Identity disagreed with his
a The Kelation of Aris-
totle's Theory of Forms to teacher. He rejected
the Problem of Identity
the universalism of
Plato, 31 or rather snowed that tnere must be a multiplication
of Plato's Ideas until there would be a universal for every
particular. That is, it is against Plato's tneory of a sepa -
rate world of Ideas or Forms that Aristotle's criticism is
29. See, e. g. , Prior Analytics , I, xlvi ; Posterior Ana -
lytics
,
I
,
xi
.
30. De Anima
,
B, v, 417b, 22-24; Meta
. ,
B, iii, 999a, 14-
24; B, iv, 999b, 1-3. The fourth, fifth, and sixth cnapters of
Book B oi tne Me taphy sics are devoted to the discussion of the
problem presented by the fact that knowledge must be in terms
of universals and that that of which we seek knowledge is a
particular. This is noted especially in B, iv, 999a, 27-29,
and 999b, 1-3 (cf. Phys
. ,
A, v, 189a, 7-9). If the first prin-
ciples are universal, they cannot be substances; if they are
individuals, they cannot, be knowable.
31. For example, Phaedrus
,
249 BC
.
= =
'
“
-- *
- » - • ~
. - - . -
-
.
v i . c
.. ,: i
.
.
-
-
• * « «
•
... t .... ;
'
. ; if
27
directed. 32 Plato's Idea exists in the heavenly sphere apart
from the individual being; Aristotle's form exists in the in-
dividual being.
Now, Aristotle defined identity in terras of substance, or
being, or essence. To d oumav oft ouk clmo
T i To iivcii (lutClt. 33 Wherever it is possible to distinguish an
l
essence, then, there it is possible to point to a persisting
identity. But our phenomena are exemplifications of essences
constantly changing according to a principle of development
/
' ) y
(entelechy). Yet form {llfoj ), essence [oucria.), tne univer-
sal, only, is the intelligible {yoTjrov) and it is accessible
only to intellectual thought 1 ) • 3^
For Aristotle identity, logical or metaphysical, is the
object of the intellect only, and intellect is the crowning
b Intellect faculty of man. 35 And the science
which is supreme is speculative; it is employment of intellect.
This, it will be seen, is in contrast with Bergson's supreme
form of knowledge.
C. PHILOSOPHY SINCE ARISTOTLE
It was Aristotle's logic which first became known to the
medieval philosophers, and it was his logic which for the most
32- Meta ., A, vi
,
987b; A, ix, 990b-991b; M, iv and v, es-
pecially iv, 1078b, 17; 1079a, 19 - 1079b, 20; 1080a, 2-12;
1086b, 3.
33. Meta. ,7~
,
iv, 1007a, 27-28.
34. See Ph.ys
. , A, v, 189a, 7-9.
35. Meta., A, i and ii.
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1 The Scholastics part dominated the physics and
metaphysics of the Scholastics. The Aristotelian universal
was the type of reality as well as the instrument of formal
reasoning. In physics, equality of cause and effect; in ontol4
ogy, substance and essential forms; in psychology, the sub-
stantial soul, static and transcendent in respect to con-
sciousness .
When British Empiricism had reacned its peak, the concept
was an impression less vivid tnan a sense impression, cause
2 The British Empiricists and effect were mat-
and the Cont.inental nation -
alists ters of "custom," the
a The British Empiricists
(1) General Statement substantial soul was
shattered into disconnected bits, and substance and essential
forms were destroyed completely.
The analytic method in the natural sciences, intensified
by the introduction of microscopic study by Leeuwenhoek (1632-
(2) Locke 1723) entered philosophy
,
36 notably
in the writings of John Locke. His logic is frankly analytic? 7
His definitions of gold, of an orange, of a horse, of univer-
sals,are analytic. Qualities, whether the primary in the
things and inseparable from them or the secondary in the per-
ceiving subject ana not belonging to the body, are distinct
36. See the reference to the microscope, e. g. , in Locke's
discussion of substance, in EHU
,
II, xxiii, 11. See also
Berkeley, TDHP
,
26.
37. See, e. g. , EHU, I, iv , 1-4; II, xi , 9, xii, 8; III,
iii
,
14
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from one another. Knowledge is divided into tnree distinct
classes: intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive.
The problem of identity of objects in nature is affected
by his not entirely successful attempt to repudiate material
substance by defining it as an I -know-no t-what . He does de-
tach secondary qualities from the substance; tney are in the
perceiving subject. But it is not clear how they are made to
appear in tne perceiving subject by the primary qualities, nor
what are the relations among the primary qualifies and between
them and substance. And so the identity of objects in nature
is left in a doubtful state.
The problem of identity of concepts is afiected by Locke’s
doctrine that concepts are manufactured by a composition of
simple ideas. Though Aristotle believed that the universal is
derived from the particular, he did not believe that the uni-
versal was merely a sum of particulars. The universal was also
a principle of thought and knowledge. Bergson believes that
the concept is a manufactured product, but that the manufac-
ture is a cutting out of a given flow of reality instead of a
putting together of ideas given separately in sense-experience.
Locke's chief contribution to the evolution of the problem
of identity is his basing personal identity upon consciousness.
Identity as such, which was fundamental to Aristotle's think-
ing, is a universal manufactured, and none too well manufac-
tured at that, by the composition of simple ideas. But con-
sciousness of being one's self to one’s self is a certainty of
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self-identity
.
If identity l to instance in that alone) be
a native impression, and consequently, so
clear and obvious to us tnat we must needs
know it even from our cradles, I would gxadly
be resolved, by one of seven or seventy years
old, wnether a man being a creature consist-
ing of soul and Dody, be the same man wnen
his body is cnanged? .Vhetner Supnorbus and
Pytnagoras, naving had tne saji.e soul, were
the same man, tnougn they lived several ages
asunder? hay, whetner tne cock, too, whicn
nad the same soul, were not tne sane with
uotn of tnern? Whex eby
,
perhaps, it will ap-
pear, tnat our idea of sameness is not so
settled and clear as to deserve to oe thougho
innate in us. 36
Consciousness maxes personal identity . -
-
.... For it being tne sane consciousness tnat
makes a man De himself to himself, personal
identity depends on that only, whether it be
annexed only to one individual substance, or
can be continued in a succession of several
substances. For as far as any intelligent
being can repeat the idea of any past action
with the sane consciousness it had of it at
first, and with tne sane consciousness it has
of any present action; so far it is tne saue
personal self. For it is by the consciousness
it has of its present thoughts and actions
that it is self to itself now, and so will be
the same self, as far as the sane conscious-
ness can extend to actions past or to come;
and would be by distance of time, or change of
substance, no more two persons, than a man be
two men by wearing other clothes today than he
did yesterday, with a long or short sleep be-
tween; the sane consciousness uniting those
distant actions into the same person, what-
ever substances contributed to their produc-
tion. 39
38. Locke, SHU, I, iv, 4.
39. Locke, SHU, II, xxvii, 10.
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For the same consciousness being preserved,
whether in the same or difi erent substances,
the personal identity is preserved. 40
Consciousness alone makes self . -- Nothing
but consciousness can unite remote existences
into the sa. e person; the identity of suostance
will not do it. For whatever substance tnere
is, however framed, without consciousness tnere
is no person: and a carcase may be a person, as
well as any sort of substance be so without con-
sciousness. .. . So that self is not determined
by identity or diversity of substance, whicn it
cannot be sure of, but only by identity of con-
sciousness. 41
That is to say, Locke was the first thinker to put forth
psychological identity as the typical identity, instead of the
metaphysical identity of substamce and the logical identity of
universals
.
Locke, moreover, was the first philosopher to recognize
the peculiarly mental quality of time and to define time as
duration which is a succession. 4^ It is Bergson’s identifying
time with consciousness that shapes his entire philosophical
system. In stating that tnere is no measure external to con-
sciousness for equal durations 01 time, 43 Locke anticipated
Bergson by three hundred years.
Berkeley did away with the independent existence of the
primary qualities as Locke had done away with the independent
40. Locke, EHU, II, xxvii, 13.
41. Locke, EHU, II, xxvii, 23. There are, of course, also
passages in the Essay not entirely free from assumption of tne
existence of spiritual substance.
42. Locke, EHU, II, xiv
,
xv.
43. Locke, EHU, II, xiv, 3-5; II, xiv, 21, especially the
latter passage.
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^3) Berkeley existence of the secondary
ones and completely demolished material substance. But he re-
jected Locke's doctrine of consciousness as identity44 and af-
firmed the reality of spiritual substance. His reason for re-
jecting consciousness as identity was tnat a person loses
ideas and gains new ones from time to time and consequently is
different consciousness. That is, nis rejection was on the
assumption that consciousness is to be defined (1) analyti-
cally, and (2) in terms of content. However , he did give the
idea of agency in spiritual substance, so tnat tne notion of
activity was associated with the notion of psycnological
identity. This activity, it is to be noted, is different from
the entelechy of Aristotle, which was a principle of develop-
ment within the being. Agency is activity initiated by. tne
being. And the inner principle of the ego as tne agent of
consciousness was apparently the ground of psychological iden-
tity for Berkeley.
Of spiritual substance as agent Berkeley said we can have
no idea, ° for ideas are passive and spirits are active. He
had a vague theory of active notions of spirits, but in gen-
eral we knnw our own existence immediately, intuitively, and
we know the existence of God, and, presumably, of fellow human
beings, by inference. Bergson's belief that no concept defines
44. Berkeley, AMP, 7th Dialogue, section 8.
45. Berkeley, TDKP, 92; PHK, sections 2, 27.
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conscious beings (though for Bergson consciousness nas a far
wider range tnan for Berkeley) is somewhat analogous to
Berkeley's belief. One end of the reason is the same for
both: activity cannot be pressed into a static measure. But
whereas the other end of the reason is the Passiveness of idea
for Berkeley, it is the rigidity of the concept for Bergson,
such a concept as identity, for example. Bergson, like
Berkeley, looks to intuition for knowledge of self, but Berg-
son’s intuition is broader and deeper than Berkeley’s.
As to concepts, Berkeley was as empirical as Locke in
principle. His "praenot ions"^ 6 function somewnat as univer-
sals, but they are "merely the effect of experience." How-
ever, the principle of contradiction, which is baseless with-
out persisting meanings, is assumed. '
The unit of reality is not some third nature, distinct
from matter and spirit, says Berkeley, i. e.
,
he would reject
neutral entities of all sorts as principles of identity. 48
The "principles of an immutable morality"^ 9 expounded in
his Passive Obedience are perhaps as near universals preserv-
46. Berkeley, TWE, sections 62, 63.
47. Berkeley, AKP, 7tn Dialogue, section 24; cf. PHK, sec-
tion 24. In the Sir is
,
sections 287 and 288, Berkeley lays
more stress on the reality of universals, and in section 310
he expresses sympathy witn the Aristotelian idea that true
universals do actually reside in tne soul.
48. Berkeley, TDHP
,
103-104: "Hyl. Well
,
then, let it not
be called matter, since you will have it so, but some third
ftature distinct from matter and spirit.... Phil. My reasW is
this: because I have a mind to have some notion or meaning in
what I say."
49. Berkeley, Works, I, xxxvi (Fraser's Introduction).
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ing an inherent identity as any notions of Berkeley's system.
As to objects of nature, Berkeley said they are ideas.
Locke had said that all the objects of knowledge are ideas
but had believed that the objects correspond in some way with
sums of qualities, perhaps inhering in an unknowaole sub-
stratum. Berkeley said the ideas are the things; physical
objects are sensible qualities; they are a language in which
<iod speaks to spirits.
Objects of nature can have no identity of their own, be-
cause they are ideas, and there can be no such thing as iden-
tity of our ideas, "perpetually fleeting and variable." 50 An
object is a "constant creation, betokening an immediate act
of power and providence." 5 ^ The identity of objects of na-
ture is an identity of law, not of substance and not of qual-
ities. The law of nature is the order in which God exhibits
things to us; it is the order of the succession of our ideas.
How each one of us has his own perception of what we call the
"same" object. Smith's "idea- is not Brown's "idea." And,
as for that, Smith has different "ideas" or "sensible objects"
which he calls the "same" object, lor tne object of sight is
50. Berkeley, TDHP, 56.
51. Berkeley, ALP, 4th Dialogue, section 14. '.Then Berke-
ley says ( Sir is , section 289), "There is no sense nor sensory,
nor anything like a sense or sensory in God," he seems to say
that things are in existence only when human beings perceive
them, but in general (in his earlier, more tppical thought)
seems to assume that the constant creation continues whether
a perceiving being is present or not.
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not the object of touch. But the different psychical facts
are connected by the laws of nature; the identity of the re-
sultant object is an identity of the law of its appearances
.
55
And two minds, though having different percepts, perceive the
same reality, not because there is one thing to see or hear
or touch, but Decause botn perceive according to uniform lav/s
of nature. We all can perceive in accordance with tne same
laws, even though we do not nave the same perceptions. The
identity is identity of meaning of God's language to us all.^4
In his later thougnt
,
which was closely affiliated with
Greek philosophy, Berkeley defended teleology as a cosmic
principle. ^ Bergson rejects teleology, and on grounds re-
lated to the problem of identity. 56
As Berkeley applied against primary qualities the argu-
ments Locke had applied against secondary qualities, Hume ap-
(4) Hume plied against spiritual substance
(and also against Locke’s identity of consciousness) the argu-
ments Berkeley had applied against material substance. Hume •
s
conscious states are as "variable and fleeting" as Berkeley's
sensible ideas.
52~. This is the theme of hrV and TWE. See iDHP, 116-117;
PHK, section 1.
o3. Berkeley, TDHP, 112.
54. Berkeley, l’DHP, 111-117.
55. Berkeley, S, 259-260.
56. Infra, 85-89. Bergson related reason and teleology.
Berkeley declared reason to be tne principal part of oqr na-
ture, following the Greeks (Amp, 2nd Dialogue, section 14),
whereas Bergson has other views [ infra, 91-92 ) and is alto-gether opposed to the partition ol EFTS' nature of man in this
section of the Alciphron
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As to the first question, we may observe,
that what we call a mind , i3 nothing but a
heap or collection of different perceptions,
united together by certain relations, and sup-
posed, though falsely, to be endowed with a
perfect simplicity and identity. Now, as every
perception is distinguishable from another, and
may be considered as separately existent; it
evidently follows, tnat there is no absurdity
in separating any particular perception from
the mind; that is, in breaking off all its re-
lations witn that connected mass oi perceptions
which constitute a thinking being. ^
Identity is given neither by sense nor by reason, 0(3 but
is a "fiction of the imagination," an idea between unity and
number, arising for a relief from uneasiness in the conscious-
ness. 5°
Hume further carries to the limit the empiricists’ repudi
ation of general ideas. These are only particular ideas, as-
sociated together, and particular ideas of course are only
faint copies of sense impressions.
Hume, like Locke, defined time as duration which is a
succession. 7/hat endures, ne says, must not be unchange-
able. 60 This is primary in Bergson's thought. Hume’s suc-
cession, however, differs radically from Bergson ' s in tnat for
Hume time makes its appearance in tne mind because of the per-
ception of a succession of changeable objects. 01 I’or Bergson
57. Hume
,
THH, I, iv,
58. Hume THU, I, iv,
59. Hume
,
THU, I, iv,
60. Hume THU, I, ii
,
0; I. ii, yX (I v TO).
61. Hume
,
THU, I, ii,
ii (I, 200).
ii (I, 184, 186, 188).
ii (I, 188, 194, 199,
iii (I, 43-45; cf. I, iv
iii ( I , 42)
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time is. the mind and external change or motion depends on
time (consciousness of succession) and not vice versa as for
Hume
.
"Descar tes .... deduced his principle of conservation of
motion directly from ’the immutability of Cod’ - that is,
b The Continental Rationalists from the iden-
(l) Descartes
tity of the
universe in time." 6 -5 Meyerson refers to the passage in Des-
cartes’ Pr incipia64 in which he declares tnat Cod never
changes his fashion of acting, that he conserves the world in
the same action with which he has created it, that conse-
quently he conserves in things the same motion he gave them
in tne beginning. Descartes thus applied identity not only
to the substance of the universe but also to the motion
(viewed as a substantial quantity) within it.
Interested primarily in methodology, the identity clear-
est in his thought is the mathematical. Otner principles or
conclusions are based on mathematical principles as norma-
tive . 66
62 . 3eel.|TDXC
, ,
91-92
,
104, 275-2 76; infra
, 59. Hume
states, further, that "It is impossible for 'tne mind to pre-
serve any notion of difference betwixt two bodies of the same
nature existing in the same place at the same time" (SHIT, I,
ii, iv (I, 47). This is as near as an empiricist like Hume
could come to stating that the mind confers identity on ex-
ternal objects.
63. Meyerson, IR, 199. Cf. SC, 24.
64. Second Part, Chapter xlii.
65. "Cartesian rationalism, inspired by Kepler's words,
Ubi natura, ibi geometria
,
had placed it [Euclidean geometryj
at the foundation of all knowledge of things idealised in pure
extension" (Aliotta, IRS, 277). Compare EC, 300: "....si ie
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The metaphysical identity in Descartes' thought is an
identity of substance. The weak point in his whole system is
his sharp dualism of thinking substance and extended substance
of creating substance and created substance.
Spinoza's extreme intellectualism places him far from the
position of Bergson. Submitting oneself to the whole, amor
(2) Spinoza Dei intellec tualis , inactive
contemplation of the universe, is as far as possible from Berg-
son s restless elan vital witn nothing real that can be con-
templated but with only an intuition of ceaseless cnange with-
in itself. Spinoza’s inspiration to philosopnize was his
yearning for a timeless identity. He tried to fly from all
that seems to cnange and to identify nimself with a changeless
One. His fundamental conception was unity of suostance. Iden
tity must be identity of the whole. Objects of nature are
only phenomenal; the human soul is only a mode of the divine
substance
.
Leibniz smashed Spinoza’s substance to fragments, endowed
each fragment with activity, and called it a monad. The monad
(3) Leibniz combines the indivisibility of a
principe de toutes choses existe a la maniere d'un axiome lo-
gique ou d'une definition mathematique
,
les choses elles-memes
devront sortir de ce principe comme les applications d ’ un
axiome ou les consequences a'une definition."
66. Descartes’ extreme rationalism puts him outside tne
range of Bergson’s sympathy. Error according to Descartes
arises when the will starts something going which the under-
standing has not sufficient light to carry out to a successful
conclusion. Bergson, on the contrary, glorifies the unpurpose
ful activity of the will as the essence of reality.
„ . .. j ' J . 'j t; .
j : . J -i": . c - - .
...
.
... v 's' . : Oi.
.
j :L . .
* - v. . u . . ;
y : . . . ’ t _. ..
-v
--
•
.^v
_ x j. . 'it. . . « • . -
"
•
i .. • -
-
~j Ot 0 •- J . j - -v J - J ~ • - • . >
x i . j i . . . . ' • -
i .
'
Cjj
.
.
:
...
...... .
- -
.
J OL i ...0 .... ...Jit j jJii .. j J
* s *iO 9XC 10 - c u. X.‘H *Jjio t J v -*i0
. .
..
j . .
J; T i Co - 0 : W .
'
-OJ - -
. . . 0 . - • -
-
.
,
.
.. .
•*. - — - *
rtl
.
•
.1 1 - •
-
;
•
•••
.
. ,
. .
'
-• •
•
•
’
-.. .
•' J -- -
: . j * : • r
‘
-
-
= 1
39
matnematical point and the reality of a physical atom. That
is, Leibniz retained the concept of substance, but cnanged it
from independent existence to independent action, from matter
to force. Quod non agit, non existit . La substance est un
etre capable d 'action . This is a decided step toward ^ergson.
So also is the doctrine of the development within the monad.
This is to say that a main difference between the thought of
Leibniz and that of his predecessors Descartes and Spinoza is
the entrance of time into the system of Leibniz.
67. In nis lectures on me Chain of Being at Harvard Uni-
versity in 1933, Professor Lovejoy of Johns Hopkins took as
his topic for February twenty-seventh "The Temporalizing of
the Chain of Being." He pointed out that in the eighteenth
century the chief feature to be noted was this temporalizing
of philosophical thought.
We can see in tne latter part of tne seventeenth century the
scientific work which introduced time to philosophy. Hoemer,
for example, discovered the velocity of light in 1675. (For a
suggestion of the significance of the discovery of the finite
velocity of light on thought, see Korzybski
,
SS
,
576.) Light
became a temporal affair. A man looking through a telescope
(the first one was used in 1610) does not at once see the heav-
enly bodies as they are. He must look at the planets and the
stars with consciousness that it has taken time for the light
to travel to the earth. This is a consciousness that has not
entered the common mind yet, but lor scientific and philosoph-
ical thinking it had tremendous significance. Kepler's laws
(Kepler died in 1630) state a relation between the areas de-
scribed fey the radius-vector of a planet and the time taken in
describing them. Galileo (d. 1642) stated a relation between
the space traversed by a falling oody and the time taken for
the fall, ilewton enunciated the law of gravitation in 1662 and
published his Pr incipia in 1687. The time during whicn a body
falls, the time during which an object traverses any space,
must thereafter be considered. The term _t was in every matne-
matical and physical formula.. In the nineteentu. century Lyell
(17-^7-1875) introduced time into geology. The very earth be-
gan to move in time under our feet, its apparently so solid
self not a being but a becoming. Geology was henceforth not
the science of ear th-as-it-is but ear th-as-i t-is-becoming.
Darwin (1809-1882) introduced time into biology, and in me
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The following two passages might have been written by
Bergson (except perhaps lor the difference between the conno-
/ /
tation of the word cr ee to Leibniz and to Bergsonj:
Je prends aussi pour accorde que tout etre
cree
7
est sujet au cnangement , et oar conse-
quent la Monade creee aussi, et mSme que ce
cnangement est continuel aans cnacune.°°
/ /
St come tout present etat d • une substance
simple est naturellement une suite de son etat
precedent, tenement que le present y est gros
de l'avenir. 69
The present as "gros de l'avenir" is exactly Bergson's though].
Origin of Species laid down the temporal principles of devel-
opment that have in later days onong so^e scientists worked
against belief in the possibility of the existence of dis-
tinct species, witn the electronic tneory of matter and the
doctrine of relativity, temporalization seems to iiave taken
complete possession of thought.
Locke, as has been seen, saw the peculiarly inner, mental
quality of time. Hume saw tnat time is primarily succession
and that duration is not remaining the same but is successive
cnanging. Spinoza died before Newton's Pr incipia was pub-
lished and only two years alter tne velocity of light was
discovered. Bug tne temporalizing of reality would only have
disturbed him. It was his wish to turn away from the tempora]
.
It was eternity, not eternity as endless time, but eternity
as timelessness, tn^t laid hold on his spirit, neason views
all things sub specie aeternitatis
,
and the way of reason is
the way of blessedness. The activity of a monad, on the
other hand, its development as an entelechy, presupposes a
temporal as well as a spatial order. Time was an essential
and distinguishing feature of the system of Leibniz. Kant's
schematism of the categories is time, and since Kant time has
continued to be a dominant factor in philosopnical thought
.
Yet the time of the scientist, of Locke, Leibniz, Kant, and
even the evolutionary philosopher Spencer, says Bergson, is an
artificial time; it is indeed really space. (This is the
theme of TFY and of an entire section in the last chapter of
EC.) Bergson's thought is in a thought stream which for close
on two hundred years nas been dominated by time, and thinking
in terms of time has of necessity changed thinking in terms
of identity.
68. Leibniz, Monadologie
,
section 10.
69. Leibniz, Monadologie
,
section 22.
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Leibniz' agreement with Locke on identity of conscious-
ness is only partial.
Bergson nas oeen interested in studies in tne unconsciou^
or subconscious, a concept invented or discovered by Leib-
niz. 7^ Since the concept was associated in Leibniz' mind
with a soul psychology, the two men treat the problem in dif-
ferent ways as related to the problem of identity. 7-
To activity and development Leibniz adds individuality as
a cardinal principle. And individuality he grounds more deep-
ly than merely in time and space. There must also be "un
principe interne de distinction." 7 ’-’ Eacn monad must be dif-
ferent from eacn of the others. 74 Tne lex continui of Leib-
niz seems antitnetical to tne principle of individuality, and
in Bergson the continuity of evolution does raise the question
whether a true individual can be dis tinguished
;
but Leibniz'
monads are more sharply separable in reality than are indi-
viduals in Bergson's system. Bergson finds in reality only a
tendency toward individuation
.
7S
Leibniz' rationalism divides him still farther from Berg-
son. Leibniz, unlike Spinoza, differentiated will and intel-
lect. He subordinated will to intellect or reason. And,
70. See Leibniz, HE, 73, 184, 187, 188
71. See, for example, Leibniz, HE, 14.
72. Infra
.
156-157.
73. Leibniz, HE, 182.
74. Leibniz, Monadologie
.
section 9.
75. Infra, 80-82.”
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Nos raisonnements sont fondes sur deux grands
principes: celui de la contradiction. . . . Et
celui de la raison suff isante
.
76
pr orn tiie principle of tne law of contradiction Leioniz in-
ferred tne principle of the identity of indiscernibles .
1 7 The
intellectualism of Leibniz puts purpose into tne universe.
(Here Leibniz disagrees with Descartes, Spinoza, and Bergson,
though on different grounds in each case.)
The fundamental difference oetween Leibniz and Bergson re-
mains. For Spinoza and Leibniz, as lor tne ancients, says
Bergson, "la realite^ comrne la ve'rite^ serai t integralement
/ / / rj . i
donnee dans l'eternite."
Kant represents a synthesis of British Empiricism and
Continental Rationalism. Jnen tne Empiricists reached tneir
3 Kant end, they had a wealtn of oDjects of ex-
perience to which to apply identity but no identity to apply.
When the Rationalists reached their end, they nad plenty of
identity but no objects of experience to -.mien to a^ply it.
It would seem that Empiricism, meaning to start with reality,
finally came to have no reality to cling to. Rationalism,
starting with the principles of reason, soon nad nothing to
apply the principles to. The Empiricists could not reacn the
universal from the particular; tne Rationalists coula not reach
76. Leibniz, Monadologie
,
sections 31, 32.
77. Leibniz, NE, 51, 238; Monadologie , section 9. That is,
I
and this is related to the grounding of individuality in a more
inner principle than space and time (time as defined by Leibniz
not by Bergson), all quantitative differences are qualitative
differences. For Bergson’s views on quantity and quality, see
infra 69-72
,
Here . the . contemnorarv voluntarist is in svmnathv
WTtft-the rationalist Leibniz. J
78. EC. 382. -
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the particular from the universal. Kant intended to give
form to empirical content and to give consent to rational
form.
His synthesis was time, the schematism of the categories.
He had his sensations ana he nad nis categories. He had in-
tuitions and he had concepts. Is there something in eacn the
same or similar that may serve as a mediator oetween the two?
Is there in intuition something void of all empirical content
and so in that respect intellectual and universal and homo-
geneous with pure concept, yet sensible and Homogeneous witn
intuition? If there is, empiricism and rationalise may be
synthesized. 1’he answer is die Zeit . Per hauin is likewise a
form of pure intuition. But,
Das reine Bild all ex Grtfssen ( guano ox urn ) vor
dem SLusseren Sinne, ist der Kaum; aller Ge^en-
st&nde der Sinne aoer tiberhaupt, die Zeit. 7 ^
Die Zeit, als die formale Bedingung des Man-
nigfaltigen des inneren Sinnes, mi thin der Ver-
kntipfung aller Vors tellungen
,
entnSLlt ein kan-
nigfaltiges a priori in der reinen Anschauung.
Hun ist eine transzendentale Zei tbestimmung mit
der Kategor ie (die die Einheit derseloen aus-
macnF] soi ern gleichartig, als sie allgemein
ist und auf einer Hegel a priori beiuht. Sie
ist aber andererseits mit der Erscneinung soiern
gleichartig, als die Zeit in jeder empirischen
Vorstellung des Mannigfaltigen entnalten ist.
Daher wird eine Anwendung der Kategorie auf Er-
scneinungen mttglich sein, vermittelst der trans-
zendentalen Zei tbestimmung, welche, als das
Schema der Ver s tandesbegr iff e , die Subsumtion
dei letzteren unter die erste vermi ttel t
.
79. Kant, KrV, A 142 = B 182.
80. Kant, KrV, A 138-139 = B 177-178. See A 137-147 = B
176-187.
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Kant was attacking tne age-old problem (ol‘ iirst importance
in the problem of lbentity) of how we may relate the univer-
sal and the particular, and he solved the proolem by time.
rhe schematism of tne categories is primarily an epi-
stemological principle. It applied to phenomena, tne empiri-
cal world. The weak point in Kant's thought in respect to
the problem of identity is his limiting of knowledge to the
phenomena. Experience is a synthesis 01 empirical and ration-
al elements. What tne world is when it is not being experi-
enced, however, we cannot know. mere are many objects of
tnought whicn can never be objects of knowledge. Among these
must be metapnysical identity.
Identity of concepts holds. Kant is enougn oi a ration-
alist to insist on the validity of tne concept. But concepts
are impossible and meaningless if no object is given mr tnem.
They cannot be applied to things in themselves. 81 It is true
that after the elimination of every sensible condition of a
pure concept of understanding tnere remains a meaning in the
concept. But it is a purely logical meaning. Such bare repre-
sentations can be put to no use. 82
Identity of objects in nature and identity oi conscious
beings is cloudy oe cause of tue distinction between phenomena
j
and things-in-tnemselves a.nd between the empirical self ana
the noumenal self. Keality comes to be a logical conception.
81. Kant, KrV, A 139 = B 178.
82. Kant, KrV, A 147 z q 186-187.
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The xeal has no consent; trie content as such lias no genuine
actuality. There are physical objects (phenomena), psycnical
objects (empirical selves), ana noumena (mere logical objects
empty of content). At tne case 01 tnis dilemjua is Kant's
tneory of tne ideality 01 c-ime. i’xie self or the tning as
noumenon cannot be temporal. Therefore, the self or the thing
as noumenon cannot oe icnown , for knowledge is mediated oy the
principle of time.
Hegel (1770-1831) denied the ultimate reality of time, but
taught a doctrine oi development in logic wnich upset, as
4 The Problem of Identity thoroughly as time
since Kant
a Hegel and Schelling could upset, tne sta-
bility of tne concept and or the object and of the self. He
i evolutionized logic with his principle or uhe Begriff as a
concrete universal. A concrete universal is a group of de-
tails or particulars, each of whicn contributes to the realiza-
I
tion of a single purpose. How, "Hur der Begriff selbst ist
frei und das wahrhaft Allgemeine . 11 85 The Begriff is actually
that which cannot be grasped, for it is constantly moving into
its Other. It is universal because its parts obey one law. It
is concrete because of the connectedness of its parts. And,
Alles ist Begriff .
Das Wesen scheint in sicn oder ist reine
Reflexion, so ist es nur Beziehung auf sich,
nicht als unmittelbare
,
sondern als reflek-
tierte, - Identity mit sich.
83. Hegel, EHC, I, iii, C, 214.
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Formelle Oder Ver standes -Identity
t
ist
diese Identit&t, insofern an ihr lestgehalten
und von deni Unterschiede abs trahier t wird. . . .
Die Identit&t mit dem Absoluten, als Sub-
j ekte eiries Satzes, verbunden, - so lautet er
:
das Absolute ist das mit sich Identische . - So
wahr dieser Satz ist, so ist es zweideutig, ob
er in seiner Wahrheit gemeint ist; er ist darum
in seinern Ausdrucke wenigstens unvolls t&ndig. . .
.
. . .
.
Per Satz der Identitd t lautet demnach:
Alles ist mit sicn identis cn, A = A; und nega-
tiv : A kann nicht zugleich A und nicht A sein .
- Dieser Satz, statt ein wahres Denkgesetz zu
sein, ist nichts als das Gesetz des abs trakten
vers tandes . ... 34
Hegel recognized the lav/ of identity but denied that
Aristotle's statement of the law is sufficient. "Y/ie allent-
halben ist die spekulative Identit&t nicht jene triviale, dass
Begriff und Objekt an sicn identiscn seien...."° 5 '.Ye must
press the investigation further until we reach "ein Ganzes in
seiner Organisation wahrhaft vers tanden . "
^
Schelling (1775-1854) carried time into the nature of
God. God, he said, never is, but is forever oecoming. With-
out the conception of a suffering God, he continued, history
is unintelligible. A suffering God is a God laDoring in time
for that v/nich is not yet. d7 Bergson carries on the idea of
the reality of time in an absolute sense, but doew not stress
suffering as inherent in reality.
84. Hegel, EEC
,
I, ii, A, a, a, 115. See the entire sec-
tion, also the notes on the section in Hegel, LH, 214-gg3.
85. Hegel, EEC, I, iii, A, 193.
86. Hegel, EEC, I, iii, B, a, 198.
87. The Kampf in Hegel’s Absolute, the eternal Schmerz
(EEC, III, Einleitung, 382), suggests time also; but, though
die Idee ist Prozess
,
the Pr o z e s
s
is often txeated more as
logical than as temporal, and Hegel did not state clearly that
time is real for the Absolute.

Hegel's bitter rival Schopenhauer was aiso an absolutist
but an absolutist oi will. His one great Identity is an iden-
47
b Schopenhauer tity of will. As voluntarism
his thought is more nearly related to tnat oi uergson than is
Hegel's, but Bergson’s will as a conscious and creative prin-
ciple is more akin to the Begriff of Hegel than to the blind
will of Schopenhauer. Bergson's voluntarism is much brighter
and more optimistic than Scno^ennauer ' s
.
Since Hegel there has been a steady development of the
evolutionary theory in pnilosopny. Spencer intended to be the
c Spencer philosophical interpreter and coun-
terpart of Darwin the biologist. Bergson complains, however,
that Spencer’s philosophy deals with neither becoming nor
evolution, but that he breaks reality into pieces, puts the
O O
pieces together again and imagines he has traced a genesis.
In the twentieth century Neoscholasticism still repre-
sents the Aristotelian identity oi concept and oi substance,
d The Twentieth Century and the Neorealism of
Professor Perry is an analysis of experience to mere logical
entities, the extreme oi tne abstract universal. But the con-
creteness and the developmental principle of Hegel's logic
have had tne greater influence.
Dewey's "experimental logic" suggests the direction in
which Pragmatism has carried logic. The aim of science be-
68. SC, 592-399.
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comes "discovery of constant relations among cnanges in place
of definition of objects immutable beyond the possibility of
alteration.
"
b9 Concepts are "simply memoranda of identical
ieatures in objects already perceived; tney are conveniences
,
bunching together a variety of tilings scattered about in con-
90
crete experience."
Other thinkers sucn as Brunschwicg, Meyer son, Bo^troux,
and Korzyuski question tne very concept oi identity as such.
Korzybski's watchwords are non-Ar iscotelian philosophy and
logic, non-kewtonian physics, and non-Euclidean geometry.
Bergson belongs to tne group wiiich stresses the evolu-
tionary and developmental character of reality. He takes his
clue from the temporal flow which we experience as conscious-
ness. fhe question arises, Are tnere any objects of thought
or of perception or any centers of consciousness that can be
distinguished from one another and tnat can preserve identity
in the midst or tne continuous cnange? 'He shall consider
lirst the objects of thought. But before discussing them v/e
snail view the main outlines of Bergson's thought, particular
ly the aspects of it related to the problem oi identity in
general
.
89. Dewey, QC, 102.
90. Dewey, DC, 166. See also 99 and 185.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE PiiOBLEL OF IDEBT I TY
:
ITS SETTING IN B&iUxSON'S PHILOSOPHY
A. BEubSOL ' S LOi'IVAiL.G IMLul-STS
Bergson has neither deiended nor attacked identity spe-
cifically. One long passage in his jjissai sur les donnees im -
1 The Place of Identity
in his Philosophy
mediates de la consci-
ence expresses his gen-
eral attitude toward the problem or tne nature of identity,
especially in conscious beings. He is defending l'acte libre
against le aeterministe .
Lais le
/
deterministe
,
meme lorsqu'il s'ab-
stient d'eriger en forces les emotions graves
ou etats profonds de l*ame, les distingue ne-
anmoins les unes des autres, et aboutit ainsi
a une conception njecaniste du moi. II nous
montrera ce moi hesitant entre deux sentiments
contraires, allant de celui-ci a celui-la, et
optant enfin pour l'un d*eux. Le moi et les
sentiments qui l-agitent se
/
trouvent ainsi as-
similes a des cnoses bien del^inies, qui de-
meurent identiques a elles-memes pendant tout
le cours de l’operation. Lais si c’est tou-
jours le m£me moi qui delibere, et si les deux
sentiments contraires qui l'emeuvent ne changent
pas davantage, comment, en vertu meme de ce
principe de causalite que le determinisme in-
voque, le moi se aecidera- t-il jamais? La
verite ^st que le moi, par cela seul qu'il a
^prouve le premier sentiment, a d^ja quelque
peu change quand le ^econd survient: a tous les
moments de la deliberation, le moi se modifie et
modifie aussi, par consequent, les deux senti-
ments qui l'agitent. Ainsi se forme une serie

/ / \
dynamique d'etats qui se penetrent, se reniorcent
les uns les autres, et aboutiront a un acte libre
par une evoluticqi naturelle. Mais le dete^rmin-
isme, obeissant a un vague besoin de representa-
tion symbolique, designera par des mots les sen-
timents opposes cjui se partagent le moi, ainsi
que le moi lui-meme. En les faisant cristalliser
sous forme de mots bien definis, il enleve par
avance toute espece d'activite" vivante a la per-
sonae d’abord, et ensuite aux sentiments dont
elle est emue. II Yerra alors, d'un cote, un moi
toujours identique a lui-meme
,
et, de 1' autre,
des sentiments contraires, non moins invar iaOles
,
qui se le disputent; la victoire demeurera neces-
sairement au plus iort. Kais ce mecanisrne auquel
on s’ est condamne par avance n'a d’autre valeur
que celie d'une representation symbolique: il ne
saurait tenir contre le temoinage d'une consci-
ence attentive, qui nous presente le dynamisme
interne comme un fait.
It is clear that "le dynamisme interne," not "un moi tou
jours identique a lui-meme," is to dominate Bergson's view of
conscious beings.
Identity as a problem is probably for Bergson one of the
"fictitious problems" created when "the habits formed in ac-
tion find their way up to the sphere of speculation." 2
1. EDIG, 131-132.
2. M’M’
,
xvii. The introduction from which this passage
is taken was written in 1910 for the English edition/ Con-
sider, rememoering the relation between identity and person-
a-li‘ty
,
nDIC
,
106: "Nous allons voir que les contradictions in-herentes aux problemes de la causalite, de la liberte’, de lapersonnalite en un mot, n'ont pas d’autre origine /than "l’ab-
surdi,te de 1’ hypothese fondamentale par la^quelle on a de-
r
§
Ule
J
^ e lemps d.a>ns /l*espace, et place/ la succession au sein
mdme de la simultaneity3 , et qu'il suffit, pour les /carterde substituer le moi reel, le moi concret, a sa representation
symbolique.' 1 The "moi toujours identique a lui-m^me," the
moi hesitant entre deux sentiments contraires," of EDIG, 131-132 > is, of course, the "representation symbolique"; trie* "dy-
namisme interne" is 'le moi reel, le moi concret." Cf EDIG184; Stephen, MM, 71. ’

Bergson has iound that immediate experience is two-sided;
it includes the actual experiencing and a tninking abo^t ex-
2 rhe Dichotomization periencing. "La vie con-
of Experience /
sciente se presente sous
un double aspect, selon qu ' on l'aperpoit directement ou par
refraction a travers l’espace." 3 Reality is continuous activ-
ity, but an active being can pretend that there have been
pauses in its action which can be vie.ved as boundaries of sec-
tions of experience, that is, can pretend that experience can
be thought about. Thinking, however, is for the sa^e of
further activity. Experience, then, is inevitably dichoto-
mized. Or, put in another way, experience is a two-sided
shield. One side is experiencing (tne living, the unrepeat-
able, the continuous, the alert, tne attentive, tne moving,
the inward); the other side is thinking about experience (the
mechanical, the repeatable, the discrete, tne static, the out-
ward). 4 In the moving continuity of reality v/e mark outlines
useful for our successful ongoing. Then we forget that 7/e
drew in the outlines artificially and arbitrarily (and tnat
3 . EDIC, 104. EG, 218: "Or, sur les moments reels de la
duree reelle 1 ’ intelligence trouve sans doute prise apr^s
coup, en recons tituant le nouvel etat avec une serie de vues
prises^du dehors sur lui et qui ressemblent autant que possible
4u deja connu."
4. In dualism in general we meet the threefold opposition
of "l'etendu et 1 ' inet^ndu, " "qualite et quantite, ' and "la
liber te et la necessite" (MM, 273). And Bergson’s view, while
not strictly dualistic, has dualistic implications. Troland,
in FP, I, 37, designates Bergson as one of tnose who "champion
a confused dualistic view with vitalistic implications."

52
we may erase one set of outlines and make otners at will with-
out effect on reality) and allow our hahits of outlining and
designing to make us believe that there are patterns in real-
ity itself. Next we aigue and dispute about our patterns,
naturally not able to come to agreement when disputants have
cut out different designs lor different uses (biology, mathe-
matics, commerce, art, psycnology, religion, let us say).
Finally confusion covers all when each disputant assumes that
his pattern jj3 the original real. He is experiencing the
real; he can never be satisfied with the pattern he has set
up as real, for it is not rear ana he feels or intuits its
discrepancy with reality. But he keeps trimming it and clip-
ping it and turning it this way and that, thinking it must
nave some snape and position that is real. He has forgotten
that reality has no place and no position, but only succes-
sion. 5 Only time is real. Spatializing is a habit time has
formed
.
To spatialize is to intellectualize
. Time, which is con-
sciousness, 6 invented intellect for purposes of practical
utility. 7 Most of our thinking is intellectualizing
,
that is,
spatializing, or artificially cutting out various shaped and
sized pieces from reality. A word (the word "chair," the word
"love") spatializes. It cuts out from consciousness, which is
5. And "la succession existe seulement pour un spectateur
conscient qui se remdmore le passe" (EDIC, 82).
6. Infra
, 61.
7. This is not to say tnat action is purposive. See infra,
85-89.

a continuous whole, a concept, wnicn is nothing real, hut a
manufactured tool for the uses oi consciousness. I think
about a chair. I may think about !'a furnished room," I may
think about "furniture," or I may think about "a cnair leg."
I say, "I love you." But "love" divides my real experi-
ence artificially. lust or loyalty , business interests or
artistic ambition, many other interests, interpenetrate in
love so tnat no one is real . ithout all the rest. ‘nia I luo.y
fur oner spatialize "love" as I like into "I’ll buy you what-
ever you want," "I like to look at you, or "-'ll take care oi
you." The reality that I spatialize by "love" or by "buy
tilings for you" or by "like to look ac you" or by tame care
of you" flows on, an undivided (indeed, an indivisiole) wnoler
1
The unrolling of reality has made inevitable the aichoto-
mization of experience into the spatial and the temporal. i'he
difficulty is that when v^e face problems we forget the occa-
sion of the dicnotomization; we forget tnat human beings are
always at the crossroads of two realities moving against each
other, the one (space) a reality, however, only because it is
useful to the other (time); we forget tnat homogeneous time is
8.
n
EDIC, 75: "Mais les faits de conscience, meme successifs,
se ,penetr e^it
,
et dans le plus simple d’entre eux peut se re-
flecnir l’ame entiere." EDIC, 95: "Le rnoi interieu^
,
celui
qui sent et se passionne, celui qui delibere et ^e decide, est
une force dont les e^ats et modifications se penetrent intime-
ment, et subissent une alteration proionde des qu'on les separe
les uns des autres pour les derouler dans l'espace."
9. EDIC
,
vii (words as spatial); 1-6, 52-05; 65-69 (espe-
cially 69); 82*106 (especially 82-83, 104); 118; MM, 231; EC,
3.
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a hybrid, springing from space grafted on time.
II y aurait done lieu de se deraander si le
temps, conpu sous la loirne d • un milieu homo-
gene, ne serait pas ^n concept oatard
,
du a
1‘ intrusion de l'idee ci’espace dans le domaine
de la conscience pure. 0
Starting from tms view of reality, Bergson has held to
two principles as a clue throughout his ov/n researenes
:
The first is that in psychological analysis
we must never forget the utilitarian character
df our mental functions, which are essentially
turned towards action. The second is that the
habits formed in action find their way up to
the’ sphere of speculation, where they create
fictitious problems, and that metaphysics must
begin by dispersing this artificial obscurity.
H
The data from a study of the comic, the data, supporting
the evolutionary hypothesis in tne natural sciences,-^ and the
data from modern mathematics^ confirm the dichotomy as given
in immediate experience-^ and as verified in an external ob-
servation of consciousness . I- 6 Reality is living, moving, un-
repeatable. The reason we laugh at mimicry, and the reason we
laugh at an orator who uses over and over again the same ges-
tures, is the same: tne mimic and the orator are pretending to
be living and real, yet they are repeating tnemselves
. Repe
tition coupled with reality is aosurdity, nonsense, like
17
10. EDIC, 75.
27-29, 272-279
11. M»]Li’
,
xvi-xv
12. R (1900)
.
13. EC (1907)
.
14. DS (1922 .
15. EDIC (1889).
16. MM (1896)
17. R, 33-35.
See EDIC, 118-119,
Gf. Stephen, MX,
. Gf. EDIC
134-137,
62-65.
vn-viii
.
171-184; MM, 16-

55
squareness coupled with circle. Repetition always implies
mechanization. The attempt of the vaudeville performer is "une
mecanisation de la vie."^ 8 "Le mecanisme n' envisage de la re-
alite que 1’ aspect similitude ou repetition. 1,19 "La vie ne se
recompose pas. Elle se laisse regarder s implement . "Tout
/ /\ / ' \ *
change inter ieurement
,
et la meme realite concrete ne se re-
\ pipete jamais."
/ /
7/hen life appears "s.e recomposer," or "se repeter," it is
for the sake of action, action, specifically, on solids. i’he
history of evolution "nous montre, dans la faculte de com-
prendre, une annexe de la faculte d’agir." 2^ Particularly,
/ / / \
"nos concepts ont ete formes a 1 1 image des solides' and "notre
logique est surtout la logique des solides." ° "Le role de
1
' intelligence est, en effet, de presider a des actions."^ 4
La repetition n'est done possible que dans
l'abstrait: ce qui se repete, e’est tel ou tel
aspect que nos sens et surtout no^re intelli-
gence ont detache de la realite, precisement
parce que notre action, sur laquelle tout 1' ef-
fort de notre intelligence est ytendu, ne se
peut mouvoir que parmi des repetitions . 25
Mais de la aevrait resulter aussi que notre
pensee, sous sa forme purement logique, est
incapable de se representer la vraie nature de
la vie, la signification profonde du mouvement
18. R, 103. Cf. also ii, 165-166.
19. EC, 49.
20. R, 172.
21. SC, 49.
22 . EC
,
i
.
23. EC, i.
24. EC, 323.
25. EC, 49-50.
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evolutif . . . . De fait, nous sentons bien qu’au-
cune des categories de not;e pensee , unite,7
multiplici te
,
causalite rnecanique, finalite in-
telligente, etc., ne s' applique exactement aux
choses de la vie.... En vain nous poussons le
vivant dans tel ou tel de nos cadres. i'ous les
cadres craquent. Ils sont trop etroits, trop
rigides surtout pour ce que nous voudrions y
raettre. Notre raisonnement
,
si sur de lui
quand il circule a trav^rs les choses inertes
,
se sent d'ailleurs mal a son aise sur ce nou-
veau terrain. 26
We cannot force the simplest of our conscious states into.
> /
the frame of a concept. "La verite est qu ' on change sans
cesse, et que l’etat lui-meme est deja du cnangement
.
,l2 ^
The concept "conscious state" is an artiiicial imitation
no / /
of the inner life.'00 "L* intelligence" is "le retr ecissement
"
/ t / pq
of "la realite plus compr enensive
.
And a study of the origins and development of morality and
religion^6 revealed in these crowning aspects of life the same
dichotomy of outward discreteness and inward continuity. I* ob -
ligation naturelle is press ion or ooussee ; in la morale com-
N 'Z "I
plete et parfaite there is un apyel . 01
26. EC, ii.
27. EC, 2. Cf. EC, 3.
28. EC, 4.
29. EC, 57. Ci . EC, 101-106. The act of a hand is simple
and indivisible to the mover; only one viewing the movement and
its result from the outside divides it artificially into suc-
cessive positions and into cause and effect or purpose and at-
tainment. See also ES(a)
,
20, 23, 25-26; ES(fh 178, 199-200;
DS, ix, 3, 54-77, 129., 191-241; IM, 1-13, 32-33, 44, 47, 52-55,
57, 59, 65-69, 80-83.
30. DSLIB (1932).
31. DSMR, 20-21, 30.
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If, instead of building up morality out of rules or out
of virtues ,
^
one moves along witn reality, one finds "le
sentiment d'une coincidence, reelle ou illusoire, avec l'ei-
I or t generateur de la vie. Vu du dehors, le travail de la
vie se prete, dans chacune de ses oeuvres, a une analyse qui
se poursuivrait sans fin," but "l'acte de la nature est
simple. "33 There is a view of morality wnich teacnes by rules:,
a method good in its place, and tnere is a method which allies:
the pupil with a per sonality
.
Par la premiere methode on inculque une
morale faite d’habitudes impersonnelles ; par
la seconde on obtient l 1 imitation d’une per-
sonne, et meme une union spirituelle, une co-
incidence plus ou mo ins complete avec elle.° 0
And as to religion,
Inde^inies en nombre, aussi, sont les ioxmes
de la superstition, ou plutdt de la religion
statique, qui resistent a ces resistances,
llais cette complication s’evanouit si l'on re-
place l'homme dans 1' ensemble de la nature,
si l’on considere c^ue 1 1 intelligence serait
un obstacle a la serenite" qu'on trouve par-
tout a-i^leurs, et que 1* obstacle doit £tre
surmonte, l'equilibre retabli. Envisage ^de
ce point de vue
,
qui est celui de la genese
et non plus de 1 'analyse, tout ce que 1* in-
telligence appliquee a la vie comportait
d’agitation et de defaillance, avec tout ce
que les religions y apporterent d *apaisement
,
devient une chose simple. Perturbation et v
fabulation se compensent et s'annullent. A
morality viewed analytically belongs to the closed
life of the ant or the bee (DSMR, 85-105).
DSMR, 51. Gf. DSMR, 52-64.
DSIvLK
,
98-105. \
DSMR, 99. "Tout est obscur, si l'on s ? en tient a de
on les appelle toutes ensemble so-
on.considdre plus._par ticulierement
,
dans
^intelligence
.
Tout s T ecIaire au contraire,
va cnercner
,
par-aela ces manii e stations
,
la vie
32.
social
33 .
34.
35. — ..
simples manifestations,
ciales ou que,l’
I Tnomme sodial,
si l’on
elle-meme" (DSLR, 102-103).
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un dieu, qui regarderait d • en haut , le tout
paraitrait inaivisiole, comrne la coniiance des
ileurs qui s'ouvrent au printemps
.
36
T
»Ve may think of the attributes 01 God, hut when we look
at our thoughts about God and try to compress tnem into one
iaea, that idea is not God; at most it is a god "que les
homines n'ont jamais songe a invoquer." 0 '
The dichotomizat ion of experience is related to five ma-
jor premises in Bergson s thougnt.
3 Five Lajor Principles in 1. The future is
Bergson's Thougnt
open. "Devant 1' evo-
lution de ia vie.... les portes de 1‘avenir restent grandes ou-
vertes." 3 ® Every tiling is not given at once. To see what is
to come we have to experience waiting. The reason we nave to
wait must be that the future is not altogether determined at
the present moment. 59 Tnere is, then, freedom in the universe
Science and history snow us that spontaneity and unloreseea-
bility are inherent in tne processes of life.
II est bien certain, par exemple
,
que si
nous envisagions 1' Solution de la vie dans son
ensemble, la spontaneite de son mouvemerit et
1 1 imprevisi bilite de ses demarches s'imposer-
aient a noire attention. 40
2. Time is real ana it is duration. The future is not
spread out now alongside the present.
36. DSMxi, 221-222.
37. DSIjK, 260-261; it is the Aristotelian God. See DSLR,
317-324, "Dichotomie" et "double Frenesie."
38. EG, 114. Cf
.
EC, 105.
39. EC, 366- 367.
40. . EC
,
244. Cf EC, 29.
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Le mecanisme radical implique une ^aetaphy-
sique ou la to^alite du reel est posee en bloc,
dans l'eternite, et ou la dure7e apparente des
choses expriment sirnplement 1 ' ini irrai d ' un
esprit qui ne peut pas connaicre tout a la
fois. Mais la duree est bien autre chose que
cela pour notre conscience, c'est-a-dire pour
ce ciu'il y a de plus indiscutable uans notre
exper ience . . . . nous ne pouvons sacrifier l’ex-
perience aux exigences d’un systeme. G'est
pourquoi nous repoussons le mecanisme radical. 4 -^
Time is succession, not a series ox simultaneities, it is
a flow of heterogeneous and original qualities, not a sum of
homogeneous quantities; it is continuous creation, not dis-
crete repetitions
.
42 The future nas to succeed the past and
Art
the present in a world in which all is not given at once.
And if the future does succeed the past and the present, time
is real. 44 Indeed, time is the only real. Keality is time
being experienced. rteal experience cannot he divided into
moments or into states. Science must juxtapose phenomena in
space. 4 ^ But when we speak or think of experience with words,
>
we are spatializing the non-spatial
.
46
"Substituant a la pene-
tration des terrnes reels la juxtaposition de leurs symboles,
/ / /in
nous pretendons reconstituer de la duree avec 1 ' espace
.
1,4
' We
41. EG, 42.
42. This is the essential point made in the first chanter
of EDIC.
43. EC, 366-367.
44. EDIC, 91-97.
45. EDIC, vii
; EG, i-iii, 212-239; IM, 8-9; cf. Stephen,
MM, 17-19.
46. Supra
,
51-56.
47. EDIC, 102. Cf. Stephen, IM, 43.

must always remember that there is a distinction between ex-
perience itself, and thinking about experience, 40 even tnough
thinking is part of experience. 49
3. Keality is of the nature of consciousness. In the
/
Essai Bergson has much to say about the purete originelle of
f
conscious states, which is inter ieur , which is quality, as
opposed to the "superficial," the "ar til icial , " tne "re-
/
fracted," the ext er ieur
,
which is quantity. Thought systems
are in terms of quantity. At best they are secondary, arti-
ficial. If they are not "projected" by the original experi-
ence, they are less than artificial; they are nothing. The
/
essential thing in the moi is "une multiplicite qualitative,"
t / / C A
not "la multiplicite numerique des etats conscients . " The
original qualitative multiplicity is le moi fondamental .
The original purity of consciousness is the basic material on
which Bergson must build. "Avant de philosopher
,
il faut
vivre .
"
We have to experience an experience before ;e can think
about it. Thinking about experience is different from experi-
encing in that there is added to the original experience the
consciousness tnat the experience was
,
not is . How conscious-
48"! EDIC, vii
, 7; IM, 13; EC, 1-8, 149-239.
49. Bergson does not discard mathematical or homogeneous
time. He says mathematical time is, properly speaking, a
spatial concept. See EDIC, 92, and EC, 49.
50. EDIC, 97. See also supra
,
51-56.
51. See EDIC, 97-98. See also ESi'b), 31-32, 36-38, 40, 43
44, 48, 59, 62-63.
52. DSlffi, 187.
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ness is nothing else than an indivisible pusning of was into
is into will be; tnat is, consciousness is notning else tnan
time experiencing itself.
Chacun des etqts dits successiis uu rnonde
exterieur exis^e seul, et leur multiplicity
n’a de re'alite que pour une conscience capable
de les conseiver d'abord, de les juxtaposer
ensuiie en les exterior isant les uns par rap-
port aux autres.^
Epiphenomenalism and psychophysical parallelism are wrong hy-
potheses. Matter, iorce, and motion cannot account for life,
intelligence, spirit.
4. The real is the active, the dynamic.^ 5 Time as dura-
tion is creative activity. -That uoe s notning i_s notning.^6
"Le temps est invention ou il n'est rien du touo."57 .Berg-
son’s elan vital is more will tnan intellect. (He stresses
always the intellect as that aspect of consciousness which
deals with static concepts.) This means that spontaneity and
unforeseeability will dominate over plan and purpose.
5. The evolutionary hypothesis in one form is convinc-
ing. That form is neither the mechanistic nor the teleologica
though it is more nearly related to the latter. 5a Life tran-
scends both mechanism and finality. 59
” 53. EDIC, 91. See also IM, 9, 65; ES^cf. ICE, v) ; DSMR,339-340
.
54. This is the main thesis of ES. See ES(a)
,
(b), (es-
pecially 44-46, 61), (c), (g); MM, II and III, and M'M*
,
x-
xi li. Cf. EDIC, 117, and DSKR, 339-340.
55. See supra
,
49-50.
56. EC, 42: "Du moment qu’il ne fait rien, il n'est rien
57. EC, 369.
58. EC, vii-viii, 43.
59. EC, vii, n. 1.
ii

In the light of neither mechanism or finality can we see
1' evolution vraie, le devenir radical. Mechanism and final-
62
ity are both a speculating on the nature of the real in the
interest of our practical affairs. 60 Each "etend sans hesi-
/ /
tation aux choses de la vie les procedeo d • explication qui
ont reussi pour la matiere brute. That is, ever since the
age of Plato and Aristotle,
' / /
A la continuite da changement evolutif notre
perception et
/
notre pensee commencent par sub-
stituer une
N
serie de formes stables qui ser-
aient tour a tour enfilees au passage, comme
ces anneaux que decrochent avec leur baguette,
en passant, les enfants qui tournent sur des
chevaux de bois. En quoi consistera alors le
passage, et sur quoi s'enfileront les formes?62
The intellectualistic view of evolution represented by
both mechanism and linality "se represent^, dans l’espace,
V / /
une matiere decoupee selon les lignes memes que suivra notre
action
.
Au fond de ces speculations il y a done les
deux convictions (correlatives et complemen-
caires) que la nature est une et que 1' intel-
ligence a pour fonction de 1 f embrasser en
entier
.
64
But philosophy which is true evolutionism "est l’appro-
fondissement du devenir en general"; it is "la coincidence de
la conscience humaine avec le principe vivant d'ou elle emane
,
60. EC, 296.
61. EC, iii
.
62. EC, 352-353.
63. EC, 206-207.
64. EC, 208.

63
une prise de contact avec 1' effort cre'ateur .
" 65 Intellect
alone cannot encompass this true evolutionism.
The reason for rejecting both mechanism and teleology as
theories of evolution is that each in its own way must assume.
tout est donne d 6 Both extend too far "1 ’application de cer-
tains concepts naturels a notre intelligence,” and, in so do-
ing f picture as given in advance something essentially unpic-
turable before its creation. Evolution is a succession of
original situations. Then it can neither be a series of
events made up of mechanically fastening together its prede-
cessors (mechanism) nor yet a series of events producing what
was foreseen in a conceptual plan (teleology). 67
In assuming that all is given and in applying intellec-
tual concepts to the evolutionary process, mechanism and
finality " s ’ accordent encore a faire table rase du temps.”
They deal with the mathematical time oi the scientists.
Whether one views evolution as a substitution of part for part
or as a gradual accumulation of parts (mecnanism both) or
whether one views evolution as a substitution of an actual
event for a conceptual plan, one considers only tne extremities
of an artificially isolated period of duration. 06 As time, the
duration between the extremities is disregarded. As space it
65. SC, 399.
66. EC, 40, 42, 49. See EC, 40-55, 112.
6 l . EC, 30. See also DSMR, 85-86, 118-119
68. EDIC
,
?-90; EC, 22-24.
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may serve as a unit of measurement, but space is not real time
Space is quantity ; time is quality. A series of quantities is
homogeneous; a succession oj. qualities is heterogeneous. We
must include the interval of duration as well as the extremi-
ties if we are to apply our evolutionary theory to reality.
Por the fact is that reality is of two orders, quantity and
quality. When only magnitudes are concerned, trie result can
be foreseen, but when qualities are concerned, the onrolling
is spontaneous, variable, and unforeseeable.
Bergson rejects, then, not only the evolutionism of Dar-
win, tne neo -Darwinians
,
and DeVries, but also or tnogenesis
.
7^
He rejects Spencer's theory 7 ^ and even Lamarcx's, though he
has more in common with Lamarck than with tne others. 72 ne
accepts transformism, but tne transforming is continuous
growth, not replacement or substitution.
With mechanistic determinism and purpose both out of the
reckoning, we might conclude that chance is the only alter-
native theory. But Bergson's evolutionism is not the outcome
of chance. We cannot, he says, define chance. Chance is
merely the order we do not expect. 74 Chance and order are
both relative to mind. The evolutionary process is free action
but it is not capriciousness
.
75
w. ”W7~2~31 -236, 243-244.
70. EC, 83, 92-93, 185.
71. EC, vi-vii
,
392-399.
72. EC, 83-84, 92-95, 185.
73. EC, 24-28.
74. EC, 254 -255; DSMh, 154-
75. EC, 51.

What is really going on in the universe, says Bergson,
is "un elan originel de la vie, passant d'une generation de
\ / / /
germes a la generation suivante de germes par 1 * mtermediaire
/ /
des organismes develop^es qui torment entre les germes le
crait d ’union." 76 This "elan originel de la vie" is of a
psychological nature, it is an eiTort in a deeper, more psycho
logical sense than even Lamarcm supposes.'''
So Bergson agrees with tne teleolo.^is us in positing es-
sential causes of a psycnological nature. He also agrees that
the organized world is a narmonious whole. But tne harmony is
not so perfect as the teleologist has claimed, and sucn har-
mony as there is, is behind rather than before. It is iden-
tify of impulsion rather than common aspiration that is tne
harmonizing principle. Eur tiier
,
tne harmony is a harmony of
tendencies rather than of states. 70
In this view the idea of creation is merged with that of
growth. 79 Evolution is ceaseless movement. There are no stop;
on the way. 89 And the movement is a movement of dissociation,
noo of association. Vegetative torpor, instinct, and intelli-
gence are not stages in an evolutionary development; they are
"trois directions divergentes d’une activite
/
qui s’est scindee
Q-1
en grandissant .
"
76. EG, 95. Cf
.
EG
,
vii
.
7 7. SC, 84. See EG, 112.
78. EG, 50-51, 54-57, 288
79. EC, 262, 269 -2 70.
80. EG, 328- 339.
81. EG, 146- 147.
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These interests have a bearing on the problem of identi-
ty. If "tout n'est pas donne , " if the future is entirely
4 rne Bearing 01 these Interests open, entirely
on the Problem of Identity
unpredictable
( impr evisible ) , determined in no slightest leature, if any-
thing in the widest stretch of trie word’s meaning may happen,
what can I write about identity that will be true by the *time
I finish my sentence? If reality is of tne nature of the con-
scious, can an apparently unconscious object have real iden-
tity? If an unconscious object can have any sort of identity,
is tne identity for itself or only attributed to it by a con-
scious being? Gan an identity endure, that is, can it cease-
lessly change by creating itself? Gan identity find place in
A
a reality whose verb is not etr
e
out lair
e
? Can identity in-
here in consciousness which is a flux? Do we experience psycho
logical identity? Is either logical or real identity given in
experience? If so, what is the nature of the identity? Gan
the same sort of identity be vie?/ed in outward discreteness and
be intuited in inward continuity?
B. SOME KEY YOhDS IK BERGSON 1 S PHILOSOPHY
To describe experience from without Bergson needs words. 82
These confuse us with contradictions, for they are spatial or
1 Tfords as Abstractions logical abstractions. 83
82. EDIG, vii
; 7; ES(a) , 23.
83. EDIG, vii, 7, 103.
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Language requires "un equivalent statique,' 1 "une imitation
ar tii icielle" of "la vie interieure," a self wnich endures. 1^4
These artificial imitations of reality are words . 85
But we must try to edge our way86 into the meaning of
Bergson's key words. Bergson adopts the activistic view of
2 Definitions Heraclitus, Leio-
a Le It6el
,
le Changement
,
la BuFfeT niz , Hegel, Lotze,
Bowne
,
Knuds on, Brightman, and others, rather than the Being
of the Eleatics, the Scnolastics, Spinoza, and tneir succes-
sors. The verb fair e taxes precedence over tne vero etre .
What does nothing is nothing. All reality is tendency
,
an in-
cipient cnange of direction. There is no core of realicy.
There is no being which experiences change or may be described
/
by tne attribution of qualities to it. Le ree l, 1 1 exist ence
throughout, is mobility, tendency, le changement . Our under-
standing is continually designating points in the change or
marking out areas in it, but this is for practical purposes.
The real is a living undivided mobility.
Le changement is continuous; there are no breaks in its
/ / /
flow. It is a "succession, ou continuite d 1 int erpenetration
/ N
dans le temps, irreductible a une simple juxtaposition in-
stantanee dans l’espace." 88
847 EC, 4.
85. R, 156-157; cf. EDIC, 101; Stephen, MM, 12-13, 17, 36-
38, 42, 56-57- Chevalier, B, 39-40, 56.
86
. Cf . IM
,
2
.
87. IM, 65, 67, 76-77; cf. Benda, B, 7.
88. EC, 369.
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And this cnange is continuously inventive of new direc-
tions, new tendencies. It is, in other words, real time. "Le
89
temps est invention ou il n’est rien du touL. ,,UJ7
/ •
Bergson usually refers to real time as la duree ratner
than as le temps . The latter term he reserves more often for
tne artificial, spatialized time of mathematic ians and scien-
Lists
.
lange
,
99 La duree toute pure is la duree
" in which there is not brought in
/
"pure de tout rne-
/
s ubr ep t i cemen
t
1
' ide (!
d ’ espace .
"
La duree Loute pure, est la forme que prend
la succession de nos etats de conscience
uand notre moi se laisse v,ivre, quand il
s ’abs tient d ' etablir une separation entre
L’etat present et les etats ante'r ieur s
.
92
That is, in pure duration past and present form an or-
ganic whole, wnich is experienced in its wholeness as a qual-
ity, not viewed as a series of events, things, or states.
The quality ol the present is affected by the past. But in
pure duration there is no confusion of present with past, no
distinguishing of past from present; there is only the experi-
encing of the unique quality oi the present as that into which
the past has grown. 93
Strictly speaking, then, duration is not measurable,
since it is quality not quantity. 9 ^ It is experienced time,
89T SC, 369; cf. SC, 1-7; IM, 44-45, 65.
90. Infra, 68-70. See references, supra, 53, n. 9.
91. SDIC, 76.
92. SDIC, 76.
93. SDIC, 77-79.
94. SDIC, 80-81.
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not a view of time taken from without.
To be real, tnere_ore, is to endure, and duration is
ceaseless inventive cnange , whicii is a definition of real
/
time. So also may consciousness be defined. Le reel , la
dur ee
,
is consciousness ( la conscience ). "Quant a la vie
/
psy chologique
,
telle qu'elle se deroule sous les symboles qui
la recouvrent, on s’apercevoii sans peine que le temps en est
/ /\ OK
l'etofie meme." ya
La duree
,
le reel
,
1* existence
,
le cnangemenc
,
is c, ual -
ite . 96 tie ourselves endure, tnat is, exist, are real, change
b Q.ualite and Quant ite ; continuously , 9 ^ and
1 'Sspace and le fei-.ps
our duration is qual-
QQ
ity. Quality stands for heterogeneity, u variety, individual
differences, uniqueness, as opposed to quantity, which stands
for homogeneity and sameness. Qualities endure, quantities
are an abstraction from enduring reality, for quantity is by
definition measurable, and measuring implies terms, limits,
static points and lines. Such, we have learned, are never in
reality as given. All into whicn we can sympathetically in-
sert ourselves endures as a quality because it is our own
existing
.
99
But, besides continuing to be conscious, we can think
about our consciousness, our duree
,
199 and we can think about
EC, 4; cl. EDIC, 82-83; IM, 55.
96. IK, 71; cf. EDIC, vii, I, II; Stephen, IM, 54-55.
97. See IM, 11; SC, 325.
98. EDIC
,
79.
99. IM, £-3.
100.
Iii, 6, 7, 54.
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all tnat nas ever entered into oar consciousness or tnat our
consciousness has ever entered into . When v/e think about la
duree
,
we must think about it in spatial terms, because think-
ing about it is to take a view of it, and taking a view im-
plies a viewpoint, and a viewpoint introduces dimensions.-1- 01
L 1 e space is just our thought about tilings from a viewpoint. 10^
/
It is in terms of quant ite . It is an artificial abstraction
/ / /
from la duree
,
which is le reel or quali te .
Now le temps as matheniaticia.ns and scientists employ it
is also a thought about reality from a viewpoint; it is quan-
tity; it is space, an artificial spatial construction. It is
the view from without of la dure'e experienced within. Science
introduces order into its terms. One order is tnat of beiore
and after . hut
,
/
On ne saura.it etablir un ordre ent- e des
termes sans les distinguer d'abord, sans com-
parer ensuite les places qu'ils occupent; on
les aperpoic done multiples, simultanes^- et
distincts; en un mot.*- on les juxtapose, et si
l'on etablit un ordre dans le successii
,
e'est
que la succession devient simultaneite^ et se
projette dans l'espace. 10 ^
_ . ,
' /
.
/
L'idee d^une sene reversible dans la
duree, ou meme simplement d'un certain ordre
de succession dans le temps, iniplique done
ell e-m'eme la representation de l’espace. 10 ^
/«
re picture succession as a line, and say v/e are not think-
ing in terms of three dimensional space.
101. EDIC, vii, II { especially 75-81, 103); cf. IM, 1, 4.
102. Cf. Stephen, Ml,:, 54-o5, 81; l’espace is logical form.
103. EDIC, 77.
104. EDIC. 78.
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Lais qui ne voit que , pour apercevoir une
ligne sous lorme de ligne, il iaut se placer
en dehors d'elle, se rendre cornpte^ du vide
qui l'entoure, et penser par consequent un
espace a trois dimensions*: 105
And space is motionless, just as time is motion.
xiinsi, dans notre moi, il y a succession
sans, exterior ite reciproque; en dehors du moi,
exterior ite' reciproque sans succession. 105
Now because science must taxe an external viewpoint of
succession, science "n'opere sur le temps et le mouvement
\ / / /
qu'a la condition d'en eliminer d’aoord 1' element essential
et quali tatif
,
- du temps la duree, et du mouvement la mo-
bili te.
"
10 1
(//e see that that is exactly what science does. In a
scientific problem only the extremities of time count. fhe
interval of duration is symbolized quantitatively, in spatial
terms. The two extremities are designated as points, spatial
terms. This externalizing of terms in relation to one another
and in distinction from one another is setting them out in
space. And such a space is Homogeneous time. 10°
Quantity is, however, always quality in a nascent state10
The real is both quality and quantity. Keality experienced as
;>
la vie inter ieure is quality; reality viewed externally is
quantity. -/hen we mention la vie in te^ ieure
,
tne inner aspect
of consciousness, we imply that there is an outer aspect of
105. EDIC, 78-79.
106. EDIC, 82.
107. EDIC, 87.
108. EDIC, 91-92.
109. Ik, 71
See also EC, 8-10, 22-24, 356-572.
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consciousness. This outer aspeco is in terms of quantity.
When we regard that part of reality which we do not experience
as part of our own stream of consciousness, we are looking
upon a quantity of the world. ./hen in imagination we insert
ourselves into any aspect of the world not ourselves we ex-
perience even that quantity as quality. On tne other hand,
when
,
instead of merely experiencing our own conscious proc-
esses, we take a view oi tnem, step outside ourselves as it
were, and view our processes as series of states, we are view-
ing our qualities as quantities.
Life is coextensive witn consciousness
.
110 That is, life
/
is duration ( la duree
,
real time/. Or, life is continuous, in-
9, La Vie., le Yivant ,
1 ’Sian Vital
imi table cnange . 111 "Par-
72
tout ou quelque chose vit, il y a, ouvert quelque part, un re-
gistre ou le temps s ’ inscr it . "H2
/ /\
Plus la duree
/
marque l’etre vivant de son
empreinte, plus evidemment l'organisme se dis-
tingue d T un mecanisme pur et simple, sur lequel
la duree glisse sans le penetrer. ^
/ v
More strictly, life is "la conscience lancee a travers la
matiere . 1,114 Pure consciousness and pure matter are charac-
terized by a certain mutual exclusiveness, tnougn neitner exist^
without the other. Life is a blending of consciousness and
II. . EG, 203, 279. In EG life is regarded in general from
the psychological point of view (EC, vii, n. l). ME(a)
,
11:
"In principle
,
consciousness is co-extensive with life." KS(a)
was prepared and delivered originally in English.
III. "' EG, 17; K, 32-34, 103-104.
il§: S8’, %-40.
114. EC, 197.
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matter, better, consciousness and matter are dissociated from
a main stream of life. Life is not a syntnesis. Liie pro-
ceeds by dissociation and division, not by association and ad-
dition ol elements. 115 "Le role de la vie est d'inserer de
/ n i i f.1
' indetermination dans la matiere." XJ-
Life implies an interaction of antagonistic tendencies,
symbolized by the words consciousness and matter, indetermina-
tion and determination, reproduction and individuation, la
dur ee and 1 ' espace . And life implies choice. 11 '’
Life flows forth from an original impetus of life. Tnis
impetus is treated by Bergson in his earlier work as a con-
scious activity11 ^ and in Les deux sourc es de la morale et de
la religion more nearly as a person. 119 It consists in a need
to create, a need to insert inde terminat ion and freedom into
necessity. Its essence is the movement by which it transmits
itself from one living being to another. 120 "Les etres ont
ete appeles a 1' existence qui etaient destines a aimer et a
r\ ? / / /
etre aimes, l'energie creatrice devant se definir par l'amour
/ /V
|
Q I
....Lieu, qui est cette energie meme . . . . " is "l'amour et
visible
besoin d'aimer and the universe is "I'aspect^et tangible
115. See EC
,
97, 288-289.
116. EC, 137; cf
.
EC, 108 -112; DSMR, 95.
117. me( a)
,
8 •
118. EDIC, 82 -83, 91-92, 110-115; MM, 159-160, 251, 262-264,
-272; EC, 29, 83-84, 194, 198, 257 -258, 279, 283 -289, 293,
398-399; Bergson-Carr
,
US, v.
119. DSMR, 225, 235, 266, 274, 276.
120. EC, 273, 279; cf. 139-140.
121. DSMR, 276.
122. DSMR, 274.
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de l’amour et du besoin d'aimer." If this be so, reality is
spirit, is conscious experiencing.
L'elan vital is an Absolute. Living beings are merely
thoroughfares through which la vie flows. 123 They appear
"relativement stables" and they pretty successfully "contre-
font . . . . 1 ' immobilite" ; but they are not des cnoses but des
progres ; "la permanence meme de leur forme n’est que le des-
sin d’un mouvement
.
1,124 me movement, "le grand souffle de
la vie," 125 is the Absolute, l 1 elan vital .
Life is consciousness. Consciousness is freely inven-
tive. That is, it is an instrument of action. 126 Two things
d La Conscience are to be noted in this instru
ment of action. First, consciousness is primarily memory;
second, consciousness is anticipation of the future involving
hesitation and choice. "To retain what no longer is, to an-
ticipate what as yet is not, - these are the primary functions
127
of consciousness."
Theoretically consciousness is coextensive with all that
has ever entered experience and Bergson takes as his problem
of consciousness or memory not how and why we remember what
we remember, but how and why we forget what we forget. 128 In
his theory, nothing can be completely forgotten. Hence, we
123. See SC, 139, 275-276, 292-294.
124. EC, 139.
125. EC, 139.
126. See
,
e. g. , EC, 193.
127. ME(a)
,
8. See the entire passage from which this
sentence is taken. Cf. IM, 12.
128. ES (d )
.
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assume degrees of consciousness merging imperceptibly into
unconsciousness. If the unconscious level of a conscious
being's memory or consciousness is a sort of unconsciousness,
v/e may infer that every object in the universe represents a
type of unconscious consciousness 129 Full consciousness
flares up only when an oostacle arises to impede tne activity
of l’elan vital at tne unconscious level. 130
Consciousness is not a sum of states existing either
simultaneously or in succession. What we call states ox con-
sciousness melt into one another so that no dividing line is
/
discernible. For consciousness is la duree . It is memory
and hesitation, but it is cnoice, mobility, nee invention -
/ ”1 ^ ”1
"elle est la liber te raeme . " "L’organisme le plus humble
est conscient dans la mesure ou il se meut libremem . "132
Consciousness nas oecome dissociated into intuition,
intellect or intelligence, ana instinct. Intuition signifies
e L ' Intelligence
,
1
' Intui - tne inner dura-
tion
,
1
'
Instinct
(l~) L' Intelligence and tional aspect of
1 1 Intuition
(a~J A Double Form of consciousness; in-
Consciousness
tellect and in-
stinct are directed toward external action. We consider nere
first intuition and intellect.
,'/nen we are tninxing spatially, outwardly, we are 1 ' in -
telligence ; when vie are enduring consciously , inwardly, vie
129. See MS(a)
,
14-15, and EC, 156.
130. ME(a)
,
14-15; EC, 156-157, 194-195, 263, 2c36; cf.
DSKR
,
13.
131. SC, 293.
132. SCj 121.
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are ] t intuition . L 1 intelligence is consciousness directed
toward operations on solid snapes. L 1 intuition is conscious-
ness directed inward toward sensitivity to tne cnanging quali-
ties of its succession. Or, intellect is condensed intuition;
intellect is the nucleus ana intuition is a fringe about it. 133
Above all, we must not think of intellect and intuition
as merely two faculties. 134 ihey represent the double form of
consciousness135 wnich is due to tne double form of reality -
matter (the discrete, the solid, tne static, tne logical - ne-
cessity) and life (continuous, the fluid, the experiential -
freedom). Intellect is_ intuition, intuition using logical
molds as instruments for making distinction (distinguere
,
to
separate). Intuition i_s intellect, intellect reversing its
i
direction of action, intellect becoming intellectual sympathy
with an object, intellect expanding itself.
Remembering tne necessary contradictoriness of words, we
are not surprised to find that tnough intellect and intuition
(b) L* Intuition as Tran- are one, intui-
scending 1 1 Intelligence
tion transcends
intellect. Intellect passes over the surface of the stream,
cutting out and solidifying patterns on which and with which
to act; intuition flows with the deep currents. Intuition is
aware of parts of tne variaore, moving whole; intellect makes
for itself discrete elements of the invariaole, immobile sym-
133. EG, 50, 53, 192, 210-211.
134. See Stephen, MM, 107.
135. Supra
.
51-58.
136. See EC, 290-291.
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tools substituted for parts of the whole. 1
-" 7
It is a mistake to assume that because in intuition life
and consciousness remain within tnemselves, intuition is on
(c) The Value of all accounts preferable
to intellect. If con-
1 * Intelligence
sciousness had been limited to intuition, it would not nave
progressed lar. 1 -^ Intellect "touche quelque cnose de l’ab-
solu." 13 ^1 Intellect opens up an unlimited field to conscious-
ness. And though intuition uses intellectual molds as instru-
ments, intellect turns inward ana routes intuition to exer-
cise.
Particularly is it a mistake to define intuition as vague
awareness or as an unformed feeling. 1^ intuition is not pas-
sivity but strain and
labor. It is "un vigo-
(d) The Effort in
1
' Intuition
reux effort de reflexion" 1 ^1 by means of which we enter into
our true selves. Intuition does not abanuon intellect but
uses it. The contrast between 1 * intelligence and 1 ' intuition
is not the contrast between the rational and clear and the
137. See EC, 168-169, 218; Stephen,
,
102, 107.
138. See EC, 197-198. Cf. DSMR, 84.
139. SC, iv.
140. Flewelling and Benda seem to give less than due recog
nition to the conscious effort involved in intuition. Cf.
Flewelling, BPB, 81-86, 94-102, 140-141, and Benda, B, 19-25,
II, 101-102; PP, 17-19, 22-23, 27-39, 70-82, with ES(d), 102-
111; IM, 56-63; ME(a)
,
34-35 (passage omitted from ES(aj);
LeRoy, PTTHB, 24, 38, 46, 56, 58, 112-113, 118, 120, 149-150,
153; Carr, PC, 3-4, II.
141. EDIC
,
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irrational and obscure, 142 but tne con eras t between immobility
and mobility, between discontinuity and continuity, between
science ano. life, between criticism and invention. me
meaningful and important syntheses of reality have oeen
grasped only after laborious intellectual operations on its
superficial manifestations
.
144
Intuition is experience of the continuous real; intellect
is knowledge of symbols of parts oi the real. These symbols,
(2) L 1 Instinct cast on intellectual molds,
are solid shapes. Intellect is knowledge of the shape, and
instinct is knowledge of the solidity. 140 Intellect is di-
rected toward forms, relations, consc iousness ; instinct,
toward matter, things, unconsciousness. Instinct is debased
intuition
.
14 ^
Intellect, intuition, and instinct do not act or even
exist separately. They are not differences of degree of
rationality (as Aristotle mistakenly supposed). 147 They are
modes of one psychic activity.
142. In spite of the material referred to in note 140 on
page 77, it is true tnat clearness as distinctness is not in
intuition, which, is primarily will. See infra , 91-92
,
135-137.
143. See IM, 47; EG, 167-169
;
v
"Notes sur les or igijies
psycnologiques de notre croyance a la loi de causaiite," 5;
DSMR, 41.
144. IM, 91; cf. Bergson's words at the banquet for Xavier
Leon, Quoted in Chevalier, B, 62.
145. Gf. EG, 161.
146. Intellect is more important in this dissertation than
instinct is. Bor further treatment oi iisti.ict, se. EG, 149-
153; ME(a), 34; DSMR, 22, 119, 135; LeKoy
,
PNKB
,
103-108.
147. EC, 146-147; cf. EC, 55.
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Matter
,
or materiality, in contradistinction from its
148
complement, consciousness , is '’inertia, geometry, necessity, :T
f La Matiere quality diluted into quantity,
pure homogeneity, pure repetition, tne dispersion of all dura-
tion. 149 It is tne resistance which the simple activity of
the vital impulse encounters. 159
avec cette image a'un geste createur
qui se aeiait nous aurons de^a une re^rbsenta-
tion plus exacte de la matiere. Et nous ver-
rons alors, dans l'activite vitale, ce qui
subsiste du mouvement uirect dans le mouve-
ment inverti, une realite qui se fait a tra-
vers celle qui se' ctefait . 151
The descent oi life is a growing materialization of the
immater ial 15 ^’ into tnings whicn are at once obstacle, in-
strurnent, and stimulus. ° Latter "aivise ce qu'elle pre-
cise. "154
Latter, viewed as a whole, is seen to be a flux, 155 but
in forming precise instruments ior external action intellect
cuts out oi matter, tnings, wnich necessarily partake of "the
immobility of a point oi view," and necessarily contain their
future in their present. 156 But things are only "des vues
prises par notre esprit sur le devenir. II n'y a pas de
148. ME(a)
,
17.
149. IM, 63-64.
150. DSMK, 117-120.
151. EC, 269.
152. ES ( f )
,
202.
153. LTE(a), 29; DSMK, 119.
154. DSMk, 119.
155. EC, 203.
156. IM, 62; Ml', 1-2; cf. EC, 219.

..157
choses, il n'y a que cles actions.
As the tendency of reality toward logical distinctness or
spatiali ty
,
158 matter is a principle of individuation. 189
Individual signiiies inaivisiule, atomic. An individual
is "anything that cannot be divided without losing its iden-
g L* Individu tity. 1,189 In the world of ex-
perience it is difficult to point out an individual. No
organism which reproduces its kina is an individual, for it
reproduces its kind by emitting one of its parts. So indi-
viduality is a tendency, not a state. It is a tendency toward
spatiality, toward logical definiteness. Any living body yet
invented by tne life impulse wears away and drops out of tne
temporal flow. Lixe guards against such chance of failure by
inventing a bodily mechanism which emits a part of itself that
will take up anew the battle of life. The parent body cannot
oe a real individual because after tne germ cell nas been
divided from it, the new organism continues to be in some
sense itself and so does the original organism. ihe new or-
ganism cannot be completely an individual, i or it is part of
an organism of which it is now independent in its functioning.
Yet if an organism, attempting to be and remain complete in
space, does not emit a part ox itself, its temporal existence
157 . EC
,
270
.
158. Cf. Stephen, MM, III, especially 77-78, 85-86; Gen-
tile, TMPA, 247; Chevalier, ±>, V; LeKoy
,
PNHB, 97-99; 186;
EDIC, 75-79; Mk, 14-30; EC, 203, 218-233.
159. See ME^a), 28; EG, 292.
160. TTinston, SI), s. v. ••Individual."

is soon cut off. The individualizing spatial tendency and the
reproducing temporal tendency are continually at war with each
other. "Le besoin merne qu' elle [l ‘ individuality] eprouve ae se
perpetuer dans le temps 1., condamne a n'e^re jamais complete
dans 1 ’ espace .
-
161
"Ou commence alors, ou finit le principe
vital ie 1 * individu?" 162
A second factor in experience forbidding tne completion
of a tendency toward an individual is the relation of tne so-
called individual to society. As so-called individual cells
are included in the human organism, so so-called individual
persons are included in an organic society, 16 '^1 and such an
inclusion is inherent in the nature of tne life impulse.
Among seemingly dissociated individuals, it is one life that
goes on moving.
That is, Bergson is an absolutist, and there is no sepa-
rate individual in an absolutistic view of the universe. The
whole dissociates itseli into aspects which may only in care-
161. EC, 14.
162. EG, 46; cf. EG, ii.
163. DSMR, 2-3, 6-14, 16-20, 211-212. Yet numan society
is an organism "laissant tant de marge aux individus qu'on ne
sait si elle est faite pour eux ou s’ils sont faits pour elle'.'
(DSKR, 122). Man’s power to act is so directed and regulated
by nature as to function in a society,. / But, "Les soci^tes hu-
maines different sans ^oute des sociec.es d’insectes en ce
qu'elles laissent indeterminees les demarches de l’individu,
comme d'aiiieurs celles de la collectivi tell (DSMR, 110. In
ME(a)
,
25-26, Bergson seems to assume the reality of the in-
dividual for practical purposes.). Human societies in their
struggles and wars are seeking to "bring about that individual
wills should insert themselves cn the social will without
losin their individual form" (ME(a)
,
33-34).
«
. .
. -
-
less usage be called parts. They are not mutually exclusive
parts, because the same wnole is flowing tnrough each, and
each in some degree interpenetrates all the others.
As for things external to ourselves, we take note of
their individuality only as it is to our material advantage to
perceive it. 164 And. we hardly then perceive individuality but
rather certain features which are of use to our action.
The living body is nearer Deing an individual than is the
unorganized body. Bergson assumes that an individual must be
\ / / / > /
un organisme
,
une sy^teme
,
must have neterogeneite de parties
and diversite' de fone tions . I*55 In the attempt to find that
which is indivisiole there is no thought of pursuing an analy-
sis until an uncuttable, an atom, is reached. In one pas-
oagel 56 Bergson clearly implies that complexity is essential
to individuality. An animal or any being which is charac-
terized by one quality to the p^acoical exclusion of other
qualities, merges into the species of which it is a member. A
being, to be thought 01 as an individual, must have individual
characteristics, must be dif ferent in quality from other beings
These key words 01 Beigson give us certain premonitions
regarding the problem of identity in his philosophy. In a
3 Bear ing of these Definitions philosophy in
on tne Problem of Identity
which temporal
164. H, 156.
165. See EC, 13, 15-16.
166. DSKR, 193-194.
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terms have priority over spatial terms identity cannot be the
identity of a material occupying space nor of a static core
of being over which changing appearances flit. With logic
defined in spatial terms identity cannot he even the identity
of that which occupies thought. Here, however, we refer only
to metaphysical identity, and perhaps to psychological iden-
tity, not to logical identity.
Identity implies that something endures or continues.
But when we say that, we must remember what it means to en-
dure. Enduring is a continuous changing which carries with it
memory of its past changing and which is ceaselessly creative.
The double form of consciousness must be reckoned with.
It may prove difficult to see clearly whether an identity can
be known by intellect and by intuition and yet somehow be the
seme identity. Troland, discussing Bergson's point of view, 15 '
gays that if a description is to have "meaning," it must be
made to touch again the actual experience. Bergson would
agree but would add that it is impossible for this ever to nap-
pen - tne only experience the description can touch is one in
which past-ness adulterates the iormer purity of the experience
one has tried to describe. Leaning involves a consciousness
which can receive meaning. Leaning involves also reference.
Reference to the real is impossible if the real is only a
)
forward moving memory - big with the past but with the past as
167. Troland, PP
,
I, 109.
• -
, «
.
- .
:
. .
•
.
.
.
- .
'
. . . .
-
truly past, forever gone and ir r eclaimable . Gan conscious-
ness as defined by Bergson bear meaning or identity? Can
meaning or identity anywhere in Bergson’s thought refer to
r eality
?
The view of matter as necessity opposing consciousness
and also as consciousness itself in its logical aspect pre-
sents difficulties, as does tne contrast between matter as
flux and material objects as immobile. What can identity of
a material object mean? And for whom or what can a cnair or
the material universe as a whole be said to preserve its
identity? Itself? An observing consciousness or an intui-
tive consciousness? Or both?
If consciousness is memory, if all harmony in the uni-
verse is from behind, we may perhaps have to confine our
statements to what has occurred till and including now. Can
such statements treat the problem of identity adequately?
Finally, tne difficulties of defining an individual and
the acceptance of tne theory that living beings are merely
channels through which tne life impulse flows, with the cor-
related theory that individuals are cells in an organic so-
ciety, make us ask whether there can be any identity (no mat
ter what identity means) otner than the Absolute - 1 ’ elan
/
vital . And if l’elan vital is the only identity, what is it
identity?
—
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C. ATTENTION AND INTENTION
Life, says Bergson, is attention. 168 The lapse of atten-
tion is the mecnanical, the conic, the antithesis of liie and.
1 life as Attention consciousness. Degree or
intensity of consciousness is proportional to attention to
life. 169
But, tnougn life or consciousness is anticipation of the
xuture, or attention, 1 ^9 it is not intention. As we have seen
2 Teleology Bergson rejects
a Bergson's Objections to
Teleology teleology in the
interest of the open luture and of a non-mechanistic tneory of
reality. The evolutionary process is not the realization of a
plan. 1 ^ 1 There is no general plan of tne vmole into which the
uetails may be fitted. All is not Coherent in nature. 17^
Bergson himself has said tnat his thought is nearer tele-
ology than mecnanism. There are many passages illustrating
b Implications of Teleology his close approach
in Bergson's Thought
to teleology.
Only a few of the passages are cited here.
168. R, 103; cf. M'-L*
,,
xtv
,
XV
.
169. See ES(e ) ; ME(a)
,
,
8 ; DSiiu
,
170. HE(a) , 8.
171. Supra, 61-65.
172. LG, 114; cf. EC, 105.
173. EC, 54.

86
L 1 intention is "un element de per sonnalite , " and
l 1 elan vital may be thought of as of trie nature of conscious-
ness, 175 which is a distinguishing mark of personality. It
is not a long step from this to tne inference tnat there is
intention in 1 ' e^an itself or himself. We may with practical,
if not absolute, certainty regard 1 ' elan vital as an energie
cr e'atr ice wnich is 1 ' amour and wnicn ''vouarait tirer d'elle-
rneme des etres dignes d'etre aimes." 178 Sucn an impulse
surely bears intimations of purpose.
The "role original" of 1' intelligence 17 ' and tne "role de
la vie" 1 ' 8 and the very fact that consciousness is cnoice179
all suggest purpose. The role of commanding personalities is
at least a hint that tne universe is of a nature to permit the
working out oi a purpose. 188
Adaptation of an organism in terms of tne interests of
tne organism implies at least a rudiment of purpose, 181 as
does the evolution toward a society. All Bergson's objections
to mechanism, epiphenomenalism, and psycno-physical paral-
lelism weign on the side of teleology
.
18^
174. BSI2R, 164.
175. DSL-R , 267; supra , 72-74.
176. See D3I.CR, 223, 274-275.
177. DSmE, 170.
178. EC, 137.
179. See especially EC, 105.
180. See DSMR, 30, 38-102.
181. Though adaptation is a replying, not a repeating (EC,
63) .
182. ITotably in ES and Mil. Also in such passages as EC,
194-201.
=—
.
,
'
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
•
•
•
.
•
.
.
•
His voluntarism works lor purpose in tnat it insists on
the possibility of action wnich is one’s own. But it works
against purpose in its opposition to intellectualism in tnat
it forbids possibility of content in the free urge to act.
Finality may be -understood in a special sense compatible
with Bergson’s system
.
183 But with his emphasis on the open
future and on will rather tnan reason as prime reality, he
cannot subscribe to teleology by that name. "A sort of pur-
pose, too, has this vital impulsion," Professor Lovejoy wrote
in 1913, twenty years before the appearance of Lea deux
sources d e la morale et de la religion , "though a purposive-
ness without prevision or conscious design." In nis later
thought Bergson has not departed from that "sort of purpose"
wnich he will not identify with true teleology.
It is clear that no consciousness really includes will
be. The will be is unknown, unformulable . Consciousness is a
3 Comments on the Place of growing novelty and
Purpose in Bergs on's Thought
at any given moment
is chiefly memory. Will be flashes quickly across i_s into
was . Intention as a clear prefiguration of the future is im-
possible in a consciousness for which time is real. When we
think we are thinking about the future, we are really thinking
about the past. We are rearranging its patterns . We cannot
183. EC, 59.
184. "Bergson ana Romantic Evolutionism." Univer si ty of
California Chronicle
,
15(1913), 450.
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completely image the future until it is present, and then it
is instantly past.
If, however, we may he allowed to define purpose in terms
not requiring exact prevision, we find intimations of purpose
in Bergson- s philosopny. The evolutionary hypothesis set
forth in devolution creatrice is that the same result (an
organ of sight is his most usual illustration) on diverging
lines of evolution is due to sameness of tne initial impulse.
/
This is to say that l 1 elan vital is describahle in some terms
or other, that it nas at least one distinctive characteristic.
In Les deux sour c es d e la morale et ae la religion tne con-
/
viction is expressed that the unique characteristic of 1 1 elan
is love. It is also, of course, active will.
/
So l'elan vital is, rirst, an impulse to love, and,
second, an impulse to act. There is nothing in the impulse to
acL which could he descriptive or limiting or directive or
regulative, insofar as it is an impulse to act. This impulse
to act presents to tne impulse to love unforeseen and unfore-
seeable situations. There does seem this much purpose in
/
1* elan : it will act lovingly in the fact of every unforeseen
circumstance
.
This is to all intents what many teleologists (those not
over-intellectualistic ) mean by purpose; that is, the purpose
to be loving in all circumstances. We must not carry the idea
of purpose too far, however, or forget that Bergson rejects
what he thinks teleology means to most minds.
v. V k
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IP elan, or any individual manifestation of 1 1 elan , inso-
far as it is denied rjurposiveness
,
nas only one-hall tne
necessary equipment for recognition of its own identity -
memory. Conscious "beings experience identity through two
aspects oi cneir conscious life. First, through memory,
which Bergson calls attention to life. Second, through pur-
pose, or intention in life. I am myseli because I can remem-
ber my past and because I can intend my future. A sell with
only memory of what happened but was not purposed and with no
purpose for tne future can experience but a halting sort of
identity.
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CHAP Tilt! i'HKEE
THE PhOBLEiv. OP IDENTITY OP CONCEPTS
A. THE GENEHAL NATURE OP THE CONCEPT IN BERGSON’S THOUGHT
Perception is an incipient activity. Vision is retinal
touch.
1
1 Spatializing Nous elisions que les
corps bruts sont tailles
dans l'etoife de la nature par une perception
aont les ciseaux suivent, en quelque sorte, le
pointille des lignes sur lesquelles 1 1 action
passerait .
2
Such artificial cutting out of the real temporal flow is
spatializing. Space is not ultimate reality. It is an ideal
construction in the interest of the differentiation of one
temporal stream into aspects which shall rna&e action upon it
possible
.
Leaving the objects of perception for consideration in
the following chapter, we turn to objects or thought ana find
that they are also spatial, Bergson says concepts are as
spatial as percepts, ana are, like percepts, formed in tne
mold of and for tne sake of action.
3
1. See EC, 12, 182.
2. EC, 12-13.
3. EC, 174. Cf. EC, i, 175, 190.
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i'o undei stand what Bergson means by saying tnat concepts
are spatial, we must consider more carefully tne nature and
2 delation of 1 ’ Intelligence the ground 01 the
to l’Elan
distinction ne
makes between intellect and will. Intuition embraces will,
intellect, instinct, and indeed all conscious and even rela-
tively unconscious life. Intuition and consciousness in its
broadest sense are tne same. But intuition or consciousness
is primarily will; it is un elan , an urge, an activity. It i
moving time.
s
The spatializing tendency is intellect or intelligence. 4
Now to Aristotle and to the orthodox scholastic and to moderns
like Descartes and Spinoza and even Kant and Hegel, intellect
is the heart of reality. Till, though in reality, is the op-
posing troublesome tendency in reality, or it is an active ex-
pression of intellect, or it is tnat which the intellect must
subdue. But to Bergson active will is the heart of xeality.
Intellect is a troublesome opposing tendency, for it keeps
spatializing. Spatializing produces matter, and matter is
limitation or obstacle to 1
’
elan vital . In Bergson’s philoso-
phy, to say that matter opposes spirit is to say that intel-
lectualizing opposes freely active willing. To say tnat real-
ity is activity which has within itself a static principle
limiting full and free activity is to say that reality is will
4. Sunra
,
51-58, 75-76.
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which embraces intellect, ox that reality is active spirit
embracing a passive matter which it is attempting to convert
into activity.
j
Aristotle and Aquinas definitely subordinated will to
speculative thought. Kant’s doctrine of the creative activity
of thought brought activity (the essential aspect of will)
into the speculative faculty of man, but tne results of cre-
ative thought were static units. Hegel attempted a complete
5
synthesis of speculative thought and will in der freie Geist .
And Hegel’s logical unit, Be, ;r iff , which is also his meta-
physical unit, is not static but dynamic; it is wirkiich .
/Z
Bergson, however, cannot be satisfied with this synthesis.
He breaks it up again, but this time with will instead of in-
tellect on top.
Reverting to the pre-Hegelian notion of intellect in un-
synthesized opposition to will (Spinoza, it is to be noted,
3 The Gonceot Artifi c ial
,
did not accomplish
Partial
,
Inadequate
a synthesis but rather
an absorption of will by intellect), Bergson, whose reality is
time or conscious activity of will, must vi ew intellectualizing
as a series of thought objects, each static and separable from
all the others. That is, he must view intellec tualizing not
5~ ENC, III, i, G, 481 (416-417).
6. This is only a ms.nner of speaking. Bergson shows no
interest in Hegel. The philosophers he mentions most frequent-
ly are the Eleatics, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza,
Leibniz, Kant, and Spencer.
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as an active process “but as a spatial arrangement of discrete
concepts. He cannot find place in his system lor a Begr iff
both speculative and dynamic.
And, since time alone is truly real, and space has only
partial reality (a reality belonging to it only because it is
time in reverse), the concept is artificial. At most it is ar
inadequate or partial view of real time.
It is to be noted that whereas some modern thinkers would
redefine the concept, as, for example, Bridgman, who would
define the concept "not in terms of its properties but in
terms of actual operations," 7 Bergson retains tne traditional
;
notion of the concept and disputes its adequacy as a means of
discovering reality. The concept is an artificial symbol of
the real, no more.
B. THE FORMING OF CONCEPTS
The intention of tne discussion just concluded has been
to make clear in a general way that Bergson teaches that the
1 The Nature of the Conscious concept is as
Process Involved
~a The Role oi Consciousness spatial as the
in General
percept, that the
concept is artificial, and that the concept is a tool manufac-
tured in the interest of action. We turn now to discuss in
more detail the genetic history of the concept as it appears
7. Bridgman, LMP, 6.
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in human consciousness. e snail give considerable space to
tne development of consciousness in the direction of intel-
lect, for concepts are products of intellect.
Consciousness in general, says Bergson, is directed
toward action.® More specifically, it is directed toward the
overcoming of obstacles. The life impulse moves on uncon-
sciously until it is checked. The check rouses consciousness
or attention.
^
By artificially placing ourselves outside tne temporal
flow, we can imagine that we are viewing one section of it as
b The Evolution of Consciousness it would
(l) The Impeding of tne Life
Impulse and tne Kousing of Atten- have ap-
tion
peared count-
less eons ago. Without foresight and without intention, by
the very exuberance of its initial impulse, life gushed forth
in many directions. But it could not continue to flow with
entire freedom. It Dore within its nature a limiting rjrin-
ciple. This principle is a tendency toward spatializing
,
toward intellectualizing, towaru matter.
Bergson's theory is that 1 ' elan is a strife between an
ascending movement (temporal spirit) a,nd a descending move-
ment (spatializing intellect). Yet, in tracing the evolution
8^ EC, i, 156-157, 194-196.
9. Strictly speaking, the life impulse cannot move uncon-
sciously, for its movement is of the nature of consciousness.
Unconsciousness means consciousness at a very low level. Cf.
EC, 121-122, 143.
10. Compare with Bergson's more mystical view the theory of
the physicist Eddington (SUW, 11-21, 17-18; EU, 1-40, 79-93).
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of life, tiie obstacles to 1 1 elan sometimes seem external to
it.-*--*- This is in keeping witn Bergson's statement that words,
|
are always contradictory
.
It seems that life can flow in many directions with
little or no impeding of its flow lor many eons. In other
directions it meets such hindrance that its flow sto;s; it
is spatialized and no longer a part of true reality; it can
no longer intuit itsell.-*-2 In other directions it meets im-
pediments by means of which, witn strain and effort, it
shapes new channels. Are we to infer that a stone seems so
absolutely spatial because tne life flow nas practically
stopped in that direction? And are we to infer that human
consciousness is the least spatialized entity in our experi-
ence because life is flowing more fieely (is triumphing over
obstacles by creating a richer variety of forms) than in any
other direction of its flow?
The human consciousness represents 1 T elan in that aspect
of its progress in which it is able to use with more freedom
than elsewhere tne spatial obstacle in the forming of new
/
channels for life to follow. Consider a branch of 1 ' elan
progressing toward human consciousness but still relatively
unconscious. There occurs an unaccountable uprising of the
lT. See SC, 107, 108, 194, 201, 217-218, 225.
12. I’or life flowing without impediment and life stopped
in its flow (3ergson's term is impasse), see SC, 109, 111.
117, 140-141.
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spatializing tendency within itseli . This tendency appears
in the form of an obstacle impeding the fi ee flow of 1* elan .
Impeding causes a starting back. A moving object im-
peded does not merely stop; its stopping includes a starting
back, an incipient turning in tne opposite direction. As
long as the life impulse flows straight anead, it can pay no
attention to its flow, ior tnat is behind. /hen its flow is
checked, it starts back, experiences an incipient turning
back, and now its attention is on its flow, that is, on the
part of the flow immediately preceding tne stop. The strong
er tne opposition of the obstacle and the greater tne strain
of tne life impulse against the obstacle, tne greater the
sensation of being turned back and so tne greater the atten-
tion on its self, its former flow.
Living beings, we must remember, are only tnor oughi'ar es
"I ”2
through which the life impulse moves. ° The impulse, how-
ever, creates the forms of its tnor oughiares . It does so be
cause when it encountex s an obstacle it nas to shift its
course. rhe friction of the encounter kindles a spark of at
tention, directed botn backward ^or inward) to self and for-
ward (or outward; to obstacle and new direction. The taking
a new direction is paying attention. And tnis attention is
the shaping of a new form o± life.
13. EC, 139-140.
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Life in a plant form, once having attained that form be-;
cause of previous obstacles and its over co-iai..g °f them, iacesi
^2 ) The Life Impulse in three possibilities!.
Plant and Low Animal Forms
First, it may en-
counter no new obstacles, and so continue to flow in its
form unconsciously. Second, it may meet an obstacle, be un-
able to surmount it, and so desert the plant form in which
it nas been flowing. It casts aside one form as it has cast
aside countless others.-^ Tnird, ii may meet an obstacle
and by strain and effort succeed in taking a new form.
If life, struggling with obstacles to its plant form,
takes the form of a locomotive being, aole to seen tne chlo-
rophyll w.-ich it nad ceased to find provided for it in its
rooted state, it encounters many new obstacles. For one
tning, henceforth chlorophyll will never be provided for it
as for tne plant form. Thus hunger as motive attention suc-
ceeds want as vegetative attention. Each time hunger (lack
of nourishment, an obstacle to its continuing as it is) in-
terrupts its placid flow, the life impulse in the amoeba, to
take an example from simple animal life, must pay attention
to itself and to new forms of seeking movements. And the new
form is henceforth impelled to keep moving. Motion, once in-
vented and utilized as an instrument with which to overcome
one obstacle, becomes independent or automotive. It keeps
14. EC, 109.
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the new form moving. Life cannot go backward .
I
0 It ca.nnot
take motion up and lay it down at will. Once arrived, motion
is in the stream of reality. Or, more properly speaking,
motion is differentiated in the stream of reality and marks
anotner of its branchings inco a new form.
When the amoeba moves either attentively in searcn of
food or inattentively from the impulse of its motility, it
may encounter dangerous cnemicals. "The path towards move-
ment involves risk and adventure, but also it involves coii-
sciousness, with its growing degrees of intensity and
depth."!® amoeba stops. Its attention is turned back on
1 7itself. Tropism is a low form oi conscious attention.
In its strain against the obstacles of hunger and dan-
gerous chemicals, the life impulse in the amoeba puts forth
pseudopodia, a new form of life. This new form, once initi-
ated, unless new obstacles destroy life in tnat form, must
remain. Life cannot turn back. It must either abandon a
form or drag with it all the accretions which it has found
necessary for maintaining itself in that form. If the new
locomotion encounters no new obstacles, life will manifest
itself forever as the amoeba. If it encounters insurmountable
obstacles in some regions, life will in those regions abandon
15. Retrogression in the evolutionary process is not a
going backward of life but the abandonment by life of certain
forms
.
16. J£E(a), 16.
17. See SC, 119, 121.
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the amoeba form. If in cer cain circumstances the life im-
pulse in some amoebae surmounts obstacles by taking new
forms, thereafter the impulse flows as two forked streams,
just as in some distant past the amoeba represented a brancn
ing off from a stream of life which continued botn in the nevj
form and also in its original direction.
As simple pseudopodic locomotion, invented as a means of
overcoming an obstacle to the life impulse in one direction
( 3 ) Increased Weeds of of its flow, be-
At tention
comes independent
and multiplies obstacles for life in its new form, so every
increase in variety oi locomotion becomes independent and
multiplies obstacles for its form of life, for now animals
feed upon one another as well as, or instead or, on vegetable
life only. 18 Increased need of attention arises, k'ore fre-
quent needs of attention arise.
Each ne?/ instance 01 attention must be, and, by virtue
of the independence or the successive adjuncts of living be-
ings, can be, more intense, more speciiic, and greater in
range than its predecessors. In man attention is almost con-
stantly being roused by obstacles which appear in the path of
his venturesomeness and varied activities. So man is almost
continuously conscious, and is almost constantly intellectu-
alizing.
18. EC, 142.
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The activities of ants, on the other hand, though so
complicated, axe relatively unconscious. The activities, in-
c Instinct vs. Heed of Choice vented long
ago, suffice for perpetuating the life impulse in , the ant
form. As man represents the evolution of consc iousness in
the direction of intellect, the arit represents the evolution
of consciousness in tne direction of instinct.^ '.Then the
choices of any species become stereotyped and sufficient in
stereotyped form to maintain life in that species, the spe-
cies goes through its complicated activities relatively un-
consciously . An interesting speculative study it gright be
to consider whether human beings can become so stereotyped in
their complicated activities that tney may continue signing
checks, locking and unlocking doors, lighting cigarettes,
opening tin cans, bowing themselves down receiving lines,
making political speeches, casting votes, and proposing and
entering into marriage, all at a comparatively unconscious
level, and whether tne life impulse could after man,, eons
flare to attention in the face of new obstacles and invent a
new form for its ceaseless flow.
Human consciousness
,
however, is different from all pre-
vious inventions of l'^lan vital in tnat it itself makes a
permanent sinking to the instinctive level almost inconceiv-
19. T7e are interested in this cnapter chiefly in intellect
For the distinction between instinct and intellect, see EC,
147-164, 179 182-183, 191-192, 201.
20. See DSKR, 94-95; EC, 146-156, 179-191.
21. ES(a), 13.
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able. 22 Human consciousness, like the amoeba's motility,
seems to be here uo stay, once it has arrived. As tne amoeba
cannot remain rooted in tne rivei bottom but must oecaase of
its motility engage in random movements, so the human being
cannot remain utterly rooted in instinct but must engage in
random questionings. These questionings expose tne conscious
ness to new obstacles comparable to the chemical dangers
which require the amoeba to develop a low form of directed
locomotion. And it is the intellectual, not tne intuitional,
aspect of consciousness that is tne active rousei of human
beings to questionings.
A / \
"Le role de 1* intelligence est, en eiiet, de presiaer a
aes actions." 2 ^ The role of intellect is to further action,
d The Hole of Intellect and so to foresee
the result of any proposed act. Intellect is consciousness
directed toward the making of choices, toward activity on
matter. Intellectuality is adaptation to matter. This
adaptation is made by means of tne "deux fonctions de 1’ in-
telligence, ia faculte de deduire et celle d • induir e .
'
,2 ^
Notre intelligence, telle que 1’ evolution
de la vie l'a modelee
,
a pour fonction essen-
tielle d'eclairer notre conduite, de preparer
notre action sur les choses
,
de prevoir, pour
une situation donnee
,
les evenements favorabies
ou defavorables qui pourront s’ensuivre. Elle
isole done inst inctivsment
,
dans une situation,
22. EC, 288.
23. EC, 323.
24. EC, 230.
1. . i „ J a , - '• - , - - -
, ...
• •
o
•
,
•
• '
«
-
•
£
.
.
.
II
102
/ \
ce qui ressemble au deja connu; elle cnercne
le meme
,
afin de pouvoir appliquei son pi in-
cite que "le meme produio le meme " . ,n cela
consiste la provision de l'avenii par le sens
c ommun . 2 5
Or iginellement
,
nous ne pensons que pour
agir
.
C’est dans le moule de
/
l' action c^ue
notre intelligence a e/te coulee. La specula-
tion es- un luxe, tandis que 1’ action est une
necessi te
.
Ainsi 1 r intell igence humaine
,
en tant que
fa^onnee aux exigences de l’action humaine, est
une intelligence qui procede a la fois par in-
tention et par calcui, par la coordination de
rnoyens a une fin et par la representation de
mecanismqs a formes de plus en plus geome/-
triques .
Emin, la conscience est essentiellement
libre; elle est la liter te meme: mais elle ne
peut traverser la matiere sans se poser sur
elle, sans s'auapteo. a -lie: cette adaptation
est ce qu’on appelle 1 ’ intellectualite
;
et
1
' intelligence
,
se retournant vers la conscience
agissante, c'est-a-dire libre, la fait natu-
rellement entrer dans les cadres ou
-lie a
coutume de voir la matiere s ' inseter
.
rhe intellect is not rejected or despised by Bergson,
ar fro. it. It is intellect that keeps the future open. In
contrast with intuition,
la conscience se determinant en intelligence
,
c’est-a-dire se concentrant
y
d’ abord sur la
matiere, semble ainsi s ' exterior iser oar rqp-
port a elle-meme; mais, justement parce qu’elle
s'adapte aux objets du dehors, elle arrive a
circuler au milieu d’eux, a £ouiner les bar-
rier es qu’ils lui opposent, a elargir indef ini-
ment son domaine. Une ibis liber et, elle peut
25. EC, 31.
26. EC, 47.
27. EC, 48.
28. EC, 293.
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d’ailleurs se replier a l'interieur, et reveil-
ler les virtualites d' intuition qui sommeillent
encore en elle.^
Whereas instinct holds attention captive, human conscious
ness in the form of intellect sets attention free. 30 That is,
the obstacles v/nich a consciousness meets depend on the range
of movement possible to the consciousness, and this range in
turn depends on freedom of attention.
Intellect is rejected only as the means of reaching liv-
ing reality. It is practical, not speculative. 31 Intellect,
however
,
"touche quelque chose de l'absolu." 3^ But "1 1 intel -
/ -2. rt
ligence ne se represente clair emen t que le discontinu .
"
/
"Notre intelligence ne se represente clair ement que l’immo -
bilite
,
11
3
4 and reality is mobility. Intellect shows an awk-
wardness when it tries to treat questions of life. "L 1 intel -
/ / /
ligence est caracterisee par une incomprehension naturelle de
la vie . 11 35 The trutu intellect arrives at "devient toute
relative a notre faculte d'agir. Ge n’est plus qu’une verite
symbol i que
.
1,36 The essential function of tne intellect is to
bind the same to the same, and so intellect can deal only with
29. EC, 198.
30. See EC, 197-200.
31. See EC, 213-214, 332-333.
32. EC, iv. See the entire passage from wnich this clause
is quoted.
33. EC, 168.
34. EC, 169. Cf. EC, 176.
35. EC, 179. See the entire passage. Cf. EC, 191.
36. EC, 214.
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the repeatable. But any state of consciousness (and reality
is of the nature of consciousness) overflows the intellect;
it "reste meme incommensurable" with intellect, lor each
state of consciousness is "indivisible et nouveau. "Le
r&le de 1 T intelligence est, en effet," as we have seen, "de
presider a des actions, no t to speculate on the real.
At the base of Bergson's vi ew of intellect is his view of
time. The inadequacy of intellect is due to tne relation be-
tween intellect and time.
/ / \
Ainsi, concentree, sur ce qui se repete,
uniquement preoccupee de souder le meme au
meme, 1 ' intelligence se detourne de la vision
du temps. Elle repugne au fluent et solidifie
tout ce qu^elle toucne. Nous ne pensons pas
le tfempS/reel. Mais nous le vivons, arce que
la vie deborde 1 ' intelligence .
^
Our intellect "n'est qu’une vue immobile et fragmentaire prise
sur" life; intellect "se place toujours natur ellement en de-
hors du temps. "40
Consciousness is attention to a has - oeen pushing toward a
not-yet . It is in this sense that Bergson means that con-
e Memory and Attention sciousness is directed
toward activity and is a consciousness of form. Memory - be- 1
cause the interruption that kindles consciousness is a turning
back of the flow upon itself. A forward pusning activity -
37. See EC, 218-219. Cl. SC, 231-233, 295-296.
38. EC, 323, quoted supra, 101.
39. EC, 50.
40. EC, 55. Cl. EC, 340-341.
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because a strain against tne obstacle. An awareness of form -
because tne obstacle breaks up tne homogeneous continuity of
|
the life flow into an apparent neter ogeneous discreteness (or
form). The form occurs simultaneously with t.^e consciousness
in the iorward pushing activity. Lei tner is conceivable
without the other. Hence, consciousness as active, specifi-
cally as intellect, is always consciousness of form. " Plus la
\
conscience s ' intellectual ^se
,
olus la matiere se seatialise . "
*
But the consciousness directed toward the flow itself, as
memory, is intuition. Ana it is clear tnat consciousness of
form (intellect), consciousness of matter (instinct), and con-
sciousness of the flow as memory (intuition) occur necessarily
together and are not tnree tnings but one - one single atten-
tive activity. ^2 it is clear, furthermore, that it is tne in-
tellectual aspect of consciousness which keeps tne future open
i or tne creative impulse tnat is life, and it is the open
future tnat allows for tne reality of time.
Consciousness as intellect directed toward action is at-
tention to discrete solids on which to act and invention of
2 The nature of Concepts new discrete solids
a Analysis
with wnich to act. In-
tellect’s anatomizing performed on tne liie stream is the
process we commonly call analyzing. Anatomizing ^cutting up)
41. EC, 206. Cf. EC, 173-177.
42. See
,
e. g. , SC, 146-147.
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suggests Bergson's meaning better tnan does analyzing. Sor
analyze (loosen up) suggests tnat tnere are planes of cleav-
age between constituent elements which can be loosened apart.
Tnere are not. "Qu'il nous suifise de dire que l'intelli-
pence est caracterisee par la puxssance indefinie de decom-
poser selon n'ii-porte quelle loi et de recomposer en n’im-
_.orte quei systeme." 4 ^ V/hat we call material objects and
what we call mental objects are alike the pieces which intel-
/ /
lect nas cut out ( deco ape ) artificially from a continuous
wnole. Among the mental objects are concepts.
In trying to explain to ourselves a new experience or a
new object, we analyze it. And analyzing, says Bergson, is
D Explanation in Conceptual merely cutting up
Terms
an unknown object
into elements already known by previous similar cutting up of
experiences. These elements are concepts.
\
Quant a 1’ invention proprement dite, qui
est pourtant le point de depart de 1‘inaustrie
elle-m^me
,
noire intelligence n' arrive pas a
la saisir dans son jaillissement
,
c’est-a-dire
dans ce qiu elle ad ' indivisible
,
ni dans sa
ge'nialite
,
c’est-a-dire dans ce qu’elle a de
crdateur . L'expliquer consiste to^jours a la
resoudre, elle imprevisible et neuve
,
en ele-
ments
/
connus ou anciens, arranges dans un ordre
different. L' intelligence n’admet pas plus la
nouveaute complete que le deven.ir radical.
C'est dire qu'ice encore elle laisse echa; er
un aspect essential de la vie, cornme si elle
n'etait point faite pour penser un tel objet.‘l4
43. SC, 170.
44. SC, 178. Cf. IM, 7-8, 17-36.
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In the end we have not explained tne new object. ',7e nave
only noticed that the intellect can cut out of it parts simi-
lar to parts previously cut out .of objects very dissimilar,
in their wholeness, from one anotner , and from tnis new ob-
ject. But reality is time, and 11 le terms est invention ou il
n’est rien du touL . " d- 5
Or, analysis is expressing a thing as a factor oi some-
thing other than itself. But if we did not truly know the
something otner, we know nothing now. And if we already mow
tne something other, to explain the new thing as merely a
factor or combinations 01 factors of tne known sonetning
other may add to our understanding ( entendement ) , but it does
not give us reality in tne new experience or objec-.
The defects of analysis accompany it no matter how far
it goes. Theoretically analysis can proceed to infinity. A1
we have is a larger and larger heap of smaller and smaller
parts. Neither tne heajjs as a heap nor tne infinitely tiny
parts stuck together again give us understanding or tne real
whole. Under standing of the real whole comes by a simple in-
divisible act of sympathetic intuition, or it comes not at
all. 46
C. THE EVALUATION OF THE CONCEPT
It is not definiteness oi , eaning for consciousness that
45. EC, 369.
46. See III, 7, 24-33; EC, 99; DSMR, 51, 120.
'.
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Bergson denies to concepts. 77hat he denies is that "by logical
1 Tne Limitations of tne universals we reach
Concept
knowledge of reality.
Conceptual knowledge is an artificial sort of knowledge. It
is applicable only to discontinuity and immobility. The real
is continuous and mobile. 47
A concept is a memory of a past viewed as from a point
outside tne stream of reality. As Dewey would say, tne value
[
and function of concepts are " essentially retrospective."^0
Concepts are immobile views oi mooile reality. To take a view|
of the temporal succession one has to step outside oi it, for
it nas only one dimension and one direction. Taking a view
47. EC, 33. Cf. EC, 6-7, 30, 112, 113, 115-116. Consider
froland, PP, I, 108-109: "The application of descriptive analy-
sis to psycnological problems, has been severely criticized by
numerous modern thinkers. Among these are the Prencn philoso-
i
pher§ Bergson, and tne German sciiool oi Gestalt psychologists, i
....The attack appears to be primarily upon analysis of the
structural and temporal types, description in terms or attri-
butes or aspects being allowed as a necessary method. Por Berg
son psycnical life consists in a relatively inscrutable inner
flux which is not subject to intellec tualization . In order
tnat it should be understood, it must be 'intuited 1
;
we must
know it directly and not by ’description’ ... .Nowh so far as
Bergson is concerned, I will say tnat his general psycnological
doctrine appears to me to be essentially mystical and explicit-
ly to rule out of tne domain of psycnology any subject matter
which can be discussed fruitfully. However, I quite agree with
his contention tnat in order to know the nature oi' experience,
we must ’intuite’ it - wnich merely means: have it. ho de-
scription or intellectuaiization of experience can iiave any
meaning, save as it can be carried back into contact with the
actual experience to which it refers. There is nothing in a
description, per se
,
which reveals the experience or its prop-
erties." It is tne carrying back which Bergson says is impos-
s ible
.
48. Dewey, GG
,
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adds at least a second if not a tnira dimension, and so in-
vents space. Pur tner
,
a view or t^e temporal succession
sweeps forward and backward; the temporal succession itself
is irreversible.
An immobile view can na.ve no identity, for it cannot en-
j
aure from one moment to another. Enduring requires time so
that what now is can be what was a moment ago. Buu we can
never recognize that anything that now is, is what was a mo-
ment ago, for it is different if only by being a moment
older
.
40
The concept, tnerefore, is foreign to reality. 50 Reality
is la duree . Logical representations are formed in spatial
molds. The concept is logical or spatial, not temporal. Its
future, present, and past are all given at once. Time cannot
penetrate it. In Bergson’s view, unrixe tne view of S. Alex-
ander, minkowski
,
Korzybski
,
and others, space and time are
not mutually necessary to each other. Time as mobile duration
is absolutely real. That which is spatial is immobile. Tne
immobile is relative said merely phenomenal.
Further, the concept must always fail in wnat it sets out
to do. It does not exactly attempt to be reality, but it does
attempt to imitate reality. To imitate reality is just tne
one tning that cannot be done. Reality is inimitable, unre-
49. EC, 2.
50. Cf. IM, 53-54; EC, 173-177.
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peatable, not r eproducible
.
51 To think I am experiencing
again wnat I experienced previously is to contradict rays ell
.
The very fact that I can tnink "experience again"' shows me
that if the new experience is in no other way different from
the earlier one, it is different in that it is felt with an
again-ness which did not characterize the first experience.
In short, the concept shares the inadequacy of its source,
tne intellect. The intellect, it has been seen, is conscious-
ness in its aspect of attention to tne interruption of tne
vital flux and to tne shaping of a new thoroughfare for it.
Or, tne intellect is taking a view of tne flux from outside.
It is impossible for tne intellect to take its place within
the movement of reality itself, and so it is impossible for in-
tellect to comprenend life.^ The static conceptual molds
break when we try to imprison within them the moving reality.
This is the voluntarist's mode of expressing tne absolutistic
axiom that any finite refers to sometning beyond ioself, and
tnat it is therefore impossible lor any finite to express
reality; finites form a continuous series of going beyond tnem-
selves. Bergson says tne mold cracks and creaks. 5 '-^
7/e must not forget, nowever
,
that though analysis oi a new
object into concepts does not 0 ive us true knowledge oi it, tne
51
.
EC, 11-12, 49-51, 53, 63, 218; IM, 12-13, 47
52. IM, 47; EC, 168-169, 179.
55. EC, ii
.
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2 l lie 3 e r v i ce it Peri or ms analysis does ado. to
the effectiveness of our action on solids. Intellect can ^o
fur oner cnan intuition. Intellect opens new fields oi activ-
ity. 54 The concept snares in the value and serviceableness of
intellect. Intuition, whicn ilows in tne deep currents of
reality, does not scruple to make use of tne artificial con-
cepts to broaden and deepen and multiply tne cnannels xor its
ongoing.
mere is even a mysterious sort of connection between in-
tellect and intuition whereby a certain magic sum o^ intellec-
tual efforts, added to one another, become "fused together" 55
and it is only after this fusion tnat m intuitional apprehen-
sion of reality is possiole. 05
D. THE IJEHTIif OP CONCEPTS
Bergson lollows the continuity and change of Hei^clitus
rather than tne being o± tne Eleatics, out not tne rationalism,
1 The .delations of Bergson 1 s
View of tne Concept to tne
main Streams of Philosophical
Thought
a General Survey
11 ) Greek Philosophy
and with it, tne
necessity, of Hera-
clitus. 57 He re-
jects the elemental
istic thought of the mediators, 58 which developed into tne dis-
54. EC, iii-iv, 197.
55. IM, 91.
56. IM, 91-92.
57. Supra
,
12-17.
58. Supra , 19-20.
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creteness of the Forms of Plato 59 and the universals of Aris-
totle. 60 He follows the anti -me chan is tic thought suggested
Ft 1by Anaxagoras and developed by Plato and Ar istotle
,
ox but re-
;
fuses to use the term teleology or purpose because he inter-
prets the teleology of Plato and Aristotle in terms of dis-
crete spatial units whicn are artificial inventions of intel-
lect. Intellect in turn is refused, in favor of will, the
primary place accorded it by Plato and Aristotle. Bergson
viev/s Aristotle’s thought in general in its scholastic forgi,
in which the logic is dominant. Bergson consciously criticizes
the abstract universal of Aristotle as a representation of
reality. Somewhat unconsciously he follows the other two
principles of Aristotle: the principle of trie entelechy and
the principle that the whole is prior to the parts.
Bergson denies the universal applicability of the ana-
lytic method followed by Locke, 6^ but holds to Locke's prin-
(2) Modern Philosophy ciple of identity of
consciousness
,
65 which has been carried on notably in psycholo-
gy by the self psychologists and in philosophy by the person-
alists. Like Berkeley, 6 ^ Bergson says we cannot define the
self. And like the three British Empiricists he denies the
regulative function of concepts. 05
59. Sunra
,
22-25.
60. Sunr
a
,
25-27.
61. Surra
,
20-21.
62. Supr
,
28-29.
63. Supra, 29-31.
64. Su ora
,
32-33.
65. SuT-ra
.
28-29, 33, 36.
i

Time was presented in Locke as essentially mental in
quality, as duration which is a succession. Hume also de-
scribed time as duration and succession. 66 Time was a deter-
mining factor in tne philosophy of Leibniz and of Kant. 67
The developmental principle allied witn tL.^e helped snape the
thought of Hegel and Schelling. 68 Bergson nas brought time
to the front place in philosophy and so denies tne reality of
the timeless concept.
Associated with and derived from tne idea of time is the
activistic principle in philosophical thought. The emphasis
on activity in the thought of Leibniz, Kant, 66 Fichte, Lotze,
Bihwne
,
Knudson, Brightman, and Whitehead is so strong in
Bergson’s system as to make impossible the independent valid-
ity of anything changeless.
Bergson's voluntarism, which allies him with Schopen-
hauer, works against the validity of the concept, which is a
product oi intellect. And his absolutism76 and tne develop-
mental nature of his thought, which are akin to Hegel’s sys-
tem, 7 -*- forbid great importance to tne concept as an abstract
universal
.
At the close oi tne first chapter one trend oi modern
thinking was pointed out. That trend is away from the static
66. Supra
,
31, 36 -37.
67. Supra 38-40
,
42-44.
68. Supra 45-46.
69. Supra 36-40 90-92.
70. Supra 74, bO -82.
71. Supra 45-46.
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b Modern Tendencies affecting and toward the
Identity of Concepts
dynamic. The
tendency in epistemology and logic is away from definitions
and classifications toward centers of activity and tnen be-
yond them toward pure acoivity with no distinguishable cen-
ters. Whether in the interests of mental nealth, or of dy-
namic and evolutionary tneories in trie natural sciences and
Hegelian philosophy, or of the validity of knowledge reacned
by consciousness as-a-whole (including feeling, emotions, in-
tuition, etc., as well as intellect), or of the pragmatic
method in epistemology and logic, the concept nas been sub-
jected to drastic modifications and criticisms in recent
years .
^
Bergson's theory is absolutistic liKe Bradley’s but not
intellectualistic . It is per sonalistic
,
but rejects purpose
c The Relations of Bergson's as formulable
View of the Concept to Modern
Developmental Systems of Thought in concepts and
coherence as possible through concepts, in favor of activity
of intuition. With pragmatism it criticizes the concept as
Paris, 1900 . 50. 53, 47; Gentile, IMPA, 43, 73, 127. 179; Kor^
zybski, SS, 7, 16-18, 21-23, 30, 54-37 , 56 , 60 , 66-6$ , 93,
107, 152-153, 161, 673, 748
s 72. For representative modern views, see Bradley, IL (e. g
I, 28, 56; II, Part iv
,
"Principles of Reason" ) ; Knudson, PP,
67, 166, 202-225; Brightman, IP, 5o-66, 130, 136, 139, 307-
309, 313; RV, 20, 80, 206-209; PG and FG (for the theory of
ohe ultimate reality of time, which affects the status of the
concept); Dewey, QC
,
99, 166; Boole, ILT, 241-242, 403-405,
423; Eddington, STG
,
196-197, 200; NPW, 4; Einstein, R, 2, 26;
Bridgman, LMP, 1-32; Meyerson, IK (e. g. , 14, 423, 433); Bou-
troux, ISM, 21-26, 154, 218-219, 225-229, 266-267, 271-272;
RTA. 21j Brunscnvicg. "L'idealisme contemporain" (^Congres intei
nab i onal de ohilosopnie; Pm i
o
sopnie gener al et meTrr'ttT'si'BW.
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static and inapplicable to the future, but its absolutism
runs counter to pragmatism and its metaphysical aspect is les
positivistic. The tneory of Boole, Knudson, Brightman { in
less measure), Boutroux, Gentile, and Korzybski that consciou
ness directed toward truth is broader than intellect is in ac
cord witxi Bergson ‘s view of intellect anu its products and
their relation to knowledge to a certain extent, tnougn
Brightman and Knudson nave more confidence in intellect tnan
the other men mentioned. In Bergson -s theory as in the the-
ories of Boutroux and Gentile activity of the nature of will
is fundamental in mind. In a more radical sense than Bright-
man, Bergson believes that time is real; tue concept is cor-
respondingly less real. The active nature of reality set
forth by Brightman, Knudson, Gentile, and Korzybski tends to
give a lower place to the static concept as abstract univer-
sal. Brightman' s definition of self in terns of the time-
transcending principle of consciousness and Korzybski 1 s defi-
nition of consciousness as time -binding contribute also to
iurnish an atmosphere not foreign to Bergson's vie./ in which
duration and cnange are synonymous and in which, tnerefore,
the changeless concepts occupy a somewhat anomolous position.
It is seen that the dynamic function of concepts (or their
substitutes) in modern mathematics and na,tural sciences in
general make a congenial atmospnere for nergson's non-intel-
lectual is tic view.
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Bergson's theory of the concept belongs in the person-
alistic stream of thought rather than the impersonal is tic
,
with the ahsolutistic rather tnan the pluralistic, with the
evolutionary ratner tnan tne neoscuolas tic , with tne volun-
taristic rather than the intellec tualistic or rationalistic,
with tne synoptic rather than witn the analytic, with the
dynamic rather than with the static, with the psychological
rather than with the logical, witn the views stressing cre-
ative activity rather tnan with viev/s stressing mechanism.
As has been said, Bergson consciously opposes the ab-
stract universal of Aristotle and less consciously continues
2 Bergson and Aristotle the line of thought be-
gun in Aristotle’s entelechy and his principle mat tne whole
is prior to the parts. We consider here tne abstract uni-
ver sal
.
The concept ior born Aristotle and Bergson is the product
o± intellect. Bor both the concept is a discrete unit of
thought. But i or Bergson tne boundaries of concepts are arbi-
trarily fixed by conscious beings and for Aristotle tne sepa-
rateness oi the concept is eternal.
Aristotle's concepts are for purposes of classifying all
real existences. 10 be classified, exis tents must first be
separable and distinguishable. Reality is a continuity for
Bergson. Dis tinguishing and classifying are artificial opera-
tions performed on the real.
— =- — — —— - -—
-
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For Aristotle the universal, though derived from the par-
ticular, is as such a principle in the mind. For Bergson it
is a tool manufactured by the mind. The concept is "obtenu
73
en composant entre eux des fragments d ’ intelligence .
"
/
Notre raison, incuraolement r esorn; tueuse
,
s’ imagine posse'der par droit de naissance ou
par droit de conqu^te, inne's ou appris, tous
les elements essentiels de la connaissance de
la ve'rite. La meme ou elle avoue ne pas con-
naitre l’objet qu'on lui presente, elle croit
que son ignorance porte seulernent sur la ques-
tion de savoir quelle est celle de ses cate-
gories anciennes qui convient a, l’objet nou-
veau. . . .Platon fut le rernier a eriger en
theorie que connaitre le^reel consiste a lui
trouver son Idee, c’est-a-dire a le faire en-,
/ / \
trer dans un cadre preexistant qui serait 7deja
a notre disposition, - comme si nous posse-
dions implicitement la science universelle.
Mais cette croyance est naturelle a I’ intel-
ligence humaine
,
toujours preoccupee de savoir
sous quelle amcienne rubrique elle cataloguera
n’importe quel objet nouveau, et l’on pourrait
dire, en un certain sens, que nous naissons
tous platoniciens
. ,
Nulle part 1 ' impuissance de cette methode
ne s’etale aussi manifestement que dans les
theories de la vie. ^4
Concepts for Aristotle are regulative in knowing and in
thinking reality. For Bergson they are of utilitarian value
in the interest of action. They are not binding on conscious-
ness as they were for Aristotle. New objects and new experi-
ences may even require the invention of new concepts.
^
The Aristotelian concept was an instrument or speculative
thought and it was toward an end - the Good. Bergson’s doc-
73. EC, 54.
74. SC, 52-53
75. EC, 52.
..
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trine is that the concept is not an instrument of speculative
thought. On many points "on reste encore dans le vague ou
dans l'arbitraire tant qu'on voit dans 1 ' intelligence une
faculte destinee a la speculation pure."' 0 The tool of intel-
lect, the concept, is an instrument of action, and action
toward no definable end.
For Aristotle and the orthodox Scholastics, will is
subordinate to intellect. For Bergson intellect is for the
sake of will (activity). "Hous sonnies faits pour agir autant
et plus que pour penser , - ou plutot, quand nous suivons le
mouvement de notre nature, c’est pour agir que nous pen-
sons '
A concept in Bergson’s system is a symbol of a past, per-
haps immediately past, but irrecoverably gone. The concept
cannot apply to the living present or to the future. In
Aristotle’s system a concept has an eternal meaning. It will
be always applicable to reality. Aristotle seems to nave as-
sumed that every possible concept is discoverable now; it is
only a question of the intellect's speculating thorougnly and
carefully enough.
Aristotle was almost entirely concerned
with establishing what had been conceived al-
ready or of refuting error, btt not with solv-
ing the problem of the discovery of truth. Now
and then, in reading his organon, one feels
that he has almost sensed the nature of this
76. EC, 164.
77. SC, 321.
II
I ,
u
"f I
.
problem, only to find that he lapses iranediate-
iy into a discussion 01 the logic or demonstra-
tion. Ke thinks of confirming truth rather
than of finding it. 78
Bergson assumes, of course, that new occasions give rise to
new concepts, impossible of apprehension at any previous mo-
ment of history. Hew meanings arise in Bergson's universe;
the meanings are all at once present in Aristotle's universe.
The Aristotelian universal is in the particular. This
was Aristotle's departure from Plato. The concept is not in
the particular according to Bergson’s tneory of reality,
partly because reality is not an aggregate of distinguishable
particulars, partly because the concept is not within reality
79
at all, but is external.
Aristotle’s theory of the concept is based on a distinc-
tion between form and becoming, and between the void and the
full, or the Hothing and Being. These distinctions do not
hold for Bergson.
/
Sous le devenir qualitatif, sous le devenir
evolutif, sous le devenir e^xtensii
,
1' esprit
doit chercher ce
/
qui est refractaire au ciiange-
ment: la qualite definissable
,
la forme ou es-
sence
,
la f in.
Pour avancer avec la re^lite
7
mouvante
,
c'est
en elle qu'il iaudra.it se replacer. In^tallez-
vous dans le changement
,
vous saisirez
/
a la
fois et le changement lui-meme et les etats
successifs en lesquels il pourrait a tout in-
stant s ' immobiliser
. Mais avec ces etats suc-
78. K. D. Carmichael, Logic of Disc overy
.
Quoted in Kor-
aybski
,
SS
,
85.
79. See, e. g. , EC, 190-193, 331.
80. EC, 340.

cessifs, aperpus du denoi s comine des immobili-
ties re'elles et non plus virtuelles, voas ne re-
const ituerez jamais da mouvement. Apielez-les,
selon le cas, ciuali tes , ± ormes , -positions ou
intentions ; vous pourrez en multiplier le nombre
autant qu'il vous plaira et rap.rocher ainsi in-
definiment l*un de 1* autre deux etats consecu-
tifs: vous e^rouverez toujours devant le mouve-
ment intermediaire le deception de 1' enfant qui
voudrait, en rapprocnant l'une de 1* autre ses
deux mains ouvertes, ecraser de la fumee . Le
mouvement glisse^. a dans 1 ' intervalle
,
paxce que
route tentative pour reconstituer le changement
avec des elats implique cette proposition atn-
Burde que le mouvement est fait d • immobilites
.
Tiier e is, for example, properly speaking, no "man” anywhere,
no "child" anywhere.
/ >
La realite, qui est la transition de l’en-
fance a l'age mur
,
pious a glisse' entre les
doigts....La verite e
7
st que, si ie langage se
moulait ici sur le reel, nous ne dir ions pas
"1 ’enfant devient homme;' mais M il y a devenir
de 1' enfant a 1' homme. "°^
"Le meme que nous passons par 1 ’ immobile pour aider au
mouvant
,
ainsi nous nous servons du vide poui penser le
plein
.
j /
L'idee d’une abolition de tout presenterait
peut-etre lqs monies earacteres que celle d'un
cercle carre: ce ne serait plus une ide'e
,
ce
ne serait qu'un mot.
. .
.
. . . .Le vide dont je parle n'est done, a;u
fond, que l'absence de tel objet determine"’,
lequel etait ici d'abord, se trouve mainte-
N
nant ailleurs et, en tant qu'^l n'est plus a
son ancien lieu, laisse derriere lui
,
pour
ainsi dire, ie vide de lui-m&ne
.
84
81. EC, 333.
82. EC, 338. Cf
83. EC, 297.
84. EC, 304-305.
352-353
.
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Cette longue analyse ete.it necessaire pour
montrer qu une realite qui se suffit a elle-
meme n'est pas
7
necessairement une reality etran-
gere a la duree. Si 1 on passe [ co^sci eminent
ou inconsciemment j ^ar l'id^e du neant pour ar-
river a celle de l'Etre, l'Etre auquel on abou-
tit est une essence logique ou mathematique
,
partant intempor elle
. t
St, des lors, une con-
ception statique du reel s ’ impose,: tout ^jarait
donne en une seule iois, dans ^'eternite. liais
il faut s’habituer a penser l'Etre directement
,
sans faire un de
7
tour
,
sans s’adresser d'abord
au fantime de neant qui s’ interpose entre lui
et nous. 5
By means of trie concept Aristotle expected to reach
truth. Eor Bergson the concept has a narrowly limited ca-
pacity for expressing truth. 80 It is the tool of intellect.
Intellect "touche quelque chose de l'absolu."^ 7 But the
truth intellect arrives at "devient toute relative a notre
faculte d ! agir. Ce n'est plus qu'une verite symbol ique ." 88
It "reste incommensurable" with life. 89
These differences between the concept in Aristotle's
thought and the concept in the thought of Bergson are based
on the difference between the two men's conception of reality.
/ /
Aristotle's God is yojjcrLujj yo^<r ij, the synthesis of all con-
cepts, the idea of ideas. 90 Bergson's God is activity.
Si, par tout, c'est la me'me espece d 'action
qui s'accomplit, soit qu'elle se defasse soit
qu’elle tente de se refaire, j ‘exprime simple-
ment cette similitude probable quand je parle
d ' un centre d’ou les mondes jailliraient comme
85. EG, 322-323.
86. Supra
,
101-104.
87. EC, iv.
88. EC, 214, quoted supra
,
103.
89. EC, 218-219, quoted suora, 103-104.
90. See EC, 214-215, 349-TV52, 377-378, 381-382, 384-335.
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les fusees d’un immense 'bouquet, - pourvu
toutefois que j e ne donne pas ce centre pour
une chose, mais pour une continuite de jail-
lissement. Dieu, ainsi deiini, n-a rien de
tout fait* il est vie incessante, action,
1 iber ti
.
^
And the essential difference between the two views of God and
/ /
reality is that time is not real ior Aristotle ‘s yo^uuj
and time is real for liergson s elan vital, to all intents
identified with God in Les deux sources de la morale et de la
religion
.
If a concept is a "timeless idea of the intellect ,
a
concept is not real for Bergson.
_ othing for him is real
3 Conclusions that is timeless, tha'
a Relation of Bergson’s
View to gtandard Jeiinitions is, without time, or
of the Concept
outside time. Eis-
ler's definition of logical identity is: "Einheit der Be-
deutung, des Gedachten, ' Gemeinten
’ ,
gegenttber der Mannig-
faltigkeit der Denk- und Vor stellungsakte
,
die sich auf den-
selben (realen Oder idealen) Gegenstand beziehen. "Ein-
neit der Bedeutung, des Gedachten" in Beigson's thought de-
pends on the consciousness which cuts out the concept in the
beginning and continues to recreate it at every instant.
Some passages suggest that percepts combined with memory are
concepts . ^4
If consciousness containing rationality, once invented,
91. EC, 270.
92. Bowne, TTK, 40, quoted supra, 3.
93. Supra, 2.
94. See MM, 106, 110, 112-113, 136, 140, 182.
II
.
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is independent, 95 we may infer that intellectual processes,
b The Concept in a System in once invented,
which Consciousness is Primary
and Logic Secondary are independent
(l) "Meaning"
or autonomous,
since consciousness is intuition and intellect, or intuition
which embraces intellect. May we infer further that once in-
vented as instruments, the concepts of intellectual activity
are autonomous? The autonomy of a concept is identity of
meaning. The fact that an object can be reduced to elements
already known, though a charge brought against the concept,
is also an implication that the "elements" retain identity so
that they can be recognized and can be meant. Any tiling that
can be meant must have identity of a sort. However, a mean-
ing can be meant only for or by a consciousness
.
Bergson’s theory of the concept is in the difficulty that
always arises in a per sondist ic type of philosophy. Con-
12) The General Difficulty sciousness is
in Personalis tic Systems
primary, logic
secondary. Concepts are in consciousness. All reality is con-
sciousness. A concept in no consciousness cannot nave identi-
ty for a personalist. The philosopher who makes logic primary
and consciousness a relation among logical entities may ask
the personalist, "If there were no consciousness in existence,
would it be true that there was no consciousness?" That is,
95. Supra, 100-101.

does the concept truth have identity independent o* conscious-
ness? Bergson would probably answer that this is a pseudo-
problem, since truth has no meaning except for consciousness,
and a concept, according to any definition, is what Sisler ex-
presses as Einheit der Bedeutung .
In Bergson's philosophy the theory of concepts is in
double difi iculty because in the consciousness which is primary
(3) The Special Difficulty will is superior
in a Personalism Primarily Volun-
taristic to rationality.
Brightman can say, "Universals then are real; but they are
real only in and for particular minds," 96 and seem to be near-
er Bergson's position than he really is; for Brightman also
says, "Mind, by its very structure, has to recognize the trutjp.
of some universals as independent of particulars"; and,
"Personal rational consciousness is indeed a univei salizing
particular; that is, mind is a concrete individual, one func-
tion of which is to grasp the meaning of universals." 96 In
this view, though universals are in the mind, tney are a part
of its structure and so exercise a certain compulsion on the
activity of the mind. Even though the compulsion is in it-
self, consciousness is not free to proceed as it would, for
its structure compels it to proceed according to certain regu-
lative concepts. Consciousness as 1 ' elan vital
,
although it
96. Brightman
,
IP, 139.
97. Br igntman IP, 137.
98. Brightman IP, 136.
..
II
,
II
- ;.•« : f 5 |
.
.
meets obstacles which (accoraing to one aspect of Bergson’s
thought) are due to a tendency given v/ithin itself, is not
compelled by regulative conceits. Reality is consciousness
which is time, wnicn is la duree , which is . rimarily active,
which faces an open future, which evolves freely. J; Concepts
arise inevitably in experience, but they belong to the outer
side of experience, that is, not to experiencing but to
thinking about experiencing. 100
Concepts share in the abstractness or words. 101 Con-
/ \ / /
cepts are ouantite
,
1 1 es -ace
,
la matier
e
;
quali te
,
la duree
,
c Relations of the Concept le cnan; ;ement ,
to Bergson-1 6 Thought as Presented /
in Chapter II are le reel , la
vie
,
la conscien ce.-*- 0^ Concepts are products of 1 ' intelli -
gence . 105 Concepts are discrete; in reality there are only
approaches to any individual as an entirely discrete unit. 104
Concepts imply repetition, and repetition is mechanism. Rea-
son implies attraction to a goal; in reality there is no
goal. Designs for the future in conceptual terms are impos-
sible . 10 0
Reality is oi trie nature of consciousness, says Bergson.
It seems on the one hand that intellect and its concepts are
99.
See supra
,
58-65.
100. See supra
,
51-58.
101. Sup ra
,
66-67.
102. Supra
,
66-80.
10 3 . Supra
,
76-77.
104. Supra , 80-82.
105. Supra
,
85-89.
..
.
.
.
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•
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d Tne Dependence 01 the Concept inventions of
on Consciousness and so the Neces-
sity of delating Identity of Con- consciousness,
cepts to Identity of Conscious Be-
ings It seems on
the other hand that intellect has alv/ays been in 1 1 elan and
has been differentiatea by a process of dissociation. If con-
sciousness is conceived as a whole from which everytning nas
been dissociated, it is itself a concept. It is tne concept
of Being, the universal of universals wnicn crowned the system
of Aristotle and which was tne lowest, barest entity in the
system of Hegel. If consciousness is conceived as a person,
that person may be said to have invented at least some con-
cepts, but hardly to have invented intellect, for a being with
no intellect cannot be said to be a person. If it is the na-
ture of 1 1 elan to form concepts, do not concepts partake of
the reality of 1 'e'lan ? But, because 1 1 elan is primarily will,
with intellect subordinate, the concepts cannot be binding on
consciousness, even though their production does issue from the
nature of consciousness, and this is to say that the identity
of concepts is wholly relative to consciousness - to conscious-
ness as will.
A concept retains identity only so long as a conscious-
ness continues to recreate it at each new instant, and then
the identity is not in the concept as an independent entity
but in the persistence of the creative consciousness (if there
is identity there). The usefulness of concepts lies in their
apparent persistence in time so that we can rely on them as
..
'
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trusty instruments. Tnat very persistence forbids that they
should endure for themselves. Succession within the concept
would alter the concept. Succession is real only for a con-
sciousness. 106 And to say that a concept has identity means
that a consciousness which can exi-erience succession as a qual-
ity and can in addition vi ew the succession spatially from a
viewpoint can remember its past viewpoints. If the conscious-
ness itself has changed in the meantime, it has endured. But
has it changed in any particular that foroids its cutting out
of its succession the same shape that it remembers having cut
out oefore? Consciousness is memory in the sense that its
swelling movement includes its past. Certainly then it in-
cludes its past views of succession as well as its past ex-
periences of succession.
So identity of a concept is conscious memory of cutting
out at past moments a logical form wuxch is now being cut out
a.gain - unless one is justified in stepping on to the conclu-
sion that a cut-out after intuition has made it by means of
its instrument intellect, becomes an intimate part of intui-
tion, as the mediated becomes the immediate in Kegel’s thought.
Bergson, whether the step is justified or not, seems not to
have taken it.
The identity of the concept is an identity of meaning for
loTT SDl'c" 82 .
—
128
a conscious toeing, and the meaning is utilitarian - it is for
the sake of action. Logical identity is secondary to psycho-
logical identity. The validity of identity of concepts is
secondary to the identity of conscious toeings, and the prob-
lem of identity of conscious toeings will form the subject of
the fifth chapter of this dissertation. A final brief chapter
will contain a discussion of the relation of identity of con-
cepts and identity of conscious toeings, and will consider the
relation of tooth logical and psychological identity to meta-
physical identity.
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CHAPTEtt FOUR
THE PROBLEM OP THE IDENTlTx UP OBJECTS IN NATURE
A. BERGSON 1 S GENERAL VIEW OP THE WORLD OF NATURE
Bergson’s views about objects of nature belong with. Hera-
clitus* metaphysics of change-*- and with the activistic prin-
1 Its Place in the Main Streams ciples of Aris-
of Philosophical Thought
totle’s entele-
chy,
2
Leibniz* monads, 3 Hegel’s metaphysics of development,
4
and the personalistic hypothesis that natural objects are ex-
pressions of the activity or will of a person. ^ Bergson's
view belongs also with the absolutism of Hegel and Schopen-
hauer (though not with the intellectualistic view of Hegel)
and so not with the Mediators' theories of elements nor with
the individualism of Leibniz nor with the analytic methods of
Locke and Hume. The view of Bergson is not in agreement with
theories of identity of substance, either of the ancient Ioni-
ans or of the medieval Scholastics or of the modern Neoscho-
lastics .
The aspects of Bergson’s thought with which we are
1 . Supra , 12-17
.
2. Supra
, 112.
3. Supra , 38-42.
4. Supra
,
45-46.
5. See Dooks by Brightman and Knudson ( supra , 114, n. 72).
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especially concerned in discussing the problem of identity of
objects in nature are his definition of reality in terms of
2 The Aspects of Bergson* s Thought conscious
Which Will deceive Special Considera-
tion in this Chapter duration
and his definition of conscious duration in terms of change, 6
his views of the relation of matter to life and conscious-
ness,
7
his correlating of consciousness with ability to act
freely, 6 his theory of the percept as cut from a continuity
by intellect and the artificiality of the percept due to the
continuity of matter and the piimacy of will over intel-
lect,
9
Ahe distinction between material objects and conscious
beings, and his view as to the possibility of distinguishing
an individual in reality.
B . MATTEtf.
Identity requires an enduring. What does not endure,
what does not ’’last," cannot be said to have self-identity.
1 Some General Considerations Enduring in
a Definition of Keality in
Terms of Conscious Duration and Bergson’s
of Conscious Duration in Terms
of Free Movement, Change, Will philosophy
means a changing, which carries with it memory of the chang-
ing. Keality is time as conscious duration, and time as
6. Supra
,
67-78.
7. Supra
, 79-80, 90-92, 105.
8. Supra
,
93-98.
9. Supra
, 75-78, 90-92.
10.
Supra
,
76-82.
.o ix r £s,$i xO u. iJini'Isi) e*ri . is ; x tf^rt Au r.Joa >fo
•
:
_
c . a
_ ivl
.< j '0_ {} ei oi_ . -o
_
-
tt)j
•
<.$. Lie i; . .3 . o -roy :o .i. oixoo axil
,
5
. iSii
? x . .
:
'
-oo 3 ioti. tu s ieo *.o &*** iri l
, .
jii.
$ v»i • 9011 3*-? ... . S kJ [IS '< ..t /C>
. --i oo s : Jo itcfo Ibii nssvrg id noi re il aib e ~ e t .;ooi
ii i i/t. i :c v o '
J
i ' : Sf.q. o < i a ". gj. i,. £>
,
a. .ii9'J
J
~.\t L 531 i i I -jfcivi.:'. X .1-3
. . r.
t
:i i . 0 • - . . in is v . ' ) x \ti r
• j
ai LI. i- • . .i .. *. .'
...
_
._
.oi I
bar, hoxj 3xt;G ajJOlosncO to auiisT
. :X9 • iti nciw . a iroxaenoO 'io
>Ii i-i
,
, •: ae- i 9t«tf :c
- ,: j .o 'i xa Ji itJ- v. et?i'_ijeo Xioi.. - ^ xija .-£> • ...
.noxiBiiJi) at/ciosaoo an amjtj s .
. . .
.
,
-
.
.
-
.
.
-
.
.
'
-r.
.
duration is creative activity, not a series of discrete repe-
titions; 11 it is quality, not quantity. 12 reality is living,
undivided mobility; it is tendency, change. 13
Objects in nature then, insofar as they endure in the
sense of changing continuously and inventively, partake of
b Conditions under which Identity reality and
Could be Ascribed to Objects in
Nature approach
self-identity. Insofar as they are not "un registre ou le
temps s ' inscrit ,
"
14 they are "un mecanisme pur et simple, sur
lequel la duree glisse sans le pene trer
.
1,15 If duration does
not penetrate them, they do not endure; self-identity cannot
be ascribed to them. Living beings are not des chose
s
but des
progres . "La permanence metae de leur forme n'est que le des-
s in d • un mouvement .
"
16
Just as Bergson says there is nowhere any child and no-
where any man but only "la transition de 1‘enfance a l*age
mur," 17 so he would say of objects of nature, there is nowhere
an acorn, nowhere an oak tree (to use the illustration used
earlier in discussing Heraclitus and the iiileatics1® ) , but only
"la transition" from the acorn to the oak. However, Bergson
has developed the thought of Heraclitus so far that in his
view the more difficulty we have in denoting an object ( une
IT! Supra
,
58-60.
12. Supra
,
67-74.
13. Supra
,
67-74.
14. EC, 17.
}§• ?Sj. fo.lO • -JjO
,
io«/ •
17. EC, 338.
18. Supra, 13-14.
,... il ti xSiL- ... u;. ion i n
x ;e^. :i*i r
^.s- r.^io . coiisba^i sx it ; £ii Mom hi vlu:
«
-•
:o s .-i . • , v^vx-ffdvn: . as ^Xexxr ;ii t noo ; n. .r, :o
ic
.
i. t t ... je a a i8Jtiifl09''- w. * si-' I- *
i : ' ;'. ii9 fcl lioixiw is j Eaoii: 100 d
ni iiost^O oi itoe; stf >0
.
.
•
-
•
-,i3t 9l Jj -«•. 3 ! C 1X19. -Jb :j. ao .df'J 319.1 t"
-SSliOla
-
•
.
• V. • -
'
•
:
3 _, . i i, s , . to ic
1 - ^X ' ' • 9J 0c ' ,Ixi
’
:
...
"aoiiisitBji al*
,1. ni <teiU ii’ c b a tUaniM :o is&uodt sis ba [oI$?a. .
,
-
(i ,oatoo tie L*xicx ,b i eul ^ i* ^ ^ ’« 9 5 iv
-
.
.
-1 . ;>
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
• ...
- .
.
.’•
. l ’L'': : :
.
132
chose ) in nature, the more certain we are that we are ap-
proaching a duration, that is, the nearer we are to an iden-
tity, or at least to one necessary condition for identity.
\
Living beings are des progres and the more fully a thing
lives, the more time is inscribed in it, that is, in the
\
progres .
If objects in nature have identity, they must exist in
time. Time is succession. “La succession existe seulement
/ / -I Qpour un spectateur conscient qui se rememore le passe.
And it has been said that existence in time is quality.
And so objects in nature, as far as they intuit them-
selves as quality, or as far as we can sympathetically insert
ourselves into them so that they are our own existing, 20 en-
dure as qualities. Otherwise they have no duration. And
in the former of the two possibilities the duration is not
their own identity but is an inclusion in the identity of a
conscious being, if identity may be ascribed to a conscious
being.
It is necessary in speaking of Bergson's thought to treat
human consciousness as one phase of a wider consciousness
c Bergson's Broad Definition of which may per-
Consciousness and its Bearing on
the Problem vade the whole
world. Theoretically, everything in the universe is conscious-
19. jJ)IC, 82.
20. IK, 1-3.
21. Supra
.
71-72.
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ness at some level. Consciousness, says Bergson, is relative
to power to move freely. 22 Here again is the association of
consciousness primarily with, will rather than with reason.
A brain is not necessary for consciousness in this broad sense
any more than a stomach is necessary for digestion. 23 An
amoeba has no brain, yet its measure of power to move freely
is also a measure of consciousness. A tree has no stomach,
yet its measure of power to assimilate nourishment is a meas-
ure of digestion. The human consciousness using a brain for
an instrument is a will using the determinations of matter.
So also an amoeba moving toward food is a will using the de-
terminations of matter. Both the human being and the amoeba
are conscious, but the degree of consciousness is measured by
memory, or ability to conserve the past. A consciousness un-
able to conserve its past may be said to be reborn at each
moment. This is really unconsciousness
.
A consciousness unable to conserve its past,
forgetting itself unceasingly, would be a con-
sciousness perishing and having to be reborn at
each moment: and what is this but unconscious-
ness? When Leibniz said of matter that it is
"a momentary mind,” did he not declare it,
whether he would or no, insensible?2^
Such a momentary destruction and rebirth precludes identity,
for identity demands a persistence in time.
There is some inconsistency in an explanation in terms of
a rebirth at each moment, since in reality there are no dis-
2T. EC, 121.
23. EC, 120.
24. ME(a), 8.
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tinguishable moments and no possible separations between the
entity that was destroyed ana the entity immediately created
in its place. This artificial supposed or pretended discrete-
ness is just what Bergson means by materiality or quantity or
spatiality, but how is it to be understood in relation to con-
scious beings able to conserve their past and in relation to
objects in nature? This leads to the question of the general
relation of matter to life and consciousness.
It has been pointed out25 that it is difficult to see
just what is the nature of matter in Bergson *s coni used dual-
2 The relation of Matter to Life istic view."^ 6
and Consciousness
a Is Matter Given in 1 ‘Mian or ihe monistic
to 1 ’Elan?
aspect of the
tnought is tnat the spatializing tendency is in 1 1 elan . The
duaiistic aspect is that matter is given t_o 1 elan . Bergson
appears to assume matter as a disorganized or inorganic given,
irue reality is duration. iet in considering the developing
ox duration into human consciousness it seems necessary to as-
sume matter.^ 7 The reason for the differentiations oi the
life impulse is its meeting with obstacles. xhese obstacles
are the material aspect oi the universe. Matter seems to be
regarded by Bergson now as a spatializing tendency in reality
itseli
,
now as an eternal given opposing trifi reality
25”! Supra
.
94-95.
26. Troland, supra
. 51, n. 4.
27. Supra
.
9<±-99.
28. supra. 95, n. 11.
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In one sense, 1 elan is the comlict of two antagonistic
principles, symbolized by tne words consciousness and mattex
,
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mde termination and determination, la duree and 1 * espace , will
and intellect. Will is primary but finds the intellectualiz-
ing or spatializing tendency given within itself and impeding
its otherwise free and purely temporal progress. In this
view spatializing and materiality arise simultaneously
,
and
matter is only the outer view of time. Matter is conscious-
ness in its logical aspect. Both time or consciousness and
space or matter and material objects are differentiated from
one ano tiier in the <bne unitary stream of consciousness.
/
In another sense 1 elan is the life stream, purely tem-
poral, which meets matter, an impeding principle of neces-
/
sity, not given in l'elan but jto it. Intellect is one aspect
/
of 1 * elan
,
not working in a direction opposed to the primary
aspect of 1 * elan ( will) but in the service of will. Intel-
/
lect, the spatializing aspect of l 1 elan
,
prevents the choking
up of the temporal aspect by matter; it keeps the future open
/
for will's activity. It is a form i 1 elan takes that it may
deal with the material (solids), by shaping out of matter in-
struments with which to work on matter or by adopting the
habits of matter that it may draw matter into the temporal
stream. Another way of saying the same thing is to say that
the attempt is made to insert indetermination into matter.
Bergson is a voluntarist. The life impulse is essentially
will. Yet will as a principle of pure activity finds itself
I
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b Keason and Will constantly opposed or modi-
fied by the principles of reason or logic. As we must say
repeatedly, whereas the intellectualist says that reason is
everlastingly hindered from being completely rational by the
unpredictable, disturbing annoyances of the volitional, cona-
tive nature, Bergson says that will is everlastingly hindered
from acting with freedom by tne disturbing tendencies of the
intellect, always planning and attempting to predict and de-
termine the future. The logical tendency in reality, which
Bergson seems sometimes to deny as appertaining to true real-
ity, 29 is spatiality or matter, necessity, inertia.
In a certain sense then we may correlate matter with rea-
son, and life or consciousness with will. Matter is necessi-
ty and inertia as opposed to the freedom and indetermination
of life; there is no more in the present of matter than in
its past; life is a swelling of past into future and the in-
scription of time is being made on everything living; matter
is both obstacle and instrument; matter is potential activi-
ty while life is real and free activity. Matter is represen-
tation while life is action. Matter is disorganized; life is
organized.
29. Supra
, 51-58, 76-77. See also 75-78. When we say
that intellect is intuition directed toward solids, the logi-
cal tendency seems to be considered as real; when we emphasize
intellect as cutting out patterns on the external aspect of
reality which is an affair of deep inwardness, the logical
tendency seems to be considered as outside reality.
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The intellectualist will tell us that the principles of
logic are the organizing principles of experience. For Berg-
son the organic precedes the inorganic, the inorganic is the
dissociation of the organic or the stopping and solidifying
or freezing over of the flow of life where it fails in one
of its attempts. For the intellectualist the disorganized
is more and more organized by reason into a whole of experi-
ence that is rational. Bergson would say that the organic
becomes dissociated into the more and more inorganic . Berg-
son's philosophy of duration is an absolutism. L’elan vital
is an absolute from which issue particulars by a process of
dissociation and division. Intellectualists look upon the
impulses of the will as the disorganized matter which reason
organizes into a rational whole. Bergson looks upon the
principles of reason as disorganized (because discrete) units
which the activity of will struggles against or manipulates
according to its practical interests.
Bergson points to many failures of the life impulse. 30
Where life continues in one form, that form must drag with it
c Matter as Failures of all the inventions
Will
that have contributed
to its creation. But in some forms the life impulse simply
fails in its ongoing. As for these failures of life to main-
tain itself in certain forms, they are the stuff of which the
30. Supra
, 95, n. 12.
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material world is made. The organic precedes the inorganic.
By that exuberance which is life, the vital impulse pushes
out in many directions. It keeps moving, moving. How in one
direction it slows down. Slower and slower the motion, until
tne flow solidifies. It is matter. It would seem that we
may look upon every stone, as well as upon every skeleton of
the dinosaur, as the spatialized symbol of some ancient
failure of life.
If we adopt Bergson's viewpoint, we may say that among
finite beings we see life lorcing its way through a tiny cell
into a human person. railure at last. And the motionless
spatialized symbol of failure is matter, nothing more. Life
will begin at once to use the matter as an instrument serving
further activity. It will decouper
.
indiscriminately, from
this that was once a human body, and from the mass of matter
into which it sinks back, the spatial form it needs, just as
to serve itseli in the form in which it has failed it ab-
stracted one aspect and anotner from the symbols of earlier
failures
.
We may by these selections from experience illustrate
Bergson*s thesis that materiality is the dispersion of all
*2"|
duration. A We can see that matter serves life as instrument
and opposes it as obstacle. But we have not answered the
question as to what caused the first failure of life. The
31. IK, 64.
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first matter, if we lollow the monistic thread or Bergson-
s
tnought, must have been the solidifying and spatial izing of
the first failure of the life impulse. If we iollow tne
dualistic thread of his thought, any lirst material form must
have been a shape imposed upon matter as a given, and the
stable form is the symbol of failure, ihis very primitive
bit of matter is henceforth a possible spatial form for life
to use but also a possible obstacle to its continuance. But
the lirst failure? We must believe that there is in the life
impulse, regardless of what may be outside it, a hindrance to
its free activity. phere is within intuition an intellec-
tualizing tendency; there is within time a spatializing ten-
dency; there is within will a logical tendency, heality can-
not, even for Bergson, be defined wholly as will. Leibniz'
principle of sufficient reason is in it. Even the absolute
will, characterized as fiee activity, is checked by the prin-
ciples oi reason. And Bergson is somewhat arbitrary in de-
claring that the check is only hindrance and not guide, and
therefore that the check belongs exclusively in the realm of
matter
.
Life or consciousness and matter in Bergson’s thought,
however, are opposed as v/ill is opposed to reason, as free
activity is opposed
to principles of
d May Identity be Ascribed
to Matter in General?
32. Cf. Lovejoy, "Bergson and Komantic Evolutionism."
University of California Chronicle
, 15(1913), 451-453.
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necessity. Bergson conceives reality as a whole to be
struggling toward a modus vivendi between these two conflict-
ing tendencies within itself. Life or consciousness is a
launching of will or indetermination into matter or necessi ty
or reason. It is a shaking up of logical inertness into what
appears after the fact to have been planned practical activi-
ty. But activity can never be really planned because the fu-
ture is imurevisible .
If we follow the monistic aspect 01 Bergson's thought,
we see that apparently there continues through all time not
only the obstacle of what is already matter resulting from
previous spatializing but also the original opposing tendency
which, without external obstacles, would still of itself, as
in the beginning, impede the flow of pure will by its spatial-
izing or intellectualizing or materializing. If we follow
the dualistic aspect of Bergson's thougnt, we see that ap-
parently matter will forever be in opposition "co will. Yet
Bergson's intimation that we may some day conquer the last
35
obstacle, death, is a suggestion that the time may come when
conscious beings will exist without being limited by material
bodies, either their own or objects entirely external to
themselves - in a word, that consciousness will at least in
some directions completely overcome matter. Of that we shall
speak not here but in the sixth chapter.
33^ Cf. SC, 14.
34. l£E^a), 17-lb.
35. EC, 294; DSULK, 342-343.
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Keality, we remember, "is fundamentally a spiritual ac-
tivity." 3^ Bergson defined matter in L* evolution creatrice as
"re
/
alite
/
qui descend," and which "ne dure....que par sa soli-
darite
7
avec ce qui monte, iiiais la vie et la conscience sont
cette montee meme." 37 The rest of reality, presumably includ-
ing matter, "derive d'elles." 3® In Les deux sources de la
morale et de la religion the view is more mystical and more
per sonalistic
,
though personalistic in an absolutistic sense.
Enfin il y aurait lieu d'nesiter encore, si
l'on croyait que l'univers est essentiellement
matiere brute, et que la vie s' est surajoutee
a la matiere. Nous avons montre au contraire
,
que la matiere et la^ie, telle que nous la de-
finissons, sont donnees ensemble et solidaire-
ment. Dans ces conditions, rien n’empeche le
philosophe de pousser ^usqu’au bout l'idee, que
le mysticisme lui suggere, d*un univers qui ne
serait que 1 'aspect visible et tangible de
l’amour et du besoin d'aimer, avec toutes les
consequences qu'entraine cette emotion crea-
trice, je^veux dire avec l 1 apparition d’e^res
vivants ou cette
/
emotion trouve son complement,
et d'une infinite d'autres etres vivants sans
lesquels ceux-ci n'auraient pas pu apparaitre,
et enfin d'une immensite
7
de mat^rialite sans
laquelle la vie n'eiit pas e'te possible. 39
Materiality is necessary for the ongoing of liie but it is not
the source of life. The visible universe is one consequence
of the activity of an "emotion creatrice."
In the double form of experience40 tne outer is the ma-
terial, tne spatial. Matter is real as well as spirit, 41 but
36. Carr, in Bergson-Carr
,
ME, v.
37. MC, 398-399.
38. EC, 398-399.
39. DSKk, 274. Cf. SC, 293.
40. Supra
,
51-58.
41. M*m
’
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matter is not independently real. It is real only by virtue
of its "solidarite" with consciousness. If matter is given
not in 1 ‘elan but to 1 1 eian
.
it is analogous to the Platonic
not-b«ing, and interpreters disagree whether that not-being is
real or not. It seems that for rsergson it is real, that is,
it endures, only for consciousness. ^ We cannot ascribe iden-
tity to matter merely as matter, that is, to matter as neces-
sity and inertia, lor matter as necessity and inertia cannot
endure in itself. It can endure only as it nas been incor-
porated into a consciousness able to conserve it. 43
C. OBJECTS
tial
,
What we call objects in nature, insofar as they are spa-
44
are but artificial shapes which we have cut out.
Conscious beings
cut their shapes
1 General Character of Objects
in Nature or Objects of Perce^ -
tion
a The Percept and the Object
as Cut from a flux and their Ar-
tificiality due to the Continuity
of Matter and the Primacy of Will
over Intellect
(1) Matter as a Continuity
or a Flux
along lines of
possible action
upon them to
the advantage
of the conscious beings. 44 Though Bergson views matter in
terms of immobility, necessity, and inertia, he believes that
in itself it is, like consciousness, a flux. Here again is
42. EC, 398-399.
43. Cf. EDIC, 91-92, where the subject under discussion is
not matter in general but "etats dits successifs du monde ex-
t^r ieur .
"
44. Infra, 144-145.
. .
•
. ..
“
-- 1 " • iO ; 0
*' k
. .
£•• r'0
.
, O
,
j j
’
I-- ' rJ
< -
-
•'
,
X - • V l: I ’1 . Jif C j VJxi
7 A i ^ 5
,
-
•
,
x j ..
...
..
. 0 I o . c
-
-
- LOU.'iX l S- f;.*: til , 0 [. ->,0 1 ;;..
•
-•
-
•'
. 1 . 3
3 . Ti • lJ- C oO
.1‘J'S-ih. S • i
••
3! ii.
;c •: ‘ £Sv ’fi to
- ... J ...
-JL VO
XjT j3 £TO
u; .. . 9, j
.
.
,
J
•
•
•
- 9 :
. .
.. «. : ill . , A
143
I
the problem of monism versus dualism. If matter is something
differentiated in 1 1 elan , it is of course flux. At any rate,
it is a continuity as is consciousness. But the farther we
proceed in the direction of matter the more we approach a
continuity which is homogeneity - pure quantity; the farther
we proceed in the direction of consciousness, the more we ap-
proach a continuity which is heterogeneity - a purely quali-
tative succession.
Since reality is fundamentally a spiritual activity,
reality is quality, how objects in nature are quantitative;
{'£) ihe Artificial uharac- they have limits
ter of Percepts and Objects
or boundaries.
quantities are never in reality as given; boundaries are not
given even in matter, whatever part we assign it in reality . 45
The quantitative units of the continuous matter which we call
objects of nature are cut out arbitrarily by conscious beings.
Percepts are cut out specifically by intellect
,
46 the
i acuity which presides over actions
.
4 7 The percepts outline
(3) Percepts and Objects as in the con-
nepresentations of Action and
Instruments of Action tinuity of mat-
ter what we call objects in nature. The percepts or the ob-
jects represent action and are ror tne sake of action .^6
4o . Supra
.
69-70.
46. Supra
. 79, 90.
47. Supra
.
101.
48. Inira, 145 .
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They are mental substitutes for action, or they are represen
tations of action, or they are instruments of action.
v /
A mesure que mon horizon s’elargit, les
images qui m'entourent semblent se dessiner
sur un fond plus uniforme et me devenir in-
diffe'rentes . Plus je re'tredis cet horizon,
plus les objets qu'il circonscrit s'enchelon-
nent distinctement selon la plus ou moins
grande facilite
/
de mon corps a les toucher et
a les mouvoir . . . .Et puisque ces demarches lui
[mon corps] sont sans doute suggerees par le
plus ou moins grand avantage qu’elle peut tirer
des images environnaiyte , . . . . enfin que cette dis-
tance elle-meme represente surtout la mesure
dans, laquelle les corps environnants sont as-
sures, en quelque sorte, contre l'action imme-
diate de moi} cqrps . . .
.
Les ob.jets qui entourent
mon corps reflechissent faction possible de mon
corps sur eux. 49
Que sont done enfin ces mouvements, et quel
role ces
/
images par ticuli^res jouent-elles dans
la representation du tout?....ce sont, a l*in-
terieur de mon corps, des mouvements destined a
preparer, en la commenpant, la reaction de mon
corps a l’action des objets exterieurs. Images
eux-memes, ils ne peuvent cre'er des images; mais
ils marquent a tout moment .... la position d'une
certaine image determined
,
mon corps, par rapport
aux images environnantes . . . . II n'y a done qu'une
difference de degre7
,
il ne ^eut y a,voir une dif-
ference de nature, entre la faculte dite percep-
tive du ,cerveau et les fonctions reflexes de la
moelle ep ini e^e .... dans un cas comme dans
l’autre, le role de la matiere nerveuse est de
conduire, de composer entre eux ou d*inhiber des
mouvements
.
50
Intellect shapes them and uses them in the interest of further
and more successful activity of will.
....des objets delimited par notre percep-
tion. ^Les contours distincts que nous attri-
buons a un objet, et qui lui confer ent son in-
49. MM, 5-6.
50. MM, 8-9.
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dividualite, ne sont que le dessin d'un cer-
tain genre d* influence que nous pourrions exer-
cer en un certain po^nt de l*espace: c’est le
plan de nos actions eventuelles qui est ren-
voye7 a nos yeux....51
Nous disions que les corps bruts sont tail-
le's dans l'etofie de la nature par une percep -
tion dont les ciseaux suivent, en quelque sorte,
le pointille des lignes sur lesquelles 1
'
action
passerait . 52
Matter in general may be regarded as a flux Put material
objects are regarded as immobile. Tne more it suits a con-
sciousness to regard anything as external to itself, that is,
the less a consciousness inserts itself sympathetically into
anything so as to share a duration, the more immobility the
thing seems to have. When we look upon matter and distin-
guish a stone with our perceptual ciseaux
,
we ascribe immo-
bility to the stone or we recognize that life as conscious-
ness nas been almost stopped in this direction of its flow by
the necessity of matter. When we see a moon-flower opening in
the twilight, or when we see a mother bird feeding her young,
we partly cut out the lines of action by which we could handle
the flower or the birds, but we partly share a duration. Ob-
jects in nature move between these extremes. The more immo-
bile and purely spatial they are, the more arbitrary is our
outlining of them. The more mobile and conscious they are,
the less of them we grasp by intellect, which gives us only
51. EC, 12.
52. EC, 12-13.
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shapes, and the more we must know them, if at all, by intui-
tion.
What we know by intuition is not in terms of percepts and
we must say that the moon-flower and the birds are not wholly
objects in nature. With Bergson’s theory that life is co-ex-
tensive with consciousness, it is hard to point to what is an
exclusively material object, which is represented only as per-
cept. But all things in the universe, even our own oodies,
have aspects which we try to represent by percepts (as we try
to represent our conscious duration by concepts). Percepts
are as artificial and arbitrary as concepts. And as concepts
are as spatial as percepts, so percepts are as intellectual or
aostract as concepts. Both are inventions for the sake of ac-
tion. The percept is cut out according to our interest or our
material advantage.
/ > \
La realite de la
/
matiere consiste dans la
totalite^ de ses elements et de leurs actions de
tout genre. Notre repr e'sentation de la matiere
est la mesure de notre action possible sur les
corps; elle result de 1 ' elimination de ce qui
n'interesse pas nos besoins et plus gene'rale-
ment nos fonctions. En un sens, on pourrait
dire que la perception d'un point mate'riel in-
conscient quelconque, dans son instantaneite'
,
est infiniment plus vaste et plus complete que
la n8tre, puisque ce point recueille et trans-
mit les actions de tous les points du monde ma-
teriel, tandis que notre conscience n*en at-
,
teint que certaines parties par certains cotes.
La conscience, - dans le cas de la perception
exterieure, - consiste precisement dans ce
choix.
53. MM, 25-26.
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Ce que vous avez done a expliquer , ce n'est
pas comment la perception na'it, mais comment
~~
elle se limite, puisqu elle serait, en droit,
,
l 1 image du tout, et qu-ell e se r^duit, en fait ,
a ce qui vous interi esse .
So, in addition to what has been said about the status
of identity of matter, 55 we may Say that identity may oe as-
b Bearing oi the General Cnu.racter cribed to
of Objects in Nature on the Problem
of their Identity objects in
nature (1) in terms 01 conscious duration (if conscious dura-
tion has identity) in those cases where a consciousness can
enter sympathetically into an activity, 05 or (2) in terms sim-
ilar to the identity of concepts 57 in cases where a conscious-
ness arbitrarily assigns and remembers outlines cut out of a
continuous matter.
in this dissertation we have used the stone as an illus-
tration of an extreme opposite of a conscious being. We saw
2 Comparison of Objects in Nature tnat such cen-
and conscious Beings
ters of activ-
ity as a moon-flower or a bird present analogies to human per-
sons as composed somehow of consciousness and material oodies.
It is not easy to distinguish exactly between material bodies,
living beings, and conscious beings, since life and conscious-
ness are co-extensive, and consciousness is proportional to
ability to move freely and to choose.
54.
156.
55.
56.
57.
MH, 29. Compare with this and preceding reference, R,
Supra
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Living beings and objects are indeed incomparable, says
uergson. Much less comparable are highly conscious beings and
objects. Probably differences between consciousness and life
and between life and matter, like difference betv/een animal
and vegetable, are, in the limiting cases, indiscernible. Dif-
ference of tendency must serve in lieu of absolute difference.
But Bergson gives a few norms which suggest the difference for
practical purposes. 5® Living beings are alert and attentive;
material objects are in repose. The greater the degree of
life and consciousness, the greater the degree of alertness
and attentiveness. Living beings engage in free unpredictable
activity; material objects are characterized by uniformity of
state. Living beings are inimitable and unpicturable
; materi-
al objects are both imitable and picturable. Living beings
can appear comic; material objects cannot.
Bergson, in his interest in the practical and the profit-
able, might suggest also that we differentiate between the liv-
ing and the materis,l by asking ourselves whether we are facing
an object or whether we are facing and being faced by a being.
Here we differentiate by asking which side of that which we
are facing we call right and which side we call left. If the
direction it faces is relative only to ourselves, to the direc-
tion we face or to the use we propose to make of the object,
58"! See EDIC, vii, 1-6, 52-55, 65-69, 74-106, 118-119, 134-
137, 171-184; MM, 16-17, 27-29, 272-279; EC, 11*12, 31-32, 49-
51, 53, 63, 218; IM, 12-13, 47; it, 33-35, 103, 165-166, 172.
Cf. Stephen, MM, 62-65.
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it is an object. If its direction is determined by its own
structure, we are facing a being.
When I stand before a table, X call the drawer toward
which my right hand moves in a straight line the right hand
drawer. When I stand before a man, x call the hand toward
which my right hand moves in a straight line his left hand,
i call the front of a bureau or a mirror the part I wish to
have toward me for my convenience. I call the front of a
boat or of an airplane the part which I build into the shape
most efficient to push into the direction I intend to take.
Whether a man or a horse moves iorward, or backward, or side-
ward, whether at my convenience or my inconvenience, I cannot
call his right side his left side. When x attribute con-
sciousness to a doll or a picture of a man or a pumpkin Jack-
o'-lantern or to a boat or an air ^plane
,
I transfer to it my
habit of applying left and right absolutely to living beings.
When we descend low in the scale of living beings, we are
confused in our attempts to describe in terms of direction.
We are coming nearer and nearer to directionless because mo-
tionless existence. We have to differentiate merely between
tendencies. All these considerations lead again to the con-
clusion that identity of objects in nature is relative to or
dependent on the identity of conscious beings.
It was shown in the second cnapter 59 that in Bergson's
absolutistic view individuality is a tendency, not a state.
59. Supra 80-82.
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3 The Limits of the Tendency
toward Individuality
We ascrioe individ-
uality to external
objects according as certain of their features are of use to
our action. Individuation is a spatial tendency, and the
further spatializing can proceed, the nearer individuality
would seem to be approacned. But spatializing leads to the
unorganized, the discrete; and the further one proceeds toward
the unorganized, the farther away individuality is seen to be.
For the individual is organic. It is that which “cannot be
divided without losing its identity
. The living body is
nearer being an individual than is the unorganized body. 62
The conscious being is the nearest to individuality, the vege-
table is scarcely distinguishable as an individual, and by im-
plication a stone can scarcely be said to be an individual at
all. The world of matter is a continuity. A material object
as an individual is to the whole of matter as a percept is to
intuition, the whole of consciousness. In each instance the
supposed discreteness in terms of which we find it necessary
to speak is artificial.
Now our general notion of identity is such that we must
assume that what cannot be distinguished from something else
cannot be said to preserve identity. We see that the more
nearly an object approaches the realm of conscious beings, the
60. Supra
.
80.
61. Supra 80.
62. EC, 13,
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more nearly the object approaches individuality as a system
or an organism. We see also that unorganized objects have
individuality conferred upon them by conscious beings accord-
ing to the advantage to the conscious beings. As far as iden-
tity of objects in nature is proportional to individuality
then, the identity is relative to the identity discoverable in
conscious beings.
D. THE IDENTITY OF OBJECTS IN NATUHE kELaTIVE
TO XBE IDENTITY OF CONSCIOUS BEINGS
Identity to be identity must endure. Whether matter is
in 1* elan or external to it, identity may be ascribed to mat-
ter only in virtue of its solidai ite with la duree which is
consciousness. Material objects can be said to preserve iden-
tity only in relation to conscious beings, either as conscious
beings can make the objects part of their own duration or as
conscious beings assign identity to artificially delimited ob-
jects in the same fashion in which they assign identity to
concepts. This follows both fiom the manner in which conscious
beings peiceive and from the impossibility of the existence of
an absolute individual in the continuous flux of matter.
Artificially fabricated objects cannot have self-identity.
Nothing in themselves, to themselves, nor for themselves guar-
antees permanence of their extent in space or permanence of
their duration in time. They cannot even be characterized as
—
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duration, for duration means ceaseless creation, and material
objects are instances of all-at-once-ness, Each object con-
tinues in its peculiar all-at-once-ness as long as conscious-
ness views it so. Or
,
a consciousness must over and over
again, by a continued creative effort, pick out the same out-
lines in matter.
In traditional terms we would say natural objects or ma-
terial objects can have only identity of meaning. But to say
that is to treat consciousness as primarily rational. Perhaps
for a consciousness that is primarily volitional we must say
i-hat objects have identity of instrumentality.
Identity of objects of nature, then, like fronts and
backs and right sides and left sides of objects, is only for
consciousness which endures and perpetually destroys and re-
creates an object according to principles of reason (logic or
spatialicyj. Identity whicn is succession is a reality only
i or intelligence
.
/
La vie consciente se presente sous un douole
aspect, selon qu’on l’aperpoit anectement ou
par refraction a travers l’espace. 6 ^
Uhacun des etats dits successifs du monde
ext^rieur exis^e seule, et leur multiplicity
n*a de r^alite que pour une conscience capable
de les conserver d'abord, de les juxtaposer
ensuite, en les exterior isant les uns par rap-
port aux autres.64
.
/
Qu • existe-t-il
,
de la duree, en dehors de
nous? Le present seulement, ou, si l'on aime
63. EDIC, 104.
64. EDIC, 91-92.
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/ /
mieux, la simultaneite . Sans doute les cnoses
exterieures changent, raais leurs moments ne se
succedent que pour one conscience qui se les
rememore. Nous observons en dehors de nous, a
un moment donne
7
,
un ensemble de positions sim-
ultane'es: des simultane'ite's anterieures il ne
reste rien. ...
,
Ainsi, dans la
x
conscience
,
nous trouvons des
etats qui se succedent sans se distinguer ; et,
dans l'espace, des simultaneites qui, sans se
succe'der, se distinguent, en ce sens que l’une
n’est plus quand l'^utre parait. .. En dehors
de nous, exterior ite re7cipxoque sans ^ucces-,
s^on: au dedans, succession sans exteriorite
r eciproque
.
Ici encode un compromis intervient. Ges
,
simultane'ites
,
qui constituent le monde exteri-
eur
,
et qui, bien que distinctes les unes des
autres, se succedent pour nous seulement, nous
leur accord^ns de se succeder en elles-memes
.
De la l 1 idee de faire durer les cnoses comme
nous durons, et de mettre le temps de l’espace. 65
Wherever consciousness cut3 out of the continuity of the
world of nature the same shape, it attributes identity to the
shape. But another cutting may outline a shape containing
part of the matter in tne firso shape and some matter outside
it, or may outline a shape wholly within the first shape, and
the second shape will also have its identity lor the acting
consciousness. Except for the active consciousness there
could be no identity of material objects. Identity of per-
cepts, like identity of concepts, is relative to identity of
conscious beings. Identity cannot be a purely spatial con-
cept. Identity implies time. If we cannot say tnat a thing
is now what it was, we cannot assert identity of it. The only
65. EDIC, 174-175.
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Entities that can embrace
a yet-to-be are conscious.
an _ls_ and a was while pushing toward
We turn now to the problem of the
identity of conscious beings.
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CHAPTER ±IVE
THE PKOBLEjl OP IDBNtITX Of CONSCIOUS BEINGS
A. GENERAL SURVEY OP THE PROBLEM
We have seen that objects of thought and objects of per-
ception are distinguishable and identifiable only by con-
1 Dependence of Other Types sciousness. Such
of Identity on Consciousness
separateness and
such identity as they have is relative to conscious beings. 1
Sisler*s first type of identity, ph&nomenologisch und lo -
g;isch
,
2
is in Bergson s thought dependent upon the second
type, the psychologisch .
An identity, to be an identity, must endure. 3 Por Berg-
son la duree is a conscious succession which is a continuity
with no breaks in its flow;
4
succession is real only for a
consciousness that can remember. 5 Our next problem is the
question whether there are centers of consciousness or sepa-
rate streams of consciousness which or who maintain self-iden
tity
.
Bergson follows in the tradition of the primacy of mind
or consciousness begun by Anaxagoras and carried on by
IT Supra
.
125-128. 132, 142, 147, 149-151, 153-154.
2 . Supra
.
2.
3. Supra
.
130.
4. Supra
,
66-69.
5. EDIC, 91-92. 174-175.
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Socrates and Plato,
duo views mina or
2 Bergson's General Theory
of Consciousness
a Its Place in the Main
Streams of Philosophical
Thought consciousness as
fundamentally will, not intellect. He follows in the line of
thought, Begun By Plato and continued in Aristotle’s tneory
of the entelechy, in which the active nature of tne self is
recognized, 6 But denies Aristotle's principle that the activ-
ity is directed By an attracting goal, the perfection latent
and potential in the consciousness
,
the idea of the Good, in
short, purpose. Bergson follows Locke in designating the
changing stream of consciousness as the only Basis of identi-
ty of self and follows Berkeley in asserting the active na-
ture of spirit. He has pressed tne thought of Locke and Hume
aBout time on to the point of identifying changing conscious-
ness with time as duration. But Bergson is entirely out of
sympathy with the analytic method of the British Empiricists.
He follows LeiBniz' thought of consciousness in its ac-
tivistic aspect But not in its extremely individualistic as-
pect. Bergson, like LeiBniz, recognizes degrees of conscious
ness ranging from the clearest and most intense consciousness
to the level of the "unconscious," a concept invented By
LeiBniz. LeiBniz, however, had a theory of a hierarchy of
separate monads, each representing one stage of consciousness,
in the interest of showing that God has filled the universe
6. On this section, see supra
,
chapter I.
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with an instance of every "compossible. " Bergson's degrees
of consciousness are instances of the different types of
frustration which 1 1 elan nas met in its ongoing. "L’avenir
/
dans chaque substance a une parlaite liaison avec le passe,"
/ 7
said Leibniz. "C f est ce qui fait l'identite de 1 • individu.
"
/
The parfaite liaison of 1 ' avenir avec le passe is in accord
with Bergson's view of consciousness. But not so dans chaque
substance - neitner the chaque nor tne substance. With Berg-
son there is no snarply marked off individual and tnere is no
I
substance
.
And when Leibniz says, "Ce n’est done pas le souvenir qui
fait justement le meme homme," he means sometning different
from Bergson’s memory. Bergson's memory is more nearly de-
scribed by Leibniz’ "Chaque ame garde toutes les impressions
/ /
pr eceaentes , " since Bergson means by memory all tnat might be
remembered if the total past were illumined.
As to the empirical self ana tne noumenai self of Kant,
Bergson woula say tnat tne two are the same. The noumenai
self is not for Bergson unknowable, but its aeepest depths
cannot be expressed in terms of the categories. Bergson dis-
tinguishes not between the empirical self and the noumenai
self, but between tne intellectualizing consciousness taking
a view of itself and the intuitional consciousness experiencing
7. The passage and tne passage in the following paragraph
are from Leibniz, NS, 73.
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itself.
Bergson’s view of consciousness approacnes the view im-
plied. in the absolutism of Hegel most closely in his theory
of the relation of individuality to the absolute, i 1 elan , and
departs from it the farthest in his theory of consciousness
as primarily will not intellect. His view of will allies him
with Schopenhauer’s theory of consciousness ; but whereas in
Schopenhauer's thought each human consciousness is represented
as rebellious against the whole and as seeking to outwit the
whole by means of intellect, the human consciousness in Berg-
son -s system is an intimate part or aspect of 1 ' elan and uses
/
intellect in the interest of the action of 1 1 elan .
In his stress on the importance of viewing consciousness
as-a-whole (intuition in Bergson's terminology) Bergson is not
only like Hegel but also like Boole, Boutroux, Korzyoski, and
Q
others of the present time. In his theory of consciousness
as time he is particularly close to Korzybsxi's time-binding
theory of human consciousness. The time-transcending prin-
ciple of consciousness on which American personalists partly
base identity of consciousness appears in Bergson's thought as
the theory that the temporal process itself is consciousness
.
But American personalism as represented by Bowne and his suc-
cessors, though giving much importance to will, accepts logical
universals as regulative principles in consciousness. Berg-
8. See the books refereed to supra
, 114, n. 72.
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son’s theory is extremely voluntaristic . Though as Bergson's
thought has become more per sonalistic
,
it has become corre-
spondingly nearer teleology, purpose is not an avowed princi-
ple with him as with the American personalists
.
Consciousness is primary in Bergson's philosophy, heali-
ty is of the nature of consciousness. "C'est la conscience,
b The Primacy of Conscious- ou mieux la supra-
ness in Bergson’s System
conscience, qui
est a l’origine de la vie."^ "La duree vraie" is constituted
/ /
by "un processus d ’ organisation ou penetration mutuelle des
faits de conscience se pour suit" "au deaans de moi." 1^ It is
/ /
true that "il y a un espace reel, sans duree,*' but in this
space "des phenomenes apparaissent et aisparaissent simultane^-
ment avec nos etats ae conscience
.
rl11 Space or materiality,
/ / /
"realite qui descend," "ne dure....que par sa solidarite avec
ce qui monte." Ana *‘la vie et la conscience sont cette montee
meme . "
^
Consciousness is duration, free choice, and free activity.
Consciousness broadly defined is activity as such. this ac-
c The Nature of Consciousness tivity as such is
simply time as duration. Time is real, since all is not given
at once 15 and hence the future succeeds the present and the
9. EC, 283.
10. EPIC
,
82.
11. EDIC
,
83.
12. SC, 398-399.
13. EC, 366-367.
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past. 14 Keal time is duration, and duration is consciousness.
Time as duration or consciousness is creative activity.
"Du moment qu’il ne fait rien, il n*est rien." 15 "Le temps
est invention ou il n*est rien du tout.',J-° .but this creative
activity cannot do any creating except as it is impeded by its
i
own spatializing tendency or by a matter whicn is external to
it. Life is an interaction of antagonistic tendencies, the
one spatial, quantitative, and homogeneous, tne other tempo-
/
ral, qualitative, and heterogeneous. La duree toute pure , la
conscience pure
,
is spaceless. It is quality, heterogenei-
ty. 17 But consciousness to be personal or individual or dis-
tinguishable must be differentiated by logical or spatial or
quantitative or material forms. These forms more or less
roughly indicate centers of consciousness or conscious beings.
In conscious beings consciousness is present in propor-
tion to the being's power to move freely. Even tropism is a
form of consciousness
.
19 Consciousness, broadly defined, must
have its activity impeded by matter before it can emerge as
20
consciousness that is self-consciousness. But tnere are
different possibilities in different logical or spatial or ma-
terial forms whicn consciousness meets or whicn it creates.
Paradoxically, tne more complicated the material form becomes,
IT! EDIu, 91-97.
15. EC, 42.
16. EC, 369.
17. uDIC
,
75, 83, 91, 97-98.
18. ME(a), 28; EC, 292.
19. Supra , 98.
20. Supra
, 72-74, 134-139.
..
.xtdii *fi Xi
,
.v. io £j.ni ctwti 1
A
"
. Ju c J- i-i> nail Xi no iinavni
.'
- .'
. c J :-
'
< 0 ... : . ] o.
;
-
_
.
.
.
. . ii , . i
. . . axi-
,
ant on a; t . id
,
- ....
. .
• .
‘
-iena^oxa^ .-;i
,
&i j 2 . gaoia'-v t 3i ,
5
me a oiexogioo
.
...
.
. , . actiol X. . iu* io .injsup
.
.
-
; .: ,.. "u!
,
.
'
.. C .... - . .-0 j .00 \ .
.'Xv . . . :- J : 01 . iL'i. %/.: - j
.
i esanencioexioo
- I
.
,
-. CO . 1C ........ J - r, . , L. - -
x
.
,
.
•
. *- t •
: .
,
8e-?e , xe
...
, , .
.;
r: r
. ^ -
. :
.
- .
•; X
. .i- ,K-i:7 ,/y ' _3 .OS
lbl
the more freely consciousness cqn move. The reason for this
is That matter is to consciousness both obstacle and instru-
ment.^ And here is the absolutist Bergson's List aes 7/il -
lens to match tne absolutist Hegel's List der Vernunft .
Consciousness arises in an activity when tne activity
meets an obstacle which impedes its free ongoing, and which
presents alternatives to the activity. Consciousness "signi-
fie hesitation ou choix." 22 If only one action is possible,
tnat action is performed on tne unconscious level, but if
more than one action is possible, consciousness arises. 22
/ \
Consciousness "s'endort quand la vie est condamnee a l'auto-
matisme; elle se reveille des que renait la possibilite d'un
choix. Consciousness "apparait comme propor tionnelle a la
puissance de choix dont l'etre vivant dispose.” 25
And so, though consciousness in general is unhindered ac-
tivity, consciousnesses in particular are the sharper and the
more intense as they are more and more hindered. Or, in other
terms, consciousness in general is unimpeded activity, while
consciousnesses in particular are flares of light kindled by
the friction of an encounter of consciousness in general with
an obstacle to its free movement.
la
A l’envisager du dehors, on pourrait done
prendre pour un simple
21 . 102(a), 29.
22. EC, 156pl57
.
23. EC, 156-157.
24. EC, 283.
25. EC 194.
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auxiliaire de 1' action, pour une lumiere que
l’action allume, etincelle fugitive qui jail-
lirait du frottement de 1‘action resile contre
les actions possibles . ^6
En approfondissant ce point, on trouverait
que la conscience est la lumiere immanente a
la zone d'actions possibles ou d'activite vir-
tuelle qui entoure 1* action effect ivement ac-
complie par l'^tre vivant. Elle signifie he-
sitation ou choix. La ou beaucoup d'actions
egalement possibles se dessinent sans aucune
action reelle ^comme dans une deliberation qui
n*aboutit pas)
x
,
la conscience est intense. La
ou l'action re'elle est la seule action possi-
ble Icomme dans
/
1 'act ivite" du genre somnambu-
lique ou plus generalement automat ique ) , la
conscience, devient nulle.... De ce point de
vue
,
on definirait la conscience de l'etre vi-
va^it une difference ar ithmetique entre l’activi-
te
/
virtuelle et l'act^vite reelle. Elle mesure
l'ecart entre la representation et 1' action.^ 7
Conscience ou ^upraconscience est la fusee
dont les debris e
7
teints retombent en matiere;
conscience encore est ce qu^subsiste de la
fusee meme
,
traversant les debris et les illu-
minant en organismes.28
In other words, consciousnesses in particular are the
representations consciousness in general makes for itself of
action it would have continued if an obstacle had not arisen.
Viewed either as light illumining action or as represen-
tation of action, our mental functionings are of a utilitari-
an character. ^9 go consciousness must be viewed as activity,
as a light that illumines activity, and as representation of
activity, always utilitarian in character.
ter.
—EC-;- 194-195.
27. EC, 156-157.
28 EC, 283.
29. M'M 1
,
xvi-xvii. Analytically, activity may be taken
for will; light for intellect, reason, intelligence, pur-
pose; representation for sensation and perception.
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As "il n'y a pas de chose, il n*y a que des actions," 30
so there is no "moi toujours identique a lui-meme"; there is
•ZT \
rather a "aynamisme interne." 0 A moi toujours identique a
lui-meme could not experience self-identity. Identity as a
hare concept is nothing real. Identity to he real must he
identity as a consciousness or must he consciousness if iden-
tity. This is in direct opposition to soul psychology. The
soul as an eternql sameness cannot represent or experience
conscious sameness. If I am to believe that I am an identity,
I must know that I am the j. that I was when I was a child.
How I can know this only if I can connect the child experi-
ences with the experiences of my present, consciousness
,
hy
virtue of its time-transcending principle, makes this very
connection. And consciousness is moving activity. A change-
less self-identity cannot he time-hinding, ana identity re-
quires time-hinding. There must he a present that is in con-
tinuous relation with a past.
As Bowne distinguished between a color sensation and a
sensation of color, 32 we may in somewhat similar fashion dis-
tinguish between the concept of identity and an identity which
is self-identity. A new-oorn baby presumably can have a color
sensation, hut the color sensation must take its place in an
organic consciousness before it can become a sensation of
30. SC, 269-270.
31. SDIC, 131-132, quoted at the beginning of Chapter II.
32. Bowne, TTK, 38-40.
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V A
color. A moi identique a lui-meme has no more meaning than
the bare notion of a color sensation. We cannot experience a
color sensation except as it is a sensation of color in or-
\
ganic consciousness. We cannot experience un moi identique a
lui-meme except as it is un dynamisme interne , carrying along
past action with present action. To continue to he myself is
to continue to experience my dynamisme interne . 35
The dynamisme interne is a free activity, hut its free-
dom is not capriciousness . Capriciousness itself is a sort
of mechanism. "Au contraire, une conduite vraiment notre est
/ \
celle d*une volonte qui ne cherche pas a contrefaire l’intel-
A \ /
ligence et qui, restant elle-meme c-est-a-dire evoluant, abou-
tit par voie de maturation graduelle a des actes que l'intel-
/ / / /ligence pourra resoudre indefiniment en elements intelligioles
sans y arriver jamais completement . Consciousness is not
really purposive. In retrospect only does it appear to have
been purposive.
retrospect is taking a view of one's experiencing as if
from outside. It is therefore in spatial, that is, conceptual
terms. Purposes must be conceptual, says Bergson. Now con-
cepts apply only to what is past. Consciousness has two as-
pects, la duree and thought about la duree . 55 But thought
/
about la duree can be only of the past, and though the present
33. See further infra, 171-175.
34. BC, 51.
35. BC, 51.
36. Supra
,
51-58.
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of our duree is our past in its qualitative wholeness, we can
think about our past only in spatial and therefore artificial
terms. And as for the future, we cannot think about it at
all. La dure'e is past and present pushing into the future.
/
Thought aoout la duree is the past only. Thinking about the
past and supposing we can think about tne future are at-
tempts to mechanize life. Life cannot be mechanized. Think-
ing is in terms of ideas. “L'acte libre est incommensurable
avec l'idee." 37 Nevertheless, consciousness in its human
manifestation is almost entirely this attempt to mechanize
life, Man is almost constantly intellectualizing. For con-
sciousnesses in particular are relative to tne degree oi at-
tention to life. This attention is both to the obstacle in
front and to the stream of consciousness behind. Our atten-
tion to the past is usually with a view to acting on the ob-
stacle in front, and so our attention to the past is as arti-
xicial as our attention to the material obstacle.
hut when the attention to tne pabt means only, "This ob-
stacle is opposing me" - that is, when the attention is mere-
ly self-consciousness, the past is not the sum of our past
experiences, but the fruit of our past exper iencing. 38 This
fruit is the present. My present consciousness as the fruit
of ray past experiencing is what Bergson means by consciousness
as primarily memory. 39
37. EG, 51.
38. Bergson's figure is that of a snowball (EC, 2).
39. For example, EC, 3-4; ME(a)
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Now we have seen that consciousness in general has been
so broadly defined as to mean merely activity as such typi-
fied by moving time, and we have seen that consciousness*^ in
particular are also defined more narrowly as intensity of
light surrounding action or clarity in representing unacted
action. We now meet in Bergson's doctrine of consciousness
as memory a broad general concept and a narrow more specific
concept. Consciousness is defined so broadly as to include
both unconsciousness and consciousness. 4^
Bergson's theory of memory is that it arises with per-
ception41 and that everything that has once entered conscious-
ness is conserved there. His problem is not the problem of
remembering but the problem of forgetting. 4^ Here is the
broad definition of consciousness as memory. Only that
crosses the threshold of the more intense consciousness which
can give useful work. 43 Here it is not clear that experience
confirms Bergson's theory. Many aspects of past experience
that have no usefulness for action do cross the threshold of
consciousness as narrowly defined, and many aspects of past
Experience that would be useful for action remain buried in
"unconscious consciousness."
Berkeley objected to consciousness as a principle of
identity on the grounds that a person loses ideas and gains
40. EC, 156.
41. See ES
42. See ES
43. EC, 5-6.
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new ones. Bergson, not defining consciousness analytically
or in terms of content, could not deny consciousness as a
principle of identity on Berkeley's grounds. What has Been
lost to consciousness has not been needed for action. As a
matter of fact, no ideas have oeen lost. Ideas are artifi-
cial substitutes for a continuous consciousness.
Sans doute nous ne pensons qu’avec une
petite partie de notre passd'; mais c'est avec
notre passe" tout entier, y compris notre cour-
bure d'&me originelle, que nous de'sirons, vou-
lons, agissons. Notre passe se m^nifeste done
integralement a nous par sa poussee et sous
forme de tendance, quoiqu'une faible part
seulement en devienne representation. 44
Therefore, since consciousness is relative to action, con-
sciousness theoretically includes all the ideas that Berkeley
thought were lost. What Berkeley called new ideas increase
rather than decrease the possibility of attributing identity
to consciousness, for identity must be an enduring, and en-
during in Bergson’s thought is an enlarging ( s 1 enfler , gonfle
en avacant , grandissant )
.
45
Bergson, of course, denies the reality oi the Locxean and
Berkeleian idea. Such an idea is an artificial spatializing
of the temporal. Consciousness is not a sum of ideqs nor even
a complex organization of ideas. Consciousness is a continu-
ity. 4 ^ Consciousness is an ijs which is constituted by its
44. EC, 6.
45. EC, 2, 5, 147
46. EC, 2.
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has -'been as a qualitative whole pushing toward its to-be .
There is no line dividing has-been from is. nor j^s from to-be .
The problem of the relation of the individual to the
whole arises in a study of conscious beings as it arose in
d The So-called Individual the study of ob-
Consciousness
jects in nature.
Individuality is approached again and again in the evolution-
ary process, but it is never completely attained. Individu-
ality is a tendency rqther tnan an attrioute or a state or
condition.
It has been noted before that Bergson does not find in
the v/orld sharply marked off individuals like Leibniz’ monads.
This is true not only in the world of nature but also in the
world of conscious persons, tnough the higher tne degree of
consciousness in a being that we speak of roughly as an indi-
vidual, the nearer the approach to tne truly individual. 47
The study of human beings properly undertaken is an at-
tempt toward attaining or realizing “la coincidence de la con-
science humaine avec le principe vivant d ! ou elle eraane, une
prise de contact qvec 1’ effort cre^teur . “ 48 The source of con
scious beings is the “elan primitif du tout.*' 49 “La re'aiite
7
,
•'
/ / crv
“suivie dans sa generation et sa croissance ,
“
47. Supra
.
145-146.
48. EC, 399.
49. EC, 58.
50. EC, vii.
See EC, 13-16, 46.
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"un elan originel de la vie, passant d’une ge^e'ration de
germes a la generation suivante de gerrnes par 1 ’ intermediate
/ '
des organismes developpes qui forment entre les germes le
trait d'union." 51
Mais alors
,
il ne faudra plus parler de la
vie en general corame d’une abstraction, ou comme
d'une simple rubrique sou$ laquelle on inscrit
tous les etres vivants. A un certain moment, en
certains points de l’espace, un courant bien
visible a pris naissance: ce courant ^e vie,
x
traversant les cor^s qu'il a organises tour a
tour, passant de generation en generation,
,
s' est divise
7
entre les especes et eparpille
entre les individus sans rien
x
perdre de sa
force, s * intensifiant plutot a mesure qu'il
avanpait
.
/
Envisagee de ce point de vue
,
la vie ap -
parait comme un courant qui va d'un germe a un
germe par 1 1 interm^dia.ire d'un organisme &<£ -
veloppe . fo,ut se passe comme si 1' organisme
lui-meme n'etait qu'une excroissance
,
un bour-
geon que fait saillir le germe ancien travail-
lant a se continuer en uny germe nouveau. L’es-
sentiel est la continuite de^progres qui se
poursuit indefiniment
,
progres invisible sur
lequel chaque organisme visible chevauche pen-
dant le court intervalle de temps qu’il lui est
donne de vivre.^3
The human consciousness appears only associated with an
organism which belongs to the evolutionary movement described
/ \
in these passages. Life is ,s un courant lance a travers la
\
matiere," ana individual human beings are differentiations of
the whole made distinguishable by the forms of intellect or
matter. The living being is M un lieu de passage 11 over which
or through which life as an undivided movement passes.
51. EC, 95.
52. EC, 28.
53. EC, 29.
..
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So far as living "beings are physical, tney are prevented
from being complete individuals by their reproductive proc-
esses. The changes in body cells are a sort of reproduction
as well as the sexual reproduction of organisms like the or-
ganisms of the parents. There is a constant giving out and
taking in which makes a complete individual impossible. It
is, however, more important to have organization than to be
not divisible into “fragments viaoles.** 54
So far as living beings are conscious, they are prevented
from oeing complete individuals by their organic relation to
society. As the cell is to the body, so the person is to so-
ciety. And as separate words are to tue inspiration of a
poem, so the individual is to the one life which goes on mov-
ing. 55
Individuality as indicated by conscious connectedness is
made more difficult to determine by the phenomena of abnormal
psychology. In instances of dual personality, are there two
individuals? Is the separation between the two personalities
as clear as the separation between two personalities associ-
ated with two physiological organisms? As has been pointed
out, the assigning of dual personality is a somewhat arbitrary
56
affair, even in pathological cases.
54. EC, 15-16.
55. EC, 280-281.
56. Supra
.
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B. THE IDENTITY OF CONSCIOUS BEINGS
IN BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY
One creation of the evolutionary process is human con-
sciousness. Human consciousness, like every other creation,
1 The Nature of Psychological is a thoroughfare
Identity
a Activity, Change through which
wages the ceaseless conflict between free activity and static
necessity. The compromises between the two determine the
form of the thoroughfare - compromises between temporalizing
and spatializing
,
between intuition and intellect. The tem-
poral principle is, of course, the deeper reality. And it
can only be intuited as a succession of qualities.
rime is a simple continuity with no boundaries and with
no divisions, because with only one dimension. One dimension
cannot be worked with or operated on in any conceivable man-
ner. It cannot change direction. Direction, indeed, could
not be conceived in a one-dimensional experience. It is not
proper to say that time has only one dimension. Time .is only
one dimension. Has brings in at once another dimension, a
view taken of time.
Temporal reality finds given in it a hostile element of
necessity which would dam its flow into a motionless lake.
But time can use the spatializing element. Space cannot dam
time. The most it has ever been able to accomplish is to
compel time's single flow to spatialize itself, that is, to
3! . IS c: iG a- 1 L I „
Y :-J. I : ; . . * o-D^' u: • •
-
. :> Jii. . ]• ; : jo< i
.
....... v J .i< *_ '.o . ;.
t
e . ;V
_.
x • - i
.
X
f
|t
v >
to .. j- sri0 , : i vio oA
oi ; j-a .r:*; ' vi ;
a
oo . JscT 2o.i • -go e ••»Xea/5da t>nJ .•
... .... , . \.j j : > .
.
. . ..
.
.
,
_
; ii. . . ; e. ; ;id
.
.
.
.
on
.
.
,t: - ' _ :tic *4X1x0 0 . . .3 CJ 1 4OS1;
,
n :
_
.
. .
0
.
...
.
break up into diverse directions, thus creating a multi-direc-
tional medium, - space. One of these directions has been
that toward human consciousness. Without the spatializing
tendency in reality, there would be no human consciousness.
Spatializing in Bergson's thought is not non-mental as in a
materialistic philosophy. Spatializing is making distinc-
tions, is introducing clarity, is assigning meanings and or-
ganizing clear and distinct meanings into mental structures.
Bergson assumes that human persons know themselves to be
themselves
.
I 1 existence dont nous sommes le plus as-
sured et que nous connaissons le mieux est in-
contestablement la notre, car de tous les autres
objets nous avons aes notions qu'on pourra juger
exterieures et superficielles f/ tandis que nous
nous percevons nous-memes interieurement
,
pro-
fondement
.
57
Bergson denies an ego as substratum of the flow or as a
string on which states as beads are strung. There is no moi
amorphe and immuable . 58 We perceive "pre'cisement " only the
\ /
beads, "c * est-a-dire des etats psychologiques" and assume that
under the different colored beads there is a "substrat in-
colore. "
\
A ,vrai dire, ce "substrat" n'est pas une reali-
te; c'est, po
x
u^ notre conscience, un simple
signe destine a lui rappeler sans cesse le car-
actere artificiel de 1' operation par laquelle^
1' attention juxtapose
/
un ^tat a un etat, la ou
il y a une continuite qui ^e deroule v Si notre
existence se composait d* etats separes dont un
57. EC, 1. See EC, 1-8.
58 . EC
,
3.

"moi" impassible eut a faire la synthese, il
n'y aurait pas pour nous de duree. Car un moi
qui ne change pas ne dure pas.
ihe synthesis is not a colorless "substrat," and it is not a
"unity of apper-perception" ; it is the character of time.. The
character of time is duration, a growing continuity. The
growing is the cnange which is time; the continuity is the
being which is time. The change with the being is identity.
\ /
And “quant a la vie psychologique
,
telle qu’elle se deroule
sous les symboles qui la recouvrent, on s'apergoit sans peine
que le temps en esc. l'etoffe meme .'*^0 This is what Eisler
calls psychologische IdenLitat . This Identitat is activity
and change, but is an activity and a change which remembers
all the past acting and ciianging.
It is Being in flux which Bergson deems necessary for any-
thing to endure. Let us say again that identity means an en-
during. Only to what “endures" or "lasts 1 * can identity be at-
tributed. Now, how do we mow that anything has "endured" or
“lasted"? Only as we remember a past that is in a present.
Only a consciousness that remembers a succession, then, can
make a pronouncement about an identity. A consciousness that
remembers a succession is an activity that never stops. Or,
if it does stop, it at once loses its identity.*. It is no
longer "enduring" or “lasting." If after a time ^as measured
59 . EC
,
4
.
60 . EC
,
4
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by or inferred from the witness of other active and changing
consciousnesses which we view by analogy as like our own) the
activity of our consciousness recommences, it preserves its
identity with an effort commensurate with the degree and the
time-length of the stopping. If there were no other witness-
ing consciousnesses to disturb it, the stop simply would not
have been an interruption of consciousness. If a sapling had
in the interval become an oak, we would say a miracle had oc-
curred, just as the removal of a silver coin from a magician's
hand to the interior of a locked box seems a miracle. As our
consciousness in minute stops does not continue its activity
in the rhythm of the movement of the magician* s hand, so con-
sciousness in a seventy-year stop would not have continued its
activity in the rhythm of the growth of the tree. The endur-
ing or the identity would be as if the seventy years had never
been.
I
If, however, the interrupted consciousness is of the na-
ture of the sleep of Kip Van Winkle or of the hero of Edward
Bellamys Looking Backward
,
the difficulty in maintaining iden-
tity is in the changelessness of the hundred years, not in ac-
tivity before the sleep began nor after awakening. That is,
changelessness means loss of identity in the only entity that
can pronounce on identity - a conscious being. Only recovered
changing restores identity. There is no clue to self-identity
in the period of changelessness. The wakened sleeper must skip
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the changeless years as if they had not been and make immedi-
ate uninterrupted connection with the change that had been
continuous before the period of changelessness if he is to as-
sert his self-identity.
From the doctrine that conscious duration is ceaseless
change, it follows that there are no two identical moments in
any consciousness.^ In tne first place, no part of such an
organic process as consciousness can, if abstracted from that
process retain its identity. Identity belongs only to the
process in its wholeness or in its tendency toward wholeness.
In the second place, two identical moments would be a repre-
sentation of unconsciousness, for a consciousness would remem-
ber the first moment and then would experience the second mo-
ment as like the first, plus "being experienced again." And
even in the recognition of the second state as similar to the
first, consciousness is moving on. Each state melts into the
next . 62
.Bergson, like Eisler, bases psychological identity pri-
marily on memory, the persistence of the past into the pres-
b Memory sent, memory particularly as it is
embodied in the conative and volitional aspects of the self.
A memory can be erased perhaps from the intellect but never
from the will.^ Memory must be understood in its broadest
61. See EG, 4.
62. See ES(bj, 48.
63. EC. 6.
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sense. Our so-called unconsciousness is part of our seli-
identity as truly as our highly conscious memories. Our mem-
ory comprises our whole past. It is from and with this whole
past that we act. .Necessity for action it is tnat determines
what of the swelling past shall crowd into consciousness, but
all is in the unconscious. i*.very act and every tnought of our
past is in our memory, unconscious and conscious. One part is
as ready as anotner to spring into the full light of con-
sciousness. The determining lactor is not intensity of first
impression in the past hut what will serve action in the pres-
ent. It would not he impossible, one might suppose, in this
theory, for a consciousness to evolve that would encounter
and overcome such tremendous obstacles that the starting back
and the friction would flare into a consciousness lighting up
embryonic and pre-embryonic memories of the branch of the life
impulse illumined by the encounter. The present is at all
times big with the past, but only that crowds into the focus
of consciousness which is useful for action of interest to the
organism. And we are not fully conscious of everything that
will serve action in the present. Much of our past which we
use in the service of action is used with comparative uncon-
sciousness. But all is an expression of a self that is itself
and no other.
For the self is a unity in multiplicity. There are two
kinds of unity and two kinds of multiplicity. There is
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c Unity and Multiplicity "l'unite a laquelle
/ / \
on pense et l’unite qu’on enge en chose apres y avoir
pense. There are "deux especes de multiplicite : celle des
/ /
objets mater iels, qui forme un nomhre immediatement , et celle
des faits de conscience, qui ne saurait prendre 1* aspect d’un
/ '
nombre sans 1 ’ intermediaire de quelque repr esentation symbo-
\ / (Z. R
lique, ou intervient necessairement l’espace."
As to the latter kind of multiplicity, consciousness
"opere une discrimination qualitative sans aucune arriere-
/ / A
pensee de compter les qualites ou meme d’en faire plusieurs ;
il y a bien alors multiplicite sans quantite." 00 When "plu-
/
sieurs etats de conscience s'organisent entre eux," they "se
/ \
penetrent, s • enr ichissent de plus en plus, et pourraient don-
\
ner ainsi, a un moi ignorant de l’espace, le sentiment de la
duree pure.” 67 But the use of the word "plusieurs” shows
/ /
that we have "isole ces etats les uns des autres," we have
/ /
"exteriorises les uns par rapport aux autres," or we have, in
a word, "juxtaposed" them.
j Quand nous comptons expliciteraent des uni-
tes en les alignant dans I’espace, n’est-il pas
vrai qu'a cote de cette addition dont les termes
identiques se dessinent sur un fond homogene, il
se poursuit, dans les prqf'ondeurs de l’ame, une
organisation de ces unites les unes avec les
autres, processus tout dynamique . . . .
?
69
Without qualitative progress no addition would be possible.
64. EDIC, 63.
65. EDIC, 66
.
66. EDIC, 92.
67. EDIC, 92.
68. EDIC, 92-93.
69. EDIC, 93.
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done grace a la qualite de la quantite que nous forraons
d'une quantite sans qualite."
/ \
Au-dessous de la duree homogene, symbole ex-
tensif de ,1a duree vraie, une psychologie at-
tentive demele une duree dont les moments he-
terogenes se penetrent^ au-dessous de la multi-
plicity numerique des etats conscients, une
mult^plicite7 qualitative; au-dessous du moi
aux etats bien definis, un moi ou succession
implique fusion et organisation. Mais nous
nous contentons le plus souvent du premier,
c f est-a-dire de l*ombre du moi projetee dans,
l'espace homogene.. La conscience, tourmentee
d*un insatiable desir d? distinguer, substitue
le symb 9 le a la realite, ou n’aperqoit la real-
ite
7 qu'a travers le symbole. 71
The real and concrete self is the qualitative multiplic-
ity without discrete moments. It is the succession of states
melting into one another. The identity of a conscious being
is this succeeding of states melting into one another, and
there is no symbol by which to designate the identity in
reality.
The unity of the self is a "moving, changing, colored,
living unity" which "has hardly anything in common with the
abstract, motionless, and empty unity which tne concept of
pure unity circumscribes .
"
72
We set out to answer the question: Do we experience psy-
chological identity? Can identity endure, that is, can it
d Will ceaselessly change by creating itself?
Can identity find place in a reality whose verb is not etre
"C’est
/
1 1 idee
70. EDIC, 94.
71. EDIC, 97.
72. IM, 23.
=.
-
,
r. s • - - • - •
..
.
. .
.
-
,
.
. . eiotii. oo ’ j *' i £ I-X:
-
.
i - '
.
-
-
a. x . :-.oox/*3 jure i c; . ^ , < . i i . ^ • ... x*x
'
- .
:
• -
- V
J
,
• i V* • - *' ; ’ -
-
•
. I
•
•
-
.
*-
-
-
8© j r: J 8 • 1 0 11C
1
j . . j j. JH
i: :
> :oJLoo
,
ix;.r.r3 .-.o *2 :avo
’ i : " V- -v**
J
-*'* 1
.
. o . -
GO - :i xs GV, (A c .i • 9 J- li > CO : -
:i
I
lbJI .jn iw bsio > 9: a -o xIz.jssz -
?£ . 3c z ix d*x r eeo • v.J.: Lzstl * nx ;o .
!
: ..-•ii -sO
•
•
.
.
but faire? Can identity inhere in consciousness which is a
flux?73 The answer is Yes . Bergson is right in saying that
the only identity which is an identity to itself is a con-
sciousness and that a consciousness to maintain self-identity
changes ceaselessly.
But when ne defines consciousness as essentially activity
of the nature of will and when he says that intellect does not
move in the depths of reality, his doctrine is not so clear.
"If a distinction is to be made between men and monkeys, it is
largely measurable by the quantity of the subconscious which a
higher order of being makes conscious," says martin H.
74Fischer. "That man really lives who brings the greatest
fraction of his daily experience into the realm of the con-
scious." It is the intellect or reason which is largely re-
sponsible for increasing the range of consciousness.
Slowed-down photography of motion, showing a golf ball
struck so that the side struck exhibits a dent equql to a
quarter of the diameter of the ball, or showing a fountain
which appears to be partly frozen rubber perhaps but certainly
'
not water, teaches us that the activity of consciousness has
not in any human being reached its possible intensity or
speed. This seems to be true of consciousness only in its
perceptual (or, as Bergson would put it, its representational
73. Supra
,
66.
74. "Spinal Cord Education." 111. Med. Jour .. December,
1928, quoted in Korzybski, SS, 1.

or spatializing) aspect, and not of consciousness as intui-
tion. But intuition as human consciousness must oe of richer
quality than intuition as animal or plant consciousness, ana
the quality is consciousness of a whole of which diiferent
aspects can he distinguisned . Surely the richness of quality
is in proportion to the variety of parts into which the whole
can oe diviaed, even granting that the division or analysis
is artificial.
If we say that intuition or consciousness broadly de-
fined is unimpeded time, can we say that impeded time (intel-
lectualizing
,
perceiving, spatializing) is swifter than unim
pfeded time? If time is ceaseless change, we must think of it
as of a sort of movement. If movement is its essential char-
acteristic, one would suppose that the more movement, the
nearer the reality of pure time. But if unimpeded time is of
infinite velocity, impeded time is more swiftly moving than
unimpeded time. Infinite velocity is instantaneity or time-
lessness. It is paradoxical but true that as time approaches
infinite velocity it recedes from reality. But Bergson has
said all along that la duree toute pure which is spaceless
never exists apart from matter. Time to be real must act,
must move. Time to act (to escape instantaneity ) must be of
finite velocity. Finite velocity is the result of discontinu-
ous opposition to what would have otherwise been infinite ve-
locity. This discontinuous opposition is the spatializing
tendency in reality. Ana tne spatializing tendency in reality
)
i r > £J' i £Ii 5iXf J - SCJ3
.,^61 .X. noi ot 10 eXori* a
to aesoeaoioeaoo *-
> *
.. X C . ,:>a. -ni. Uh 00 i!£0
.0,,-
•
• • •
r-
, _
“ w
.1ii.LXxX.IB
.
:i - -
' '
“iSU^ J " 1
'
...
'
slJ Mic.
t , 0 ,
o, f*"'" 6; ^ '
.
~
<T,
. O -i > ^ ^ x c . > r -. - r
. ... 3 so bl o r olio
.0X3
.
+ - r 3 i+ T l.
:-
;
'
rl li e; )' *i set!
A-
•
'
_ 3 3 sci s4n*>«« Bl
*
'
.
•
••
-
X. . •
• •
... ...
-
•< 1
•:
"
* -••
w +)
1 30. 3lii'3 .'1 9 •
-O f;a 1 I
It so 1 •-'••
.
. i0C X8. *. .1
r . enl e
-
'
.
f
... bU!0r 3. V 03 -1013
8( 0 s;.c
.... S'- S'-33 j ill - -•• -*
' : T
is intellect. If time is real, the reality is as much clue to
intellect as to impulse to move, and intellect is as much a
true aspect of duration as is will.
The most intense consciousness or the highest degree of
consciousness is that consciousness which brings most of its
environment into itseli. a consciousness that can bring the
dent in the goli call into itself is a higher degree of con-
sciousness and ^endures" more truly than a consciousness which
brings only the general trajectory of the ball into itself.
For Bergson says that the time of the continuous movement of
the object is real duration ana the time that marks only the
bare extremities of the movement is artificial time, or space.
Surely then the time of the continuous movement through the
uail, from one side of it to the other, and the time of the ro-
tation of the ball in its flight, is more truly real duration
than the time that marks only the striking and the flight.
This is, of course, what Bergson calls analyzing an unanalyza-
ble indivisible whole merely into smaller parts. It is the
quality of an undivided act which he calls a duration. But it
is just such intellectual operations as conceiving the ball as
dented and as rotating and at the same time grasping a synthe-
sis of the whole so that in gaining a conception of the normal-
ly invisible we do not lose the percept or the concept of the
experience under normal conditions, which Bergson must mean
by his intellectual operations on reality that are necessary
lal
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7
"before an intuition of the real is possible. ^ And the indi-
visible quality of the experience is different in the two con-
ditions. It seems that the intellect, identifying the normal
percept of the ball with the concept obtained through the ex-
perience of seeing a slowed-down moving picture taken at ab-
normally high speed, is itself an essential aspect of the ex-
periencing of the duration of the ball's flight as part of
our own duration.
And so with our own conscious life throughout. The in-
tellect's identifying the finer and finer perceptions with
the more and more generalized activity of consciousness is as
essential to a duration as is the activity. Activity alone
cannot assure me that ,je change done sans cesse
,
that un moi
qui ne change pas ne dure pas
,
and without this assurance we
A / /
do not "percevons nous-memes interieurement
,
profondement .
"
In dreams, moreover, our consciousness is in many re-
spects more intense than the consciousness of waking life. A
discomfort that is comparatively slight in waking life often
appears in a dream as violent suffering. An emotion of sorrow
is frequently heightened in a dream to a degree much nearer
the unbearable than is the same emotion in waking life. The
activity of consciousness is at an almost infinitely faster
tempo than the activity of waking consciousness, fet, though
75. IM, 91-92.
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we remember some of our dreams and though they are in our
past, playing their small pare in the quality of our present,
we distinguish them from our past waking experiences. We do
not include the activity of our dream consciousness in our
duration as an abiding identity in at all the same way in
which we include the activity of our waking consciousness.
Now consciousness as simply activity which remembers its act-
ing cannot be a present which is the same qualitative whole-
ness of its past if the qualitative wholeness is colored
equally by its past waking consciousness and its dreaming
consciousness. The quality of the present is what it is part
ly because the dreams of the past have been distinguished
from the waking experiences of the past. This distinguishing
is no artificial breaking up of a continuity. Indeed, the
conscious activity in tne dream seems the artificial breaking
up of a continuity. The brusning of the dream aside, which
we cannot help doing, is in the interest of preserving the
true continuity of conscious duration. The basis of the dis-
tinction between dream and real conscious duration is coher-
ence. And it is intellect or reason which preserves a con-
tinuity on the basis of coherence.
Identity of consciousness is identity of a cnanging ac-
tivity, but the activity is activity of reason as well as of
will. One may sqy that where there is an identity, the will
is rational or that where there is identity the reason is
.
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active. Both will and reason are necessary for a duration.
The unalterability of the past, the irreversibility of
time, furthermore, is an intellectual concept, and psychologi-
cal identity, which is the typical identity in Bergson's
thought, is impossible without the concept of the irreversi-
bility of time. A self has much freedom for the future in his
system, but no freedom for the past. The past cannot be al-
tered. To alter the past would be to turn bach and to repeat
the past in some sort of way. Time will not turn back. The
past cannot be repeated. The identity of each self is affirmed
I
by the irreversibility of the process of reality. It must be
kept in mind that this identity of each self is an identity df
an activity that may not always be fully conscious. The iden-
tity may be intended to be only in memory as will, not neces-
sarily in memory as a system of logical relations. But we
cannot escape the conclusion that the fact that the past can-
not be repeated or altered, the fact that the self is all that
it has ever been, is an eternal truth, a truth of timeless va-
lidity. And this faco, as truly as the fact of conscious ex-
periencing, must be a part of reality and not an artificial
view of reality.
iet the irreversibility of consciousness and time is a
concept. It is moreover a concept that is not a remembered
arbitrary cutting out of an artificial block of the temporal
flow. It is a principle of reason that no rational conscious-
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ness can deny. And it is as essential to conscious experienc-
ing as is will.
Conscious duration is primarily memory, but is not only
memory.
e Anticipation not But all con-
Purpose sciousness is also
anticipation of the
future. Consider the direction of your mind at
any moment you like to choose; you will find
that it is occupied with what now is, but al-
ways and especially with regard to what is about
to be. Attention is expectation, ana there is
no consciousness without a certain attention to
life. lhe future is there; it calls us, or
rather, it draws us to it; its uninterrupted
traction makes us advance along the route of
time and requires us also to be continually
acting. All action is an encroachment on the
future.
To retain what no longer is, to anticipate
what as yet is not, - these are the primary
functions of consciousness. 76
In describing consciousness as partly anticipation and as ef-
fort and creation Bergson approaches purpose as a source of
experience of self-identity but does not reach purpose.
The vague memory broadly defined is not purposive. Only
the past as clearly conscious in the present is purposive, and
it only seems to have been purposive in retrospect. Purpose
is not real. If purpose is not real, the reality of all the
ideal values is threatened. 77
If the ideal values were not real in the beginning, they
yet may be real in the present if what consciousness evolves
W. iCE ( a ) , 8
.
77. See Knudson, PP, 166.
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into is real, once it has evolved, hut if what consciousness
evolves into is real, the intellectualiz ing process is as
truly real as the volitional process.
On peut done concevoir la succession sans
la distinction, et conyne une penetration mu-
tue^lp, une solidarite, une organisation intime
d' elements, dont chacun, repr esentatif du tout,
ne s
'
7
en distingue et ne s • en isole que pour une
pensee capable d 'abstraire .
°
But human consciousness _is "une pense
/
e capable d ' abstraire .
"
The abstract thought, says Bergson, is an artificial process,
and purpose is in terms oi this abstract thinking. He says
that reality is an impulse toward inventive action which is
directed toward no end (except that the implied end of loving
and being loved has been introduced in Les deux sources de la
morale et ae la religion ), and that the intellectualizing
process is an artificial viewing of reality. It is this arti-
licial character of intellect that makes purpose artificial or
illusory, for purpose must include intellect as well as will.
The reality of the ideal values has an important bearing
on the problem of psychological identity. As Kogers asks
about the logos doctrine of Heraclitus
,
79 so we ask about mem-
ory: can it "furnish all the unity ana permanence that we re-
quire" for identity? We are aware of selfhood when we remember
our pasts and wnen we tnrust forward a purpose into the future.
The phrase "anticipation of the future" does not fully describe
78. jfiDIC, 77.
79. Supra
,
17.

Iexperience. We are not only expecting tne future; we are max-
ing the future and we are mailing it according co patterns of
our present ideal values. Grant that the future horus some
things unknown and some things known. Our purposes help to
determine the way in whicn possibilities ootn known ana un-
known emerge into the aatual.
Tne course of evolution does suggest a cosmic struggling
against obstacles, as Bergson has pointed out. But evolution
does not necessarily point to a purposeless struggle. If time
is real ana 1 ' elan has in time developed a character so that
it seems not to be purposing love but to oe loving necessarily
because of its nature, the essential of purposing is there.
L T elan must have in time purposed to be loving ana must still
oe choosing to continue to oe loving. Wherever there is a will
willing in accordance with an iaeal, even though the willing
consciousness may adopt a new concept of tne iaeal, there there
is purpose, whether one pxesent conauct is a continuance of
love or wheoher 10 is a change from spite to love. Confucius
wrote, “when I was seventy, I could follow my heart's desire
without transgressing. " He dia not mean that he acted without
purpose. He meant that at seventy he was acting in accordance
with a sustained ideal instead of struggling and veering
hither and yon according to conflicting ideals. Purpose is
brougnt more forcefully to attention wnen the purposing con-
sciousness struggles between conilicting ideals. But wnen one
: ;• jc .. .
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purpose is sustained through tne years and the centuries, the
purpose is present just the same.
In his later thought .Bergson* s stress on the ideal value,
love, implies the reality of the ideal and a cosmic purpose
airecoed toward love. The importance of great men in direct-
ing the world toward higher things implies a human purpose
directed toward love in human society. 8^ One wonders ho
w
Bergson yet can insist that one only seems to have purposed a
deed after its accomplishment. Experience indicates, on the
contrary, that we are conscious of psychological identity as
much in the present purposing as in memory of past acts that
now appear to have Been purposive.
As the student can adopt a new concept of atomicity, 81 so
he can adopt a new concept of beauty or of love. But he is
likely to be doing so on the assumption that tnere is a time-
less ideal toward which he is struggling in time. 82 We have
pointed out the difficulty regarding the logical universal for
a personalist such as Bergson. Values, the personalist holds,
are dependent on personality. 85 The personalist must keep the
ideal value, though a concept, within the person. The person-
alist who, like Bergson, believes that time is real for the
supreme consciousness, is in a harder position than personal-
ists like Bowne and Knudson as far as ideal values are con-
Q0~. Supra
,
85-89
.
81. Supra
,
3-4.
82. See supra
,
116-122.
83. See, e. g. , Brightman, IP, 163, 225.
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cerned. If time is not real for the supreme consciousness,
the ideal values are eternal and secure in that person; they
84
are "norms in the mind of God." Human persons need time in
which to adopt new concepts of ideal values, that is to say,
to enlarge and enrich their concepts of ideal values; hut the
iaeal value is real in the cosmic personality. l'he human per-
sons enlarging of a concept of love is a discovery of new as-
pects of a love presumed to he exemplified perfectly in the
supreme person. If time is real for the supreme conscious-
ness, the ideal value seems to he set adrift in the cosmos it-
self.
Midway between Bergson and Bowne or Anudson is Brightman.
Even before he had adopted the theory of the reality of time,
though he wrote that values belong to the eternal,^ 6 he wrote
also, "For this theory, however, the important thing is not to
he able to draw a definite and final map of the ideal that is
beyond all possibility of further development."®6 And even
since adopting the theory of the reality of time, he holds to
the normative and rational character of the ideal. The reason
lor this is that Brightman stresses the rational aspect of
reality. 8 / Therefore, though many readers may find it hard to
reconcile belief in an open future in which time is real with
84. Brightman, IP, 152. This book was published in 1925,
before Brightman had adopted the theory of the reality of time
85. Brightman, IP, 127-128.
86. Brightman, IP, 142.
87. Compare, e. g. , the rational nature of the moral laws
in Brightman, Ml, his latest book.
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belief in cosmic purpose based on values in terms of ideals,
and so may find it difficult to accept identity of conscious-
ness combining the two aspects, brightman is easier to follow
than Bergson is because brightman makes reason direct the will-
ing which occurs in time, brightman and ±>eigson both want to
leave place for the creation of new ideals and values but
Bergson is more concerned aoout their being entirely new, while
brightman is concerned equally about their being entirely new
and about their conformity to norms that are regulative in the
activity of consciousness, both brightman and Bergson want
the future open for an evolving consciousness
,
both declare
that the future is open, and both admit that the evolution of
consciousness is in distinguishable directions. But Bergson is
more concerned about the openness, while Brightman is concerned
equally about the openness and the direction, reason is an un-
changing ideal for Brightman.
If experience of purpose is an illusion and if the forming
of purposes and the organizing of past experiences coherently
is admittedly artificial, memory may also be an illusion, and
there may be no identity. In actuality, experience of purpose
is as real as experience of memory, and psychological identity
is based equally on both. Here Bergson's basis for psychologi-
cal identity is weak. The more we can infer from his "finalite
/
88. Compare, e. g. , the activity (willing) of the Supreme
Person as a rationalizing of the irrational Given in Brightman,
PG and PG.
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f Tendency toward
Individuality
au sens special, the stronger we find his basis for identity
of conscious beings.
Identity of human beings is limited by the possible
limits of individualizing in reality in two respects: (l) the
relation of the human being
to 1 ' elan and (2) the relation
of the human being to human society.
As memory as well as individual physical organism, a human
being is only a lieu de passage for 1 1 elan . He is only incom-
pletely individual. He loses parts of himself in reproducing
new individuals. His material body begins existence as a part
of two other material bodies, and his memory, like his body, is
linked with his pre-natal past. Hew individuals whicn he shares
in creating are continuations of his body and memory. When we
consider the phenomena of artistic or poetic or religious inspi-
ration, or when we consider the more commonplace experience of
pondering over how we shall meet a personal problem, we find it
hard to accept our conscious process as an atom, an individual.
My deepest intuitions, when I turn ray thoughts inward at Berg-
son's bidding, come with intimations of belonging to a wider
whole which shares them with me. Such overlapping and inter-
mingling of mental content makes marking off identity a confus-
ing process. We say, "I thought and thought, and suddenly it
occurred to me that I could do so and so." Such an experience,
89. EC, 59.
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says Bosanquet, "Bears witness to the seamless continuity By
which the individual passes into the universe." 90 And his
words strike us as being relevant. Bergson would mean the
same thing By saying that we have reunitea ourselves By in-
tuition with l-elan primitif du tout .
rurther
,
tne human person lives in an organic society of
which he is as it were a cell. 91 How hard it is in society to
separate muividual identities: a person abstracted from re-
lations to society is no more a reality than a sensation ab-
stracted from a person.
Bergson, however
,
protests against regarding the social
body as "I’unique realite
.
/ /
Mais d'abord, pour que la societe existe,
il faut que l'individu apporte tout un en-
semble de dispositions innees; la societe ne
s'explique done pas elle-meme. 9 ^
Society, in Brief, is, like the human individual, merely
.
/
one manifestation of 1 elan vital . Society has authority over
the individual, out the inaiviaual can criticize ana reform
society.
Mais ce n'est pas ^ssez hire: ii fauara
creuser plus profondement encore si l’on veut
comprendre, non plus seulement comment la so-
ciete oblige les individus
,
mais encode com-
ment l’individu peut juger la societe et ob-
tenir d’elle une transformation morale. Si
90. Bosanquet, TCNM, 40.
91. DSMR, 7-14, 33, 95. Cf. ES, 57; Lovejoy, "Bergson and
Romantic Evolutionism." University of California Chronicle.
15(1913), 451.
92. DSMR, 108.
93. DSMR, 102.

la societe, se suffit a elle-meme, elle est
1 'autorite supreme. Mais si elle n’est qu'une
des determinations /ie la vie, on conqoit que
la vie, qui a du deposer ,1 ' espece humaine en
tel ou tel point de son
N
evolution, communique
une impulsion nouvelle a des indiv^dualites
pr ivile'giees qui se/ s^ont retrempees en elle
pour aider la societe a aller plus loin. II
est vrai qu*il aura fallu pousser jusqu'au
principe meme de
N
la vie. Tout est obscur, si
l'on s'en tient a de simples manifestations,
qu'on les appelle toutes ensemble sociales ou
que l'on consider e plus par ticulierement f/ dans
l'homme social, 1 ' intelligence . Tout s' eclair
e
au contraire, si l'on va chercher^ par-dela
ces manifestations, la vie elle-meme. ^onnons
done au mot biologie le sens tres comprehensif
quxil devrait avoir, qu'il prendra peut-etre
un jour, et disons pour conclure que toute
morale, pression ou aspiration, est d'essence
biologique
.
94
It seems then that identity of conscious beings resolves
itself into identity of an absolute consciousness. All psy-
2 Concluding Statement chological identities are
manifestations of the one great identity. And that identity
is identity of process. Tne closest we can come to an under-
standing of it is in our intuition of our own psychological
identity. The concept with which the intellect would grasp
self-identity is an operation "accomplished on the frozen mem-
ory of duration, on tne stationary trace which the mobility of
duration leaves behind it, and not on the duration itself." 94
I know that I am myself when I look inward and intuit my pres-
ent as a forward creative pushing of the interpenetration and
94. DSMh, 102.
95. IM, 22.
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organization of all my past moments experienced as a qualita-
tive multiplicity with no connotation of quantity or of dis-
crete elements. This intuition carries us beyond the distin-
guishing of ourselves as individuals, for distinctness and
clearness are not in intuition but only in its outer or par-
tial aspect, intellect. Intuition, if we can press it far
enough, reunites us with l'eian onginel de la vie .
Identity of objects in nature and identity of concepts,
identity phStnomenologisch and logisch
,
depends on identity of
consciousness. The determining aspect of Bergson's thought as
regards identity of conscious beings is his absolutism and
mysticism. Human consciousnesses are not created by the vital
impulse as beings entirely separate from itself. Creation in
Bergson's philosophy is self-creation, duration. Theoretical-
ly, individual memories are coextensive. Potentially, each
bears in it the whole past, and so the whole flows in each of
its individual forms. Jiach individual form is a manifestation
of the one self-identity - l 1 elan vital . We may practically
affirm psychological identity of human beings, but metaphysical
identity may be affirmed only of tne absolute.
i
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CHAPTER SIX
THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF IDENTITY BELATED
A. SUBSISTENTS AND EXISTENTS
We may conclude that identity has a meaning in Bergson's
philosophy and that the meaning refers Both to logical sub-
1 Identity of Concepts sistents and to exist-
ents.l as t o the question in what the identity consists, the
identity of logical subsistents consists in the clearness and
distinctness of meaning which results from the activity of a
consciousness developed in the direction of intelligence, when
that intellectual activity operates on the memory of the past
of the consciousness as a whole, (jlear distinguishing means
differentiating. Memory as a whole has within it no differen-
tiation. It is indivisible. ihe difi erentiations made within
it by the intellectual aspect of consciousness are both arbi-
trary and artificial. But once made, they are witnin the mem-
ory. The identity of logical subsistents holds as long as the
memory which cut out the meanings holds. But the identity is
qn identity of instrumentality, not an identity regulative or
normative in directing conscious activity.
1. Supra
,
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Since all the consciousnesses which intellectualize have
issued from a common source, the units of intellectual activ-
ity are bound to oe similar, if we may reason by analogy from
Bergson’s argument for the explanation of the development of
an organ of sight along different lines of evolution. This
provides for identity of concepts not only within one con-
scious being but among conscious beings.
Identity refers to existents as well as to logical sub-
sistents. We have divided existents in this dissertation into
2 Objects in Nature and Con - objects in nature
scious Beings
and conscious be-
ings. There is really no such division in Bergson's thought.
10 exist is to endure. To endure is to cnange and at the same
time to conserve the cnanging. There is no line between ob-
jects which do not change and remember the cnanging and con-
scious beings which do cnange and remember tne cnanging. So
far as an object truly endures, it is an existent in which
identity inheres. Identity in Bergson's thought is, like
consciousness, a matter of degree. There is no sharp division
between phenomenological and psychological identity. The cut-
ting out of a percept is as artificial and arbitrary a matter
as the cutting out of a concept. Nothing external to con-
sciousness determines the outline. However, it must be remem-
bered that what we ordinarily call an object in nature exempli-
fies a degree of consciousness. The higher the degree of con-
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sciousness, the more the ooject approacnes individuality;
that is, the less artificial ana aroitrary is our recognition
of it as a separate existent and the more external determina-
tion tnere is of the limits of tne ooject or being made tyy
our consciousness. Identity of existents v objects in nature
and conscious beings) is a conscious auration which varies
from so-called unconsciousness to high intensity of conscious-
ness .
Identity of existents is not an identity that can oe de-
scribed in words. It is not an identity of meaning or of co-
herent organization of experience. It is an intuition wnich
is fundamentally an aimless activity.
We ashed in the second chapter whether an identity which
is eased on thinking about an exper iencing can oe Known to be
the identity of the experiencing tnougnt about. Strictly
speaxing, the two identities cannot be recognized as the same
experiencing. rhe lundamental reason for this coni using state
of affairs is uergson s view of reason as artificial and in-
strumental. As we approacn clearness of consciousness
,
we
leave reality behind, clearness is the work of intellect or
reason, neality is the will which wills notning. A will will-
ing nothing is an abstraction, of course. Consciousness as
will or pure spaceless duration never exists alone. As a mat-
ter 01 fact, 11 is spatiality or matter or the intellectual
aspect of consciousness which brings will into the realm of
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existence. The activity 01 will creates matter. The activity
and the creation of matter occur simultaneously. The one is
tne other. But the philosopher wno accepts logical pxinciples
as in reality would say of Bergson *s system that will as tne
ground of reality is logically prior to reason. Bergson's
thought is temporal rather than logical, and will is not tem-
porally prior to intellect.
identity of existents consists then in memory of varying
degrees of consciousness.
B. EISIeR’S THREE TYPES OF IDENTITY
What we have said about identity of logical subsistents
has to do with the identity Eisler calls logisch and has to
1 logisch, Ph&nomenologisch, do in a measure
Psychologisch
with the identity
iiiisler calls ph£nomenologisch (the two being one type in
Eisler's definition). What we have said about the identity of
objects in nature and about tne identity of conscious beings
has to do in a measure with the identity Eisl^r calls ph^nom-
enologisch
.
The tnird type of identity in Eisler's classification is
or metaphysical. A study of conscious beings shows that
2 Real or Metaphysical metaphysical identity in
a Relation to Psycho-
logical Identity Bergson's philosophy is
of the nature of psychological identity. For only psychologi-
cal processes can endure or continue or last. Only psycho-
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logical processes can remember a past that is the present.
Only a conscious being is a present that is a past, and only
of a present that is a past can identity be affirmed.
However, the refusal to admit purpose as real in con-
scious beings and the limit set upon the individuality of con-
b Purpose and Individuality scious beings de-
nies real identity to any existing conscious being.
These two points are related. Memory tends more toward
absolutism, purpose more toward individualism. If memory of
aimless activity is the sole basis of psychological identity,
memory theoretically includes the whole past of each individu-
al. Since each individual has become differentiated from a
common source of activity, each individual acts out of the
whole and can through intuition become reunited witn the
whole. But if each consciousness is purpose as well as memory,
each individual thrusts out his own purpose. Accomplished, it
belongs in his memory but not in the memory of other branches
of the evolving impulse of life.
If the eye is accounted for by a common source which has
evolved without purpose, all was in the source, undifferen-
tiated. There is really less open future tnan there is if all
tnat happens is a working out of a purpose that develops.
The difficulty in the mechanistic view is to fit it to
our experience of purpose and to express it in terms intelli-
gible to consciousness, the only realm where explanation can
.
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be offered. The difficulty in the extremely intellectualistic
teleological view is to leave any room for freedom and open
future or lor individuality. The difficulty in the less ab-
solutistic and less intellectualistic teleological vie*? is to
give an eternal character to a purpose that is forever develop-
ing in time. The difficulty in bergson's vi ew is to keep a
future open to real novelty and to keep meaning in reality.
If what appears new is really only a differentiation within a
whole which has always borne a character which would evolve
toward these apparent novelties and which is the source of any
unity or harmony in the universe, the novelty is illusion.
Only the differentiation is new. If reality is a harmony
wnich is a neutral potentiality, reality has no meaning. Sup-
posing meaning can be given to it, it is still true that the
siver 01 meaning is at least as real as the neutral potential-
ity.
The question about harmony is whether the harmony is a
neutral potentiality or whether it is a harmony of meaning.
If it is a harmony of meaning, there is reason at the heart of
reality, and psychological identity must be in terms of reason
i
as well as of will.
Identity of a conscious being based on such a broad memory
as to be not accessible to reason is an identity without mean-
ing and cannot be identity of an individual consciousness, for
an individual is a meaningful unity! Conscious identity must
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be based equally on memory and purpose. The problems raised
o
as to moral change, legal identity, and punishment or reward**
cannot be solved in this dissertation. But the solutions must
take into account both tne conscious being’s memory of what he
has done and his purpose of what he will do.
All the considerations which tend to a theory in which
there is no place for the individual lead to the conclusion
/
that metaphysical identity can be attributed only to 1 * elan
vital .
/
C. THE IDENTITY OE L*ELAN VITAL
/
Nov/, if there is metaphysical identity in 1 ' elan , what
is the nature of the identity? It is an identity of process,
not an identity of a changeless state or thought of thought.
It is an identity of consciousness, that is, of memory and
/ '
anticipation. L 1 elan is an identity because 1 1 elan is time,
and time binds past to present to future by virtue of the very
nature of its succession and continuity. We have concluded in
the chapter on the identity of conscious beings that identity
of conscious process is the only identity that can be self-
identity.
We call Bergson, especially in view of Les deux sources de
la morale et de la religion
, a personalist. Persons are ra-
tional consciousness. As Bergson has tended to stress the ra-
/
tionality of 1 1 elan
,
in ascriomg an ideal (love) to it, he has
-.
. v - - 5 o
i. - -
. -3 - -- -
' *
.
'
-
'
.
..
-
-
•
'
-
: o Si . i i
.
..' ; .. . j . - - - -
’
i l - - J
-
... .
- --
... -
J w
i o . o -
1
& . • :
,iOO 9v'.:..
o ,
_ f : . -- 0 -• • -
„ jt $ 'i anoL. ;_e
- • f . 3 L‘. -
'J '.i
•
. ii: _C3fl05> 1c . . J
• $
.
. 1 C - .
,
..
:
•
. .
-
.
.
-
<
• -
-
i
'
trs • • d-; i->c f .
v. .J" .
"become more per sonalistic . Nov/ if 1 ' elan is a person, he must
have been rational from the beginning. If he has from the be-
ginning been rational, he has from the beginning been making
distinctions and has been acting in accordance with ideals.
If 1 1 elan is an undifferentiated potentiality, and this
is the only metaphysical identity, we must reach tne surpris-
ing conclusion that wnile concepts formed in the process of
the dissociation of tne aspects of 1 1 elan are artificial,
1 * elan itself is only a logical unit, a subsistent, the uni-
versal of universals of Aristotle's thought, or mere being,
the barest concept in Hegel's tnougnt. It emerges into exist-
ence only as spatializing occurs, and spatializing is an arti-
ficial view of temporal reality.
Even though Bergson says that spirit never exists apart
from matter, that will never exists apart from intellect, as
long as he says that will is primary and that consciousness
is primarily activity, not meaning or a coherent organization
of meanings, and as long as he says that reason does not move
in the depths of reality but that it is reason or intellect
or intelligence that makes differentiations in reality, we
must assume that 1 1 elan is really one great Absolute Neutral
Entity.
However, it has been pointed out that Bergson's later
thought is more per sonalistic than his earlier thought. The
/
term elan is not so prominent in Les deux sources de la morale
.*
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/ /
et de la religion as it was in L' evolution creatrice. In Les
deux sources de la morale et de la religion the evolutionary
principle appears as a person - a being creating because he
loves and wishes to be loved. Here is a mucn closer approach
to the personal. A person does not evolve only by dissocia-
tion and differentiation, as if a person were an abstract uni-
versal; a person evolves also by association and organization.
A person is not only active; a person is rational. A person
not only remembers; a person purposes. And an effort createur
directed toward loving and being loved plans and purposes. A
creative effort springing from the desire to love and be
loved, besides implying rationality and purpose, implies a
greater separateness between the creator and the created than
is implied in the evolving of a cosmic urge without purpose.
For love implies a certain other -ness betv/een the lover and
the beloved. ro be sure, Bergson has become more mystical in
his later thought than he was in his earlier, and the mystic
is inclined to define love as absorption. But even to the
mystic, and especially to a moral mystic such as Bergson, a
certain separateness subsists between the creator and the cre-
ated. If the two are to be united by love, there must remain
a certain separateness. Moreover, a moral union Dy love sig-
nifies snaring a purpose.
Love is a concept in that it stands for a meaning. But
its meaning is not an artificial view of reality. Its meaning
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need not even be fixed. We can entertain at first a narrow
concept of love without being bound to the narrowness forever
or being obliged to say that what we first meant was not love.
Love is an intellectual concept but it is also an open growing
intuition of a growing reality.
If Bergson really does recognize that reality is con-
scious personality, as he seems to do in accepting the intui-
tions of mysticism in Les deux sources de la morale et de la
religion
,
he can admit that we reach reality both by intellect
and by intuition, and he can admit that human persons and the
supreme person can entertain a purpose without utterly closing
the future. For consciousness is both intellect and intuition,
both reason and will. And, though not entirely clearly, Berg-
son seems to admit that principles of reason are given in real-
ity itself. If we vi ew reality as a person who is forever act-
ing, but always acting necessarily according to principles of
reason within itself, we seem justified in concluding that all .
concepts are not static but are endowed with the developmental
force of conscious activity. Of such concepts love is an
example. These concepts need not be always artificial patterns
bur may be part of the moving reality. Such a view would admit
that there is a growing purpose in the world and would complete
its real identity. The purpose v/ould simply mean for Bergson's
metaphysics that uod can mean love without having tne boundaries
of love artificially fixed by its past history.
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And if we can admit enougn purpose in tne world to give
meaning to the effort and creation of will, without static
immobility and necessity, wnicn Bergson rightly denies as the
/
ground of reality, we can intuit a real identity in 1 1 elan
and in ourselves. The identity of persons is grounded in
memory and purpose, in will and reason.
Bergson's hope tnat consciousness may overcome tne ob-
stacle of death may mean that consciousness may at last over-
come matter and exist only as a temporal process, or it may
mean that consciousness may learn to adapt matter to its pur-
poses so successfully tnat one conscious being may be forever
associated witn one physical organism continuously being re-
newed. Ii we are to accept tne former suggestion, we turn
more toward the absolutistic type of thougnt
.
The overcoming
of deatn would be a reabsorption into 1 e'lan originel ; it
would be a reunion of tne individual ( rndividualized by matter
with the ineffable whole, after the manner of oriental philos-
ophies. There would be no meaning to tne conscious being be-
cause no intellec Dualizing
,
tnat is, no spatializing. The
immortality would pertain only to 1 eian ; it would mean noth-
ing to the human person. borne spatializing in Bergson's sense
of the word, whicn woulu include Paul's “bodies terrestrial"
and “bodies celestial, is necessary for individual survival.
If we are to accept the second of the two suggestions, we
turn more toward the personal and individualistic type of
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thought. Each relatively separate consciousness would, con-
tinue forever renewing the physical body or material form
which is in part its principle of individuation.
Will as such can have no identity. A will can have no
memory in the generally accepted meaning of the word. What
has never entered clear consciousness as meaning might as well
not he. The final pr onouncement upon the relation between
consciousness ana the unconscious or subconscious must //ait on
much more psychological investigation than has as yet been
carried out. But there is no discoverable difference between
non-existence of anything that might be in the unconscious
and non-meaning 01 what might be in the unconscious. Only
when some meaning is attached to the unconscious, that is,
only when the unconscious has been organized in some meaning-
ful way into the whole of experience by a rational conscious-
ness
,
can the unconscious be a fruitful concept for either
psychology or philosophy. This organizing implies reason,
heason allows the conservation of iaeal values. If the ideal
values are conserved, there is purpose, for an ideal value is
not only a description of what might be; it is an imperative
to work toward the might -be.
/ / /
We have shown that 1 ' elan of devolut i on creatrice can be
characterized in certain definite ways, that is, that there is
meaning in 1 * elan and its activity. *e have shown also tnat
there are strong elements of teleology in the evolutionary
.
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theory based, on un elan vital . During the years oetween the
puolication of devolution creqtrice and tne publication of
Les deux sources de la morale ex d e la religion Bergson has
gone further in the direction of characterizing and person-
alizing 1 1 elan and iurtner toward teleology. He is not in-
terested primarily in the problem of identity and does not
take pains to state clearly the aspects of his maturer thought
that affect identity specifically. He does say, 2
Nous depassor^s ainsi, sans doute, les con-
clusions de "devolution cre'atrice". Nous
avions voulu rester aussi pres que possible
des faits. Npus ne disions rien qui ne put
etre confirme un jour par la biologie. En at-
tendant cette confirmation, nous avions des
re'sultats que la methode philosophique
,
telle
que nous 1‘entendons, nous autorisait a tenir
pour vrais. Ici nous ne sommes plus que dans
le domaine du vraisemblable
.
He does not put forth tne more per sonaris tic and tne more
mystical statements with tne same confidence with wnich he
put forth his theory of creative evolution. d elan as 1 1 amour
is a proposition only "dans le domaine du vraisemblable." In
this same domaine is the supposition that human beings are
"distincts de Dieu, qui est cette energie meme." 3 Bergson's
science seems to lead him to an absolutism of will in which
human beings are differentiations of a primitive impulse. His
faith, or his "methode philosophique," leads him to accept as
vraisemblable a theory of personalism not untinged with
pluralism and purpose.
2~. DSMH, 2 74.
3. DSMH, 276.
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The farther the personalistic aspect of the thought is
pressed, the more closely tne psychological identity of con-
scious beings approaches metaphysical identity and tne more
closely logical identity is embraced by reality, because of
the regulative and normative force of the logical universals
as principles of the consciousness on which psychological
identity is based.
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CONCLUSION
In Bergson's philosophy identity can refer both to logi-
cal suosistents and to existents.
Identity of concepts and identity of objects in nature
(logical identity and phenomenological identity) are relative
to and dependent on identity of consciousness (psychological
identity)
.
Identity of logical subsistents consists in clearness
and distinctness of meaning for a consciousness. The concept
is artificial. It is incommensurable with reality, which is
life and consciousness . Its identity is grounded in the spa-
tializing tendency in consciousness . Its validity depends on
the continued creative and recreative activity of mind and on
memory. Identity of concepts is memory of previous artificial
constructs and a fresh constructing according to the former
plan as remembered. Identity of concepts is an identity of
instrumentality, not an identity regulative or normative in
directing conscious activity.
There is no sharp division between phenomenological and
psychological identity, because every object in nature repre-
sents a certain degree of consciousness. The lower the degree
of consciousness
,
the more nearly the identity of an object of
nature resembles the identity of a concept. It is an artifi-
. J
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.
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cial representation manufactured oy a consciousness in the
interest of its further activity. The higher the degree of
consciousness
,
the more nearly the identity of an object in
nature approaches psychological idenoity, which is unrepre-
sentable and accessible only to an intuition wnich can sym-
pathetically enter into and snare a duration.
Psychological identity is identity of consciousness wnich
endures because it cnanges ceaselessly and creatively and re-
members the changing. Psychological identity is grounded in
memory, but in memory as intuitional, not as a clearly organ-
ized and coherent representation of a past. The more complex
the organism and the more intense the consciousness (the more
the present is the past as a qualitative whole), tne more
truly a conscious being endures. As Bergson nas oecome more
personalistic he has made more place lor purpose in his view,
though he has never openly declared the reality of purpose in
the experience of a conscious Deing. Psychological identity,
in experience, is grounded equally in memory of a past and
purpose for a future. The memory on which Bergson grounds tne
identity is insufficient
.
identity of human beings, even as psychological, is lim-
ited by the fact that tney are members of a closely knit soci-
ety and by the fact tnat both the individuals and society are
manifestations of the absolute, 1 ^lan vital . True psycuologi-
cal identity is accessible only to intuition, and wnen a con-
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scious oeing sinks back into intuition, intuition carries him
beyond his own identity ana reunites him with 1 * elan originel
de la vie .
Only 1‘elan vital has metapny sical or real identity.
That iaentity is not an inference. Inference is by means of
/
concepts. We cannot know the identity of 1 1 elan through the
concept. But when by a tremendous effort of intuition we
move in the deeps of reality, we intuit tne iaentity of the
elan and know tne force tnat nas oeen 1 lowing througn living
beings dining tne ages oi tne past.
The results of natural science suggest the activity of
a force oi tne nature of consciousness. We know tnat one
loice is consciousness wnen in mystical experience we intuit
our own identity and our kinsnip witn reality revealed to us
as a need to love ana oe loved. In sucn moments of intuition
/
we learn that 1 1 eian is working toward the creation of oeings
able to love and worthy of being loved.
Bergson does not, as far as I can find, ever explicitly
aifirm a belief in purpose. But when he attributes to 1 elan
the effort to produce souls worthy of love he is admitting
purpose implicitly. Tne exact details of tne future are not
shaped oy any concepts patterned on tne past, but tne "effort
cre'ateur" that characterizes the life impulse is at least an
effort and creation directed by love. Such a vie-.y admits
that there is a growing purpose in tne world and completes
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its real identity. Tne purpose simply means lor metaphysics
that God can mean love witnout having the boundaries ol' love
ax til icially fixed Dy its past history.
And if we can admit enougn purpose in the world to give
meaning to tne effort and creation of will, without static
immobility and necessity which Bergson rightly rejects as the
/
ground of reality, we can intuit a real identity in 1 1 elan
and in ourselves. The identity of persons is grounded in mem-
ory and purpose. It is identity of no core of being, of no
spatial entity. Purely spatial identity is inconceivable.
Hill as such can have no identity, for identity implies
meaning. It is not clear how much meaning Bergson has in his
later years moved from the artiiicial realm into the flow of
reality. The more he allows for the reality of meaning and
the reality of ideal values, the more closely the psychologi-
cal identity of conscious beings approaches metaphysical iden-
tity and tne more closely logical identity is embraced by real-
ity, because of the regulative and normative force of the
logical universals as principles of the consciousness on which
psychological identity is based.
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SUlulARY
Bergson belongs with the philosophers who stress the
evolutionary and developmental character of reality and with
those who believe that reality is of tne nature of conscious-
ness .
His system is based on his understanding of experience
as dichotomized into the experiencing and the thinking about
the experience, into intuition and intellect, will and rea-
son, time and space, the mobile and the immobile, the free
and the necessary, the open future and the closed future, the
volitional and the logical, the flowing and the static, the
continuous and the discrete, the living and the inert, con-
sciousness and matter. rhe experiencing ana its correlates
are the real; the thinking about experience and its corre-
lates are the artificial, or they are real only by virtue of
their "solidarit^" with the temporal.
It is difficult even for Bergson himself to express his
thought about reality in woras
,
for words belong to the ab-
stract and artificial. Metaphors are used frequently and
changed frequently.
Ultimate reality is l'elan vital
,
which is of the nature
of conscious duration, or which is time as measureless because
non-quant itative qualitative succession. Living beings are
..
-
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thoroughfares through wnich life flows. lhe successive flow
of life is real only for consciousness.
Consciousness is attention primarily as memory, memory
in its broadest sense. Bergson's denial of true purposive-
ness to the effort and creation which characterize conscious-
ness forbids us to experience our self-identity in our inten-
tion as well as in our attention to the flow of our memories.
Intellect has fulfilled an important function in trie
evolution 01 life, but its concepts are artificial and super-
ficial views of reality. Identity of concepts is guaranteed
by the trustworthiness of memory of views taken of reality.
Such validity is really psychological, however, rather tnan
logical. And according to Bergson, identity of concepts does
not reach reality. His view of identity of concepts is in-
fluenced by his view that conscious reality is primarily will
and that the logical principles are givens wnich thwart the
primary reality, even tnough serving as instruments. Berg-
son's view of logical distinct. ions is not entirely clear.
Though spatiality is usually regarded as a given tendency in
temporal reality, concepts are "foreign" to reality. Never-
theless, tney are instruments which serve the purpose of real-
ity and which are necessary preparations for intuition of true
r eality
.
Matter is homogeneous spatiality. Consciousness cuts out
of the homogeneity objects according to the interest of the
-. ;
r
.j j i
.
consciousness. The objects have no shapes belonging to tnem
per se . Identity is not inherent in them. Material objects
have such identity as is assigned them by conscious beings
and the conscious beings assign tne meaning according to their
usefulness as instruments.
Consciousness is independently real in Bergson’s philoso-
phy of duration. The existence of which we are surest is our
own. Conscious beings are oi the nature of reality. They
come nearer than other finites to reaching individuality.
They know their own identity only through a simple act of in-
tuition. This psychological identity is a unity from behind;
it is an identity primarily of memory. It is ceaseless change
and ceaseless effort and creation. It is a unity in multi-
plicity.
The individual is like a cell in organic society out does
not thereiore lose his identity. An individual can even criti
cize and change society. The individual and society alike are
manifestations of the life impulse.
The life impulse alone has metaphysical or real identity.
It is intuited by the mystical soul. This intuition reveals
1 1 elan as love creating in its flow beings able to love and
worthy to be loved. Here purpose surely enters and added to
memory gives the fuller content necessary for real identity.
This purpose by tne standard of love suggests tnat there are
concepts which may nave meaning by which to plan the future
without shutting up the future to repetition of a past.
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Identity may be attributed to concepts, objects in na-
ture, and conscious oeings. Identity of concepts and iden-
tity of objects in nature are relative to and dependent upon
the identity 01 conscious beings. rhe identity of conscious
beings is an identity of ceaseless creative cnange which car-
ries with it memory of the changing. Conscious beings and
society to wnicn tney belong are manifestations of un elan
originel de la vie . Metaphysical identity may be attributed
only to this elan . As Bergson's thought has developed through,
the years, 1 1 elan has become increasingly personal in charac-
ter and human beings have become increasingly separate crea-
tions by 1 * elan .
rhe most difficult points in Bergson's system in regard
to the problem of identity are his voluntarism and his re-
iusal to grant explicitly the reality of purpose and so of
all the ideal values. His later thought allows more reality
to purpose and to ideal values.
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